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This thesis investigates the significance of the notion of fantasia for artists and critics of art 
in Italy during the sixteenth century up to the definitive edition of Giorgio Vasari’s Lives 
(1568). It charts the pre-history of this term in an age before the imagination was attributed 
paramount importance in aesthetics, yet in a time when artists already intensively debated the 
mental powers at play in their practice. In this context, fantasia was a controversial faculty 
and an ambivalent term of ekphrasis. Its appeal as a philosophical concept was counteracted 
by its vexed role in the psychology of perception, where it was sometimes appraised as an 
uncontrollable pictorial agent that accidentally agglomerated mental images. In the wake of 
early Mannerist anti-classicism and its valuation of abnormality, fantasia was reclaimed as an 
irrational creative process allowing for formal renewal. The imagination, however, was not 
yet understood as ‘creative’ in the modern sense. Its potential for innovation was limited to 
the recombination of elements previously observed in nature. As the supremacy of mimesis 
(imitation) was increasingly put into question, the combinatorial model of invention fantasia 
stood for became a major paradigm through which the question of non-naturalistic form was 
problematized. The beliefs attached to fantasia, therefore, structured the early modern 
thinking about the nature of pictorial fiction, the value of artistic innovation and its relation to 
selfhood and subjectivity in the years leading up to the Council of Trent and the 
academisation of art. We argue that fantasia is essential to understanding some of the earliest 
aesthetic reflections on the unconscious dimension of creation and the share of 
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In the final chapter of The Circe (1549), Giambattista Gelli — a Florentine shoemaker and 
man of letters in his spare time — stages a conversation between Odysseus and an elephant. 
The pachyderm is one of Odysseus’s good friends who were metamorphosed into animals by 
the enchantress Circe. The spell will only be broken if Odysseus can persuade his friend that 
human form is preferable to the pachydermic condition. A long argument ensues between 
Odysseus and the elephant about the pros and cons of being human. It culminates in an 
apologia for the human mind. Odysseus maintains that animals lack the highest mental 
faculty necessary for securing knowledge, namely the intellect (intelletto). At this point the 
elephant raises a remarkable objection: don’t animals have imagination (fantasia), and can’t 
the imagination do the same things the intellect does?  
‘’Tis very true’, replies Odysseus, ‘that fantasia is so noble a power that some learned 
men at times wondered whether it could be the same thing as the intellect.’ However, 
Odysseus explains, the imagination’s scope is limited to the material and concrete nature of 
the images it manipulates. Unlike the intellect, it is unable to abstract form from matter. 
Thinking in images, following this view, is a restrictive mode of thinking. Odysseus’s reply 
closes — in cauda venenum — with a stinging remark: 
 
Besides this, although fantasia can compound and divide, like forming a centaur 
from a man and a horse, and feigning a man without feet and without hands, [...] it 
cannot ever imagine anything which it hasn’t seen; if not as a whole, at least in its 
parts.1 
 
                                               
1 Gelli 1967, pp. 277-78. Our translation is inspired by Gelli 1963, pp. 166-7. 
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For the Florentine Gelli, fantasia is bound by the senses. 
Gelli’s remark recalls a reflection in the first of René Descartes’s six Meditations 
(1642) related to the creative potential of dreams, which at the time were explained as 
nocturnal vagaries of the faculty of imagination. The French philosopher shares Gelli’s 
guardedness about the imagination’s freedom, yet he goes even further, drawing a critical 
conclusion for the art of painting: 
 
[T]hings which are represented to us in sleep are like painted representations 
which can only have been formed as the counterparts of something real and true 
[…]. [And] as a matter of fact, painters, even when they study with the greatest 
skill to represent sirens and satyrs by forms the most strange and extraordinary, 
cannot give them natures which are entirely new, but merely make a certain 
medley of the members of different animals.2 
 
In other words, even the most fantastical fictions a painter can devise are always, in the final 
analysis, reducible to known models. Pictorial imagination is imitation disguised — and 
subverted. 
 Both authors seem to share a fundamentally pessimistic premise about the 
imagination’s potential for invention. Such pessimism may not seem all too surprising 
coming from Descartes, whom we readily associate with scepticism and rationalism. But 
what about Gelli? In many ways the Florentine was a typical product of the Renaissance. 
Born the year Columbus set foot on mainland America, he admired Michelangelo and sat for 
Bronzino. He remained a cobbler all his life, spoke with pride of his arte and boasted his 
status as an artisan turned scholar who had elevated himself socially through private study 
and natural intelligence. Provocative and modern, he spearheaded the academic ‘rebellion 
against Latin’.3 He was an active member of the Accademia Fiorentina, a hub of Florentine 
artistic theory, and he belonged to the community of intellectuals who, surrounding Giorgio 
Vasari, fostered the birth of the history of art. In fact, Gelli wrote biographies of artists 
himself. 4 He described the development of painting from Giotto to Michelangelo as a story 
of resurrection and progress in which each artist went ‘one step further than his predecessor’.5 
Would Gelli have agreed with Descartes’s dispiriting scepticism about pictorial creativity? 
Gelli’s and Descartes’s views are neither provocative nor unusual if taken in their 
broader intellectual context. The commonalities in their views stem from a shared 
                                               
2 Descartes 1911, I, Meditation 1, p. 146. 
3 De Gaetano 1976. 
4 On Gelli’s biographies, unpublished in his lifetime, see Mancini 1896, pp. 32-62; Daly Davis 2013, pp. 325-
40; Rubin 1995, pp. 184-5. On Gelli and Bronzino, see De Gaetano 1976, p. 29 and p. 33. 
5 Gelli, Sopra due sonetti del Petrarca (1549), cited in Daly Davis 2013, p. 330. 
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dependence on Aristotle’s doctrine of the inner senses, which shaped the Western tradition of 
psychology up to the early modern period.6 According to this doctrine, the imagination — 
phantasia in Greek, initially translated into Latin as imaginatio — is envisaged as a faculty of 
sense perception, not of creation.7 It was first theorized by Aristotle in De anima book 3 in 
order to explain how some of our perceptual content remains vividly accessible to us 
mentally even when sensation itself has ended, and yet before our memory has recorded the 
information in the form of knowledge. Phantasia is the name given to this intermediate phase 
of perception bridging the gap between the senses and pure thought. Its primary role is to 
receive and store the sensory data, and to serve as an interface for its retrieval by the intellect. 
It acts as a bridge, allowing the (material) sensory input to proceed to the (immaterial) mind, 
and therefore it was regarded as crucial in explaining the kind of discrepancies — such as 
illusions, hallucinations and dreams — that may occur along the way.8 Yet in its original 
Aristotelian makeup, the imagination was not involved in the making of art — Aristotle never 
associated it with the terms of man’s creative activities (techne, poiesis), and phantasia plays 
no role his Poetics and other writings on aesthetics.9  
The scholastic tradition of the Middle Ages took up this Aristotelian model as the 
basis for understanding the human mind.10 Philosophers and physicians sought to harmonize 
it with an organic model of the functions of the body of Galenic derivation, positing that the 
imagination was located in a specific ventricle of the cerebrum. They considered it as a 
bodily function subject to the external factors that affect the humoral fabric of the body, 
including temperature, humidity and nutrition, as well as astral and demonic influence. As an 
inner sense connecting the outer senses (which are always true, in the scholastic tradition) 
with the intellect (the locus of knowledge), phantasia was a dubious intermediary. It was 
deemed highly corruptible, and it often became a scapegoat for mental errors. Accordingly, it 
was held responsible for all kinds of conditions connected to human desire, and typically 
                                               
6 On the context of Descartes’s conception of imagination, see notably Schlutz 2009; Sepper 2016, pp. 27-39. 
7 Some medieval authors propose to distinguish between phantasia and imaginatio/imaginativa. Although this is 
also the case of a small number of scholastic Italian philosophers during the Renaissance, the majority of early 
modern authors use the terms phantasia and imaginatio interchangeably. The artists and art critics of the 
Cinquecento under examination in this dissertation also use them synonimically, and the distinctions made by 
past authors have little or no significance to them. Our study, therefore, treats both terms en bloc. Distinctions 
will be made, however, about the differences in currency, register and connotation between fantasia and 
immaginazione in our Chapter 1. For an important series of discussions on the relation between phantasia and 
imaginatio in the medieval and early modern tradition, see Fattori and Bianchi 1988. 
8 On Aristotle’s view of imagination, see chiefly Modrak 2016, pp. 15-26; Wedin 1988; Schofield 1992, pp. 
249-277; and, for a succinct overview, Labarrière 2014, p. 773. 
9 Sheppard 2014, p. 27; Cocking 1991, p. 21. We will deal later with the use that classical rhetoric made of 
phantasia from Cicero to Pseudo-Longinus, as well as its art-theoretical use in Philostratus. 
10 Useful outlines of the destiny of Aristotle’s doctrine of imagination in the Middle Ages are provided in: 
Karnes 2011; Harvey 1975, passim and esp. pp. 41-53. 
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idleness and melancholy, and occasionally hysteria, lycanthropy and fatigue. 11  Although 
views differ on the details, most thinkers concurred in seeing the imagination as little more 
than ‘a sort of draught-horse of the sensitive soul’, in Mary Carruthers’s words, ‘not even 
given intellectual status’. 12  This conceptual matrix was also the one that informed the 
thinkers of Renaissance Italy at the time of the first elaboration of a theory of the visual arts. 
This conception is evidently a far cry from our contemporary view of the imagination 
as the premier mental power for creative thinking and, as such, an essential attribute of the 
artist. The Romantics have accustomed us to think of the imagination as a productive force 
which ‘strives with all its might to express itself’ (Friedrich Schlegel), while the art critics of 
the nineteenth century elevated it to the status of ‘Queen of the faculties’ (Charles 
Baudelaire). 13  Yet this view, according to many intellectual historians, is ‘a modern 
invention’.14 Volkhard Wels, who provided the most clear-cut account of the ideological shift 
that separates us from the early modern period, proposed that only about 1700 did the 
imagination begin to be seen as a productive faculty able to generate form, and therefore as 
an indispensable agent of artistic creativity. 15  Our ‘imagination’, according to these 
historians, is alien to the Renaissance. 
From this apparent state of affairs, an initial paradox arises. In effect, the early 
historiography of the Renaissance itself was founded on the idea of man’s ‘creative 
imagination’. It should suffice to recall Jules Michelet’s definition of the Renaissance as an 
‘essentially creative’ age, or Jacob Burckhardt’s memorable pages on the ‘power of 
imagination’ of the Italians, to grasp the foundational role that this idea has played in our 
historical understanding of the period.16 In their influential Legende vom Künstler (1934), 
Ernst Kris and Otto Kurz quoted Goethe on the ‘mind’s own power to shape’, and then 
affirmed: ‘This emphasis on the artist’s imagination was also responsible for the new heights 
                                               
11  See the essays collected in Haskell 2011, and the classic Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl 1964. For a 
discussion of fantasia and melancholy in early Cinquecento popular culture, see Faini 2010, pp. 7-31. 
12 Carruthers 2005, p. 1. 
13 Gespräch über die Poesie (1800), cited from Wels 2005, p. 199. Charles Baudelaire, Salon of 1859, in 
Baudelaire 1964, pp. 180 ff. Baudelaire directly opposed fantaisie to imitation: ‘To these doctrinaires, so 
satisfied with nature, an imaginative man would certainly have the right to answer: “[...] Nature is ugly, and I 
prefer the monsters of my imagination [fantaisie] to the triteness of actuality”.’ 
14 I borrow the phrase from Penelope Murray, Introduction to Cocking 1991, pp. vii-xvi, p. viii. Other authors 
who stress the break between the pre-modern ‘perceptual’ imagination and the modern creative/aesthetic 
imagination include: Sheppard 2014, pp. 1-2; Scharold 2012, pp. 55-56; Lyons 2005, p. xi, p. xi; Rosenmeyer 
1986, pp. 197–248. This view is criticised (based chiefly on the late-sixteenth century evidence from Philip 
Sidney) by Klein 1996, pp. 19-62. 
15 Wels 2005, pp. 199-226. On the 18th-century development of the notion of a creative imagination, see Engell 
1981 (for German and English thought) and Maguire 2006 (for French thought). 
16  Michelet 1855, p. 329 (Table of Contents): ‘Sens et portée de la Renaissance: elle est essentiellement 
créatrice, et organisatrice’; Burckhardt 1955, Part IV, Chap I, p. 225: ‘Power of the imagination’ (in 
Burckhardt’s original wording, Die Herrschaft der Phantasie). 
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to which Renaissance art theory raised the artist’s accomplishments’.17 While subsequent 
authors showed more consideration for historical context, an overall ‘psychological slant’ 
cemented itself in the historiography. Perception of the early modern period was slowly 
shaped by this leitmotiv, and the Renaissance became synonymous with imaginativeness. The 
tendency is still discernible in later milestones such as Peter Burke’s Culture and Society in 
Renaissance Italy (1972) and beyond.18 In effect, some of the most remarkable recent essays 
about early modern culture stress the epochal importance of a fictive and productive form of 
thinking subsumed under the term ‘imagination’.19 Could it be that the Renaissance lacked 
the key concept through which we grasp its signal developments? How can we reconcile our 
historiographical proclivities with a deeper insight into the intellectual culture of this period, 
and the conceptual and linguistic tools that effectively informed its understanding of artistic 
production? 
 These questions constitute the initial spark behind the present dissertation. Our project 
is to address them by tracing the destiny of the terms fantasia and immaginazione in the early 
printed art literature of Italy. We take our cue from Gelli’s response to the elephant as well as 
Descartes’s extrapolation, and we attempt to pose the same questions as the first intellectuals 
who reflected theoretically on the figurative arts, in the wave of the major stylistic, technical 
and iconographical transformations that these arts underwent at the turn of the sixteenth 
century. Our main concern, following Descartes’s cue, will be the problem of the invention of 
figures, and specifically the creation of a non-mimetic figure: to what extent, in the 
Cinquecento view, can the mind of the artist form a credible representation of something 
which is not there to be observed? How was this process accounted for, and what was its 
cultural significance? In pursuit of these questions, we elect the terms fantasia and 
immaginazione as a point of departure and a heuristic tool. We hope to propose a short notion 
history (Begriffsgeschichte), chronologically and sociologically focused, which may offer a 
contribution to the larger pre-history — or, as Irmgard Scharold has recently termed it, the 
‘archaeology’ — of the modern notion of the creative imagination.20 We ask, in particular, 
whether the visual arts and the specific problems they raised played a distinctive role in the 
development of the so-called ‘modern’ notion of imagination. 
                                               
17 Kris and Kurz 1979, p. 47. 
18 Burke 1972 (several times retitled, notably as Tradition and Innovation in Renaissance Italy: A Sociological 
Approach). A more meticulous discussion of this psychological slant can be found in the Prologue to Reiss 
1997. 
19 Ramachandran 2015, esp. the statement of thesis p. 15: ‘I argue instead for an alternative genealogy of 
modernity, one that emphasizes the collusion of empiricism and the poetic imagination [...]. The making of the 
modern world, in this book, depends finally on the synoptic energies of the imagination even as its individual 
elements are produced through rational enquiry and action’.  
20 Scharold 2012. On ‘pre-history’ as a research method, see the approach developed by Terence Cave and 
discussed in Holland and Scholar 2009; Cave 1988; Cave 1999. 
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One guiding assumption we should keep in mind throughout this enquiry is that the 
imagination was a highly problematical faculty in the early modern period. As we already 
suggested, of the three mental actors involved in the acquisition of knowledge (sense, 
imagination, intellect/memory), the middleman imagination was the most disputed. It was 
also a controversial power in the realms of medicine, theology and magic. We find a 
revealing illustration of this in the first monograph dedicated specifically to the imagination 
in the early modern period, the De imaginatione (1501) of Gianfrancesco Pico della 
Mirandola (1469-1533), nephew of the more famous Giovanni.21 Gianfrancesco’s text lies 
somewhere between a commentary on Aristotle’s De anima and a theological pamphlet. His 
main concern resides in the way we ought to regulate the imagination — called phantasia and 
imaginatio interchangeably, since the author rejects the distinctions made by previous 
philosophers between these terms — in order to avoid error and sin. Pico acknowledges the 
indispensable character of imagination, yet he emphasizes above all that this sense is 
influenceable (labilis), easily corrupt, and prone to evil since youth. He is particularly 
interested in the evils and diseases of the imagination (malis or morbis imaginationis). He 
lists out their causes and proposes a series of cures. He holds the imagination’s disorders 
responsible for personal as well as societal and religious turmoil. In fact, he claims that every 
philosophical or scientific disagreement among men should be blamed on the imagination.22 
Therefore reason should keep the imagination in check at all times. Only then is there a hope 
that this faculty may be used to elevate oneself closer to God. 
At the threshold of the sixteenth century, Pico’s De imaginatione does not broach the 
question of the artist’s use of the imagination. The book, nevertheless, begins with the 
following reflection: 
 
Phantasia has sometimes been called ‘painting’ [pictura] by Plato, and for the 
reason, I should suppose, that in its sensorium are painted the impressions of 
things, and the various appearances receive form and are fashioned at will, in a 
manner not unlike that in which painters depict the various and dissimilar forms of 
things.23 
 
The soul is home to a painter, imagination, following the traditional trope Pico resorts to in 
his exordium. The metaphor had become particularly ubiquitous in the Renaissance. Writers 
                                               
21 Pico della Mirandola 1971. On this text, see Pappalardo 2014, pp. 99-154; Christophe Bouriau’s commentary 
in Pic de la Mirandole 2005; Park 1984, pp. 16-40; Schmitt 1967. 
22 Pico della Mirandola 1971, chap. 7. The imagination is behind most absurd doctrines, called ‘philosophical 
monsters’ (philosophica monstra). 
23 Pico della Mirandola 1971, chap. 1: ‘Ea ipsa a Platone quandoque pictura appellata est [,,,]’. Caplan translates 
phantasia as ‘Phantasy’ and pictura as ‘picture’. I opt for ‘painting’ following the more recent translation by 
Bouriau (‘peinture’) referenced above. 
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further elaborated on it by describing the mind as a microcosmic gallery of pictures or an 
academy of artists sketching tirelessly. 24  The persistence of this image is, perhaps, an 
invitation to consider the history of the imagination as an integral part of the history of art. In 
any case, it speaks to the abiding affinity between painting and imagination, so strong that the 
one appears almost unthinkable without the other and vice-versa. How would an artist have 
contributed to the debate on the role of imagination? How would a practitioner of painting 
have envisaged the role fantasia plays in his or her practice?  
Surprisingly, a preliminary review of the indices of the earliest Italian theoretical 
treatises on art suggests that imagination played no part at all. The words phantasia and 
imaginatio are entirely absent from both Leon Battista Alberti’s De pictura (1435), his De 
statua and De re aedificatoria (c. 1450). The terms aren’t used in Piero della Francesca’s De 
prospectiva pingendi either.25 One might think that the problem is ill-posed because another 
terminology was employed for mental conception (possible candidates include inventio, 
cogitatio, intellectio, ingenium, mens, poiesis or perhaps disegno). The problem may, 
however, lie elsewhere: in an issue of intellectual culture, of language and, more specifically, 
of register. Both Alberti’s and Piero’s works on the visual arts were produced in Latin; 
although the volgare version may have had precedence — a topic of scholarly debate — they 
were conceived in a Neo-Latin spirit and with a view to latinisation.26 If we look at the 
vernacular side of the picture, however, the situation turns out to be quite different. The 
earliest extant monograph in volgare dedicated to painting, Cennino Cennini’s Libro dell’arte 
(c. 1400), accords a pivotal status to fantasia. The book opens with the claim that painting 
‘requires fantasia and manual dexterity in order to find things not seen’,27 and references to 
pictorial fantasia recur several times, notably when Cennini explains to the young student of 
painting (the implicit addressee of the Libro) that ‘if nature has endowed you with a modicum 
of fantasia, you will end up taking on a style of your own’.28 The Libro’s circulation was 
                                               
24 On the importance of these metaphors, see Bolzoni 2001. 
25 Our research is based on digital versions of the texts. For Piero, we used the following digital version, which 
also contains a useful glossary: della Francesca 2017 (available at 
http://edizionicafoscari.unive.it/media/pdf/book/978-88-6969-091-4/978-88-6969-091-4.pdf). For Alberti, we 
word-searched the texts from Signum, the digital library of the Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa (http://fonti-
sa.sns.it/). For a useful index of bibliography on Alberti’s terms, see Siekiera 2004, pp. 245-313. Note that 
phantasia and imaginatio are also wholly absent from Alberti’s De re aedificatoria. See Lücke 1975. 
26 On the precedence of the volgare in Alberti’s writings on art, the debate was rekindled, notably, by Rocco 
Sinisgalli. See the Introduction to Alberti 2011b. 
27 Cennini 2015, chap. 1, p. 20 (with our emendations). The oft-quoted passage raises considerable philological 
difficulties, not so much for the phrase we quoted as for what immediately follows. Note that Fabio Frezzato’s 
2003 critical edition made a significant correction to the text. The most recent proposals by Klaus Krüger, 
Christiane Kruse, Wolf-Dietrich Löhr are summed up in Seiler 2014, pp. 111-154.  
28 Cennini 2015, chap. 27, p. 47 (with ‘imagination’ for fantasia). 
 20 
extremely limited. 29  Vasari, the preeminent researcher of Tuscan painting, only became 
aware of it in the 1560s and paid little attention to it.30 Nevertheless, a similar prevalence of 
fantasia emerges in Vasari’s vernacular Lives. The term fantasia occurs well over sixty times 
in the biographies, with ten instances in the Life of Michelangelo alone.31  
The verbal gap between, on the one hand, Cennini and Vasari, and Alberti and Piero 
on the other, should alert us to the possibility that phantasia and imaginatio had a different 
destiny in volgare than in Neo-Latin — or ‘Neo-latinising’ — culture. Both the Libro and the 
Lives are good indication that fantasia and immaginazione were key components of the 
artist’s vernacular vocabulary. In fact, while these terms were apparently not central to the 
humanistic approach of an Alberti, they seem to have been ubiquitous in the mouth of 
practitioners and teachers, and a frequent topic of workshop conversation. Vasari, we should 
recall, wanted his book to use ‘the particular words and terms of our arts, rather than the 
pretty ones or those culled from delightful writers’.32 ‘I have written as a painter’, he claimed, 
‘in the language that I speak’.33 
The vernacular culture of the artist to which Vasari pays tribute is the real object of 
the present dissertation. Our aim is chiefly to reconstruct the linguistic and conceptual arsenal 
of those who made art, those who thought with or through art, or were the art works’ 
addressees and first interpreters. As much as possible, we attempt to focus on this specific 
category of locutors — artists, literati admirers or critics of art — which is hard to trace in 
the Middle Ages, but whose voice emerges dramatically in published form in the sixteenth 
century. Therefore, we focus on the terms fantasia and immaginazione in the volgare. Our 
study, in that sense, may be considered an enquiry in what has been called ‘everyday 
psychology’.34 In effect we aim to examine the belief system as well as the linguistic and 
conceptual habits of a demographic which was not specialized in scientific discussions of the 
                                               
29 Alberti had no knowledge of Cennini’s book (he writes in Della pittura, 1,1, that ‘no one else, as far as I 
know, has written of this matter’). Cennini’s Libro emerges (although it distinguishes itself) from the tradition 
of books of recipes, which were not meant to be circulated; on the contrary, they were often kept secret 
(Cerasuolo and Glanville 2016, pp. 14-15). 
30 In a letter to Vasari of February 1564, Borghini says he has ‘the book of Cennini’ and read the ‘good old’ 
(buon vecchio) work in less than a day. Vasari subsequently inserts a mention of it in his biography of Cennini 
in the reedition of the Lives (1568). He describes a single autograph copy in the possession of a certain Giuliano, 
goldsmith of Siena. He regards it as an outdated book of ‘secrets [...] by now universally known’ and obliterates 
its theoretical dimension. Angela Cerasuolo proposed that it was sent unrequested to Vasari by Giuliano in 
1563, while Sandra Costa suggested that Vasari never read it. See Cerasuolo and Glanville 2016, p. 15 and pp. 
30-41; Cerasuolo 2016, pp. 117-125; Fingas and Schüppel 2008, pp. 225-235, esp. pp. 225-6; Costa 2000, pp. 
395-402. 
31  I have used the PDF version of the 1568 Vite provided by Fondazione Memofonte 
(http://www.memofonte.it/ricerche/giorgio-vasari/). 
32 Vasari, Vite 1568, I, 9, also cited in Le Mollé 1988, pp. 9-10. 
33 Vasari, Vite 1550, p. 993. 
34 See Jones 2011, p. 208. The term designates the layman’s set of beliefs, sometimes tacit, about how the mind 
functions and how it is structured. Other authors have used the expressions ‘vernacular psychology’, ‘folk 
psychology’ or ‘popular psychology’.  
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mind. This demographic, nevertheless, had — as we all do — vernacular beliefs about the 
imagination, and suppositions that subtly show in its manners of speaking and, as Lakoff and 
Johnson wrote, in the ‘metaphors it lived by’.35 Our choice grows out of the intuition that 
artists and viewers who engaged with art on a deep level may have had their own specific 
approach to the imagination. In effect, the visual arts per se raise a number of problems and 
questions — having to do with the sourcing of images, with ‘inspiration’, drafting, modelling, 
but also the act of recognizing forms, translating them, making them evident, and the 
difficulty of making an ideal form materialize in the work — which must have prompted 
particular reflections in relation to the questions we have raised so far. For this reason, we 
chiefly seek, as far as the sources allow, to retrieve the point of view of visual thinkers.  
 
Scope of the Present Study 
 
With these questions in mind, the present study undertakes to examine the usage, status and 
conceptual value of the terms fantasia and immaginazione in the nascent art theory of 
sixteenth-century Italy up to the publication of the second and definitive edition of Vasari’s 
Lives in 1568. As far as written sources are concerned, our enquiry primarily encompasses 
the artist-writers and authors of treatises (trattatisti), as well as the early critics of art. The 
key figures in our corpus are Leonardo, Paolo Giovio, Anton Francesco Doni, Paolo Pino, 
Giorgio Vasari, Daniele Barbaro, Benedetto Varchi, Lodovico Dolce, Vincenzo Borghini, 
Benvenuto Cellini and Vincenzo Danti. Meanwhile we include, when useful, considerations 
from later texts by authors such as Gian Paolo Lomazzo, Giovan Battista Armenini, Pirro 
Ligrio, Gregorio Comanini, Romano Alberti and Federico Zuccaro, as well as those 
associated with post-Tridentine criticism, like Giovanni Andrea Gilio and Gabriele Paleotti. 
Yet the focus of our attention lies earlier, in the original formulation of a theory of art in 
volgare during the first two thirds of the sixteenth century. In this regard, the intellectual 
culture of the Accademia Fiorentina, and the crucial debates held there in vernacular and 
involving artists in dialogue with intellectuals and literati such as, in addition to those cited 
above, Giambattista Gelli and Cosimo Bartoli for example, is of primary importance. We 
principally direct our eye to discursive writings, whether theoretical, critical or historical, and 
we incorporate relevant material from the protagonists’ correspondence. We also take into 
account the poetic production of the aforementioned authors and of other practising artists of 
the day, such as Michelangelo and Agnolo Bronzino. Moreover, since the fundamental 
problem we have raised involves figuration, our study is centred around discussions of the 
                                               
35 Lakoff and Johnson 2003. 
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figurative arts, in particular painting and sculpture; questions of architecture arise incidentally 
when we deal with problems of ornament. 
Although we proceed from written sources, we never lose sight of the artistic 
production. Indeed, it is this material which our study ultimately seeks to illuminate. 
Throughout our enquiry, we adduce a range of visual material. It serves different purposes. 
At times it exemplifies or grounds our claims about the beliefs attached to fantasia and the 
aesthetic attitudes that derived from these beliefs. It can also constitute the starting point of 
our enquiry when we undertake to flesh out the visual culture of fantasia — as in Chapter 3, 
an iconographical case study based on a drawing. In our final chapter, we broaden out our 
perspective to include practices of collecting and the display of art. We may sum up the 
methodological journey behind our thesis using the image of the so-called ‘semiotic triangle’ 
of Ogden and Richards (words – concepts – objects).36 Our study moves along the superior 
edges of the semiotic triangle: from an interest in words and terminology (Chapter 1), we 
move to a problematic analysis of the ideas and concepts behind the terms (Chapter 2), and 
finally to an image-based case study (Chapter 3), concluding with a complementary chapter 
on visual culture (Chapter 4). 
We begin by examining the question of language, with Chapter 1 devoted to the 
currency and meanings of the words immaginazione and fantasia in the vernacular parlance 
of painters and sculptors. Our Chapter 2 is devoted to the role they attributed to the 
imagination in their artistic practice. In particular, we examine the question of whether the 
fantasia was understood as creative, how it generated novel images, and how this particular 
understanding of invention related to the contemporaneous understanding of creativity in 
literature, scholarship, the natural sciences and linguistics. Having proposed an historical 
overview of the terminology (Chapter 1) and the conceptual valence of imagination (Chapter 
2), we engage in a case study focused on a drawing by Giorgio Vasari known as the Allegory 
of a Dream (Chatsworth, Devonshire Collection). We show how the beliefs attached to the 
notion of fantasia around 1550 shed light on several elements of this design’s unusual 
iconography; in particular, we propose a new interpretation of the fourth ‘hieroglyph’ drawn 
by Vasari as the illustration of a castello in aria or ‘castle in the air’. Alongside the chimera, 
the centaur, the siren, and the golden mountain, the castle in the air is one of the key 
examples of mental fictions which the philosophical tradition cites as an illustration of the 
imagination’s combinatory creativity. The chapter unfolds, therefore, as a broader study on 
the origin, evolution and literary context of the iconography of the castello in aria. Finally, 
our last chapter takes the question of the imagination from a different perspective by turning 
                                               
36 Ogden and Richards 1994 (originally published in 1923). 
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to the role of the viewer’s imagination in the perception and interpretation of images. We 
propose a case study on pietre paesine, a semi-precious stone whose veining formed 
ambiguous shapes which stimulated the imagination to different interpretations. 
As our chronological starting point, we elect the year 1501, marked by the publication 
of Pico’s De imaginatione. This choice is justified by a number of reasons. In 1977, Martin 
Kemp published a foundational article on the topic of fantasia, ingegno and invenzione in 
fifteenth-century art theory. 37  Kemp’s study, which provides some basis for our own 
approach, covers sources up to 1500; it is advantageous to begin where he left off. The 
opening of the sixteenth century, furthermore, marks the beginning of a new era, both for art 
theory and for our particular topic. Firstly, it coincides with the emergence of printing for the 
diffusion of artistic literature. As Lina Bolzoni has emphasized in her seminal study on the 
culture of memory in the age of the printing press, the printed word heralds an epochal 
change in the establishment of a common arena of discussion; at the same time, it affects the 
very understanding of the mind’s faculties as tools for the acquisition of knowledge.38 This 
moment is particularly critical with regards to art theory, because the turn to printed books 
will be followed by the self-conscious choice of the vernacular as language for setting down 
the principles and history of the visual arts.39 In this context, the new learned terminology for 
designating the mental operations at stake in the making of art (fantasia, immaginazione, 
giudizio, intelletto and disegno, among others) becomes crucial, as we shall discuss in greater 
depth in Chapter 1. Both the rise of the printed trattato d’arte and its wide vernacular 
legibility, then, frame our choice of focusing on the first two thirds of the sixteenth century. 
Lastly, around 1500 the Cinquecento interest in fantasia will take a radical turn following the 
rediscovery of the paintings of the Domus Aurea. As Roland Kanz put it, the unearthing of 
the non-mimetic, outlandish and (vis-à-vis decorum) outrageous designs that were first called 
grotteschi came ‘like a sting in the flesh’ of the established doctrine of imitation.40 Since 
then, most discussions of the grotesque were accompanied by new considerations on the 
imagination, and the notion of fantasia became central to debates on the decorative arts, as 
we shall discuss further on.  
The end point of our study is the year 1568, marked by the publication of the second 
edition of Vasari’s Lives. A number of phenomena arise in the 1560s which would call for a 
diversification of source material and methodologies that could not fit in the present 
                                               
37 Kemp 1977a. 
38 Bolzoni 2001, p. viii. 
39 See Collareta 2003, p. 234; Ruffini 2011, pp. 137-159; and the literature we discuss in the first sections of 
Chapter 1. 
40 Kanz 2008, p. 149. 
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dissertation. Firstly, the increasing clerical concern for art, epitomized by the Council of 
Trent’s decrees on religious imagery (1563), implies both new protagonists in the debate 
(churchmen and Catholic intellectuals) and the rise of a new conception of the image, both 
material and mental, which will durably influence artistic discourse in Italy. 41  This is 
accompanied by a range of claims on the artistic and spiritual use of the imagination, which 
would warrant a separate study.42 On this matter, we refer our reader to the rich scholarship 
that has been developing over the past twenty years on the aesthetics and psychology of the 
Catholic Reform, where the imagination is frequently thematised.43 Secondly, parallel to this, 
the geographical centres of production of artistic theory shift and multiply; after Florence and 
Venice, Milan, Rome, Bologna, Genoa, Haarlem, and Paris gain influence. In the majority of 
these cities, the context in which learned discussions of art take place also changes 
dramatically since the rise of the art academies from 1563 onwards (foundation of Florence’s 
Accademia del Disegno), which enrol artists and offer lectures on a variety of topics, 
including natural philosophy.44 These complex developments, again, lie beyond our scope.45 
The present study examines the debates found in the inceptive stages that led to these later 
developments. In this framework, it follows the centres of emergence of discourse on art 
south of the Alps, focusing on the Florentine context of the Accademia Fiorentina and the 
figures gravitating around the preparation of Vasari’s Lives, while also dealing with the 
Venetian context (chiefly in Chapter 4) and including, when necessary, voices from Rome, 
Faenza, Milan and Bologna. 
The various ruptures of the turn of the sixteenth century evoked above justify our 
choice to begin our enquiry in 1501 and to focus, moreover, on fantasia and immaginazione 
in the everyday volgare of artists. Indeed, the first two thirds of the Cinquecento witness a 
wave of volgarizzamenti (translations into vernacular Italian) of academic philosophy, 
making a range of new knowledge available to people who did not master Latin.46 This 
                                               
41 See the review of literature by Tracy E. Cooper and the essays by Maria H. Loh and Robert W. Gaston in Hall 
and Cooper 2013; Bianchi 2008. 
42 A doctoral thesis on late-sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theories of the imagination and the visual arts by 
Sophie Lenearts is currently in preparation at the Université Catholique de Louvain. I thank the author for 
having kindly shared her research proposal with me. 
43 See de Boer 2000, pp. 243-260; Göttler 2010, esp. pp. 1-30; Melion 2009; de Boer 2013; Dekoninck 2005; 
Baumgarten 2004, esp. the review of literature pp. 127-138. The fifteenth- and sixteenth-century roots of these 
phenomena and their relation to the imagination is treated in the essays by Klaus Krüger and Walter S. Melion 
in Falkenburg, Melion, and Richardson 2007. Taking stock of the recent progress on the Jesuit approach to 
images is: de Boer, Enenkel, and Melion 2016. 
44 See Duro 2002, pp. 88-103; Pevsner 1940. On the Florentine academy, see Meijer and Zangheri 2015; 
Barzman 2000; Waźbiński 1987. 
45 On seventeenth-century discussions of the imagination North of the Alps, see Junius 1996; Nativel 2002, pp. 
217-231; Weststeijn 2008, pp. 123-170; Swan 2003, pp. 61-93; Swan 2003, pp. 560-581; Swan 2015, pp. 216-
237; van Eck 2016 (online publication). 
46 Sgarbi 2016, pp. 317-342; Lines and Refini 2014; Briggs 2003, pp. 99-111; Calzona 2003. 
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coincides with a moment of revival of Aristotelianism in the universities.47 In the field of 
natural philosophy and psychology in particular, Aristotle’s doctrines — often seen through 
the commentaries and synopses of his followers, and chiefly the highly debated Averroes, the 
Parisian scholastics, and the influential Paduan and Bolognese professors such as Nicoletto 
Vernia, Agostino Nifo, Alessandro Achillini and Marcantonio Zimara — represented 
standard knowledge. 48  These doctrines constituted the scientific background which the 
trattatisti of art would be expected to reference, or at least harmonise with, should they aspire 
to wider intellectual credibility. Vis-à-vis the topics we focus on, the traction of Plato’s ideas 
was limited. During the first two thirds of the sixteenth century Platonism was a ‘a kind of 
“countercultural” phenomenon’, as James Hankins put it, and its influence is mostly felt in 
cosmology and the occult sciences. 49  Only in the 1570s did Platonism re-emerge as a 
powerful force.50 Contrary to what one might expect, this Aristotelian context weighs more 
heavily than Ficinism on the authors of our corpus. In view of this, we must side with the 
caveats that have been raised by several authors since the 1980s, and chiefly Horst 
Bredekamp and David Summers, that the place of Neoplatonism in the development of art 
theory is not to be overstressed. 51  This is also true of the Florentine context we shall 
investigate. One of the key Florentine figures who shaped the theoretical basis on which our 
topics were discussed was Benedetto Varchi (1503-1565), lecturer at the Accademia 
Fiorentina — the literary academy sponsored by Cosimo I since 1542 and Florence’s 
epicentre of learned conversation. Varchi was the first university-trained philosopher to take 
the visual arts as his primary object of reflection. He did so in two lectures delivered in 
March 1547 at the academy, in which he notably discussed Michelangelo’s creative process 
as well as the paragone debate, basing his discussion of the latter on an opinion survey of the 
major artists of Florence.52 These 1547 lectures mark a form of precedent; after this date, the 
first wave of vernacular art treatises rolls in with the editio princeps of Alberti’s De pictura 
in the Italian translation of Lodovico Domenichi (1547), Pino’s Dialogo (1548), Doni’s 
Disegno (1549), Biondo’s Della nobilissima pittura (1549), Vasari’s Lives (1550) with its 
                                               
47 Grendler 2002, pp. 267-313; Schmitt 1983.  
48 Bianchi 2007, pp. 49-71; Grendler 2002, pp. 267-313. 
49 Hankins 1998, online publication. 
50 This is tied notably to the establishment, in the 1570s, of the first university chairs in Platonic philosophy at 
Pisa (first held by Francesco de’ Vieri, then Jacopo Mazzoni), Ferrara (Francesco Patrizi) and the Sapienza in 
Rome (Francesco Patrizi after his transferral). 
51 Bredekamp 1986, pp. 39-48; Summers 1987, 1987, pp. 1-2; Falguières 2005, pp. 193-266, section ‘L’horizon 
aristotélicien du XVIe siècle’, pp. 202-206; arguing for the prevalence of Aristotle (and not Plato) up to (and 
including in) Zuccari’s Idea, see Kieft 1989, pp. 355-368. The same conclusion was reached by Anna Magnago 
Lampugnani in a recent thesis on the theories of inspiration and furia and their reception in art literature. See 
Magnago Lampugnani 2018. I am grateful to Anna Magnago Lampugnani for sharing her conclusions with me 
before the submission of her thesis. 
52 Varchi 1550. 
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theoretical preface, and Dolce’s Aretino (1557). 53  Varchi had been educated at the 
distinguished universities of Padua and Bologna, where he had been brought into contact 
with the Aristotelian doctrine of the inner senses. This doctrine had a central place in his own 
research, and he abundantly expounded it before the academy.54 His instigative project of 
theorising the arts was strongly shaped by his will to bring artistic discourse into agreement 
with Aristotelian psychology. For example — in a lecture we shall present more fully in 
Chapter 4 — he proposed to rectify Michelangelo’s vocabulary of the creative process, 
claiming that when Michelangelo wrote that conception took place in the intellect, his 
terminology was inaccurate, because instead of intelletto he should have used the word 
fantasia.55 He concluded his discussion by saying that a sculptor did nothing else but ‘wrest 
things from potentiality,  and turn it into actuality, following the Aristotelians’, and for this 
one needs ‘neither Plato’s Ideas, nor Avicenna’s good demon’. 56  Varchi’s attitude is 
indicative of the kind of pressure that was put on artist-writers to bring their views in line 
with the scientific orthodoxy of the day — a question on which we shall return. It also reveals 
the importance placed on terminology from the 1520s onwards, when the questione della 
lingua was an apple of discord, and language the main marker of identity. 
 
Review of Literature 
 
The Italian Renaissance has long represented a gap in the historical scholarship on the 
imagination. The first landmark study on the topic, Luigi Ambrosi’s great survey titled 
Psicologia della immaginazione (1898), leaped from Dante to Descartes — overlooking even 
the early modern monographs on the imagination.57 The next to undertake an historical study 
of the imagination was the literary scholar Murray W. Bundy, whose ample Theory of 
Imagination in Classical and Mediaeval Thought (1927) remains a precious resource for its 
grounding in the (abundantly quoted) primary sources and the aesthetic questions it raises.58 
Bundy’s scope ended with Dante; unable to deliver the second volume he announced in his 
introduction, his work on the Renaissance came out in an article on England and France and 
another on the original (but uninfluential) conception of imagination of Girolamo 
                                               
53 The princeps of Varchi’s Due lezioni contained an appendix with the letters of the artists he consulted about 
the paragone. 
54 Sgarbi 2015, pp. 1-23. 
55 Varchi 1550, pp. 30-31, also in Barocchi 1971, II, p. 1337. 
56 Varchi 1550, p. 34. 
57 Ambrosi 1898. 
58 Bundy 1927. 
 27 
Fracastoro’s Turrius (1555).59 The overall lack of interest for Renaissance philosophy and the 
scattered nature of the studies caused many subsequent overviews on the history of the 
imagination to overlook the Renaissance entirely — in the mid-1990s Leen Spruit could still 
remark that ‘the general custom is to leap straight from medieval to seventeenth-century 
views on perception’.60 
 Interestingly, we owe the first major specialist article on the Italian Renaissance to a 
young student of philosophy who would (only later) become a major historian of artistic 
theory, namely Robert Klein.61 In the mid-1950s, he described the transcendental imagination 
in Ficino and Bruno, focusing on philosophers and their sources. Klein’s dense philosophical 
map hinted at disegno theory and emblem theory, although he related them to the intellect 
rather than the imagination.62 In the meantime, interest in the psychology of perception led 
Ladendorf, Gombrich and Janson to propose broad cultural histories of imaginative looking.63 
Pivotal contributions next came from literary theorists, notably the chapter devoted to ‘Poetic 
Imagination’ in Baxter Hathaway’s Age of Criticism (1962). Hathaway summed up the 
doctrines of the soul in the Paduan context (Tomitano, Speroni, Fracastoro, Robortelli) and 
the late-century disputations of Mazzoni, while also providing overviews on Barbaro, Gelli 
and Varchi.64 He noted a strong Aristotelian tendency and an ‘almost complete absence of 
interest in Augustine’ even in exegetes of Dante; on the other hand, he was left with the 
suspicion that Renaissance authors say less than they mean.65 Hathaway’s avowed blind spot 
was, in a sense, partly what Eugenio Battisti’s Antirinascimento (1962) attempted to shed 
light on. 66  By thematising irrationality in Cinquecento folklore, Battisti’s book was an 
indirect contribution to our topic. Its ‘archaeology of the fable’, for example, sowed the seeds 
of Carlo Ossola’s ‘story of the favoloso’ in art theory from Doni to Comanini (1971), where 
much information on capriccio and fantasia crops up.67 
In 1964, the imagination dramatically took centre stage in Renaissance art history 
with the publication of the expanded version of Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl’s reading of 
Melancholia I. In a twist of which the original 1923 essay gave no hint, the engraving was 
now interpreted as an illustration of Agrippa von Nettesheim’s Ficino-inspired theory of 
                                               
59 Bundy 1930, pp. 535-545, which touches on a few post-Tridentine Italian critics; Bundy 1941, pp. 236-249. 
60 Spruit 1995, p. 273, n. 17. 
61 Klein 1956, pp. 18-39, esp. pp. 35-36 on art theory.. 
62 Klein 1956, pp. 35-36. 
63 Ladendorf 1960, pp. 21-35; Gombrich 1960, pp. 181-202; Janson 1961, pp. 254-266.  
64 Hathaway 1962, pp. 301-396, esp. pp. 331-340 on Barbaro, Gelli and Varchi. 
65 Hathaway 1962, p. 308: ‘Some theory of imagination must have existed behind all the talk about literary 
feigning or invention, but the connection was usually not made. [...] The mind of the time was host to more 
psychological belief than it was willing to take the time to debate’. 
66 Battisti 2005 (orig. 1962), pp. 57-170. 
67 Ossola 2014 (orig. 1971), pp. 155-217. 
 28 
‘imaginative melancholy’, the first and lowest of three levels of melancholy (imaginative, 
rational, mental) corresponding to a concentration of humor melancholicus in the 
imagination’s ventricle, and accompanied by exceptional, ‘frenzied’ talent in the manual 
arts.68 Meanwhile, Nicole Dacos delivered the foundational study on the rediscovery of the 
grotesque.69 Much of the written sources she assembled revealed fantasia as a running theme 
which was later picked up by scholars to whom we shall return shortly. 
 Thanks to Dacos’s landmark contribution and the last instalment of Paola Barocchi’s 
thematically-organised compilations (1971) came the first attempts at treating fantasia as an 
ad hoc topic of art-historical research.70 The turn occurred in the late 1970s. Martin Kemp 
made the formative contribution in 1977, when he discussed invention, fantasia and ingegno 
in fifteenth-century artistic literature, with a focus on Leonardo, Filarete and Francesco di 
Giorgio Martini.71 He noted the increasing importance of invention and the critical terms 
expressing it  in artistic literature (ingegno, fantasia, immaginazione and invenzione), which 
he fundamentally attributed to the humanistic recovery of classical sources and to the culture 
of Quattrocento Florentine architects.72 He found ‘no unanimity in the usages’ of these terms, 
but could draw the general conclusion that that mimesis remained a fundamental principle 
that invention could never override. On fantasia, Kemp admitted that its introduction into art 
theory was ‘erratic’ and ‘untidy’.73 He insisted, nevertheless, that imagination was attributed 
a ‘vital role’ (the word ‘vital’ is used eight times throughout his essay). Two caveats ought to 
be raised to the conclusions of this otherwise spectacular essay: Kemp overlooked the 
negative connotation of fantasia in Dante and of immaginazione in Leonardo; and he 
dubiously attributed Filarete’s frequent use of fantasia to the Greek literature Filelfo 
introduced to Milan (in fact in the examples adduced Filarete, like Cennini, is making an 
everyday usage of fantasia and fantasticare, already widespread in Florentine song and verse 
in the Trecento, which hardly needs Aristotle or Philostratus to be explained).74 Shortly after 
Kemp’s article appeared a published thesis by Milton Kirchman on Mannerism and 
Imagination (1979), which subsequent scholars copiously ignored.75 Kirchman’s two-part 
                                               
68 Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl 1964, pp. 355-364. 
69 Dacos 1969. In Praz 1975, the chapter ‘Grottesche’, pp. 71-75, was originally a review of Dacos’s book 
published in 1970 under the title ‘Fantasia con metodo’. 
70 Interest in critical terms, furthermore, had been raised by Baxandall 1971, who touched multiple times on 
ingenium, and on imagination on pp. 16, 82-83, 103. 
71 Kemp 1977a. Kemp’s interest certainly stems from his research on Leonardo’s brain studies, notably Kemp 
1971; Kemp 1977b. He furthered his treatment of fantasia in a number of publications, notably Kemp 1989, pp. 
32-53; Kemp 1997, pp. 86-88 and pp. 226-255. 
72 Kemp 1977a, p. 396. 
73 Kemp 1977a, p. 368. 
74 About the verb fare, Kemp pointed elsewhere (p. 397) that it ‘could be applied as readily to pasta as painting’. 
This is the case of some of Filarete’s usages of fantasia as well. 
75 Kirchman 1979. Eugenio Battisti was among the scholars to offer his input. 
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project deals with a re-assessment of Mannerism as historiographical category on the one 
hand and the aesthetic value of imagination in its sixteenth-century intellectual context on the 
other. Although Kirchman barely interrelates the two sections, he is the first to 
simultaneously browse through literary theory and artistic theory with imagination as his 
focus.76 Although art itself does not come under scrutiny and despite other shortcomings, the 
dissertation is valuable for its breadth and emphasis on primary sources.77 
 The next important effort came in Michelangelo and the Language of Art (1981) by 
David Summers, who could build directly on Kemp’s headway.78 Of the thirty five chapters 
devoted to a reconstruction of the key notions in Michelangelo’s unwritten ‘sub-theory’ 
(notably movement, ornament, fantasia, difficoltà, terribilità, licence, ingegno, idea, giudizio 
dell’occhio, proportion, qualitas), the one about fantasia is the longest (40 pp.). 79  The 
author’s achronological and decontextualised approach, deplored by reviewers, proves 
particularly challenging in this very chapter, which sets out to ‘introduce the major themes in 
the development of the idea’ since antiquity. 80  Summers nevertheless assembles an rich 
corpus of quotations related to fantasia. More sensitive than Kemp to the Renaissance’s 
condemnation of imagination, he found that ‘fantasy’ had ‘two sides’: the faculty of image-
association and the vehicle of sin. He associated Michelangelo with the latter, positing that in 
his later life the master reread and assented to Savonarola’s warnings against fantasia.81 
Summers also highlighted the themes of melancholy, love, clouds-figures and the grotesque. 
However, he did not pick up on fantasia’s importance in the literary universe of the burlesque 
poets who dominated the scene through much of Michelangelo’s early career — a burlesque 
universe with which Michelangelo flirted constantly in his own poetry. Finally, the same year 
Salvatore Settis traced the uses of fantasia in commission contracts for paintings.82 
In the meantime in the history of philosophy, building on E. Ruth Harvey’s study of 
the medieval inner senses, Katharine Park devoted a master’s thesis to The Imagination in 
Renaissance Psychology (1974) focusing on medicine and stressing the imagination’s 
purported effects on the body.83 Park and Eckhard Kessler later offered useful syntheses.84 
                                               
76 Kirchman 1979, pp. 99-255. Kirchman notably examines the Renaissance theory of the fable and emblem 
theory in the light of his interest in the imagination. 
77 The absence of bibliography and visual material aside, Kirchman’s  tendency to overlook influential figures, 
notably Vasari, is positively counter-balanced by the abundant selection of passages from rarely cited sources. 
In the face of this abundance, Kirchman is hard-pressed to conclude, noting: ‘We hesitate to overemphasize 
fantasia as the essence of Cinquecento art theory’ (p. 259). 
78 Summers and Kemp were in contact and exchanged findings before the publication of both their papers. 
79 Summers 1981, pp. 103-143 for the chapter titled L’alta fantasia, and see also pp. 203-233. 
80 Summers justified the untidiness by the idea that ‘such lack of system conforms to the historical reality’. See 
in particular the reviews by Charles Hope, Michael Baxandall, Elizabeth Cropper and Charles Dempsey. 
81 Summers 1981, pp. 113-115. 
82 Settis 1981, pp. 706-761. 
83 Park 1974; Harvey 1975 (originally a Ph.D. thesis completed in 1970). 
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The Neoplatonic current Klein had explored was reassessed by Eugenio Garin at the first 
international conference devoted to the pair phantasia-imaginatio in 1988.85 We owe the next 
notable contributions about philosophy and medicine to monographs on Bruno (1997),86 
Ficino and Bruno (2000),87 Van Helmont (2000),88 Fracastoro (2008),89 and Pico (2014).90 
The research group Imagination und Kultur run by Rudolf Behrens between 1999 and 2003 
resulted in five edited volumes, one of which aimed to trace the pre-history of the idea of 
creative-fictional imagination.91 Research groups on fantasy or imagination were also headed 
by Marie-Luce Demonet, Claudia Swan and Koen Vermeir. 
In the history of Italian art, the Venetian context which Summers and Kemp had not 
covered was addressed by Norman E. Land (1986), who discussed the viewer’s fantasia in 
Pietro Aretino’s ekphrases of Titan.92 The discussions that followed came from monographic 
studies. Sharon Fermor thematised fantasia in her treatment of Piero di Cosimo (1993).93 
Franciscus Junius, who accorded an important place to phantasia in his De pictura veterum 
(1637), kindled a more philological interest in Colette Nativel (1996).94 In his monograph on 
Donatello (2002), Ulrich Pfisterer highlighted the place of the term fantasia in the fifteenth-
century ‘discovery’ of the idea of individual style. Pfisterer drew attention to an important 
passage in Giovanni Cavalcanti’s Nuova Opera (1440-7), where an allegory named Fantasia 
explains the varying quality in different artists’ works through astral influences as well as the 
diversità di fantasie that Fantasia had distributed among the artists, in other words their 
characters.95 The early Renaissance notion of fantasia was further put into context in the 
work of Francis Ames-Lewis (2002), Wolf-Dietrich Löhr (2008) and Peter Seiler (2014) with 
particular focus on Cennini.96 Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann, on the other hand, discussed the 
later sixteenth-century notion of fantasia in relation to Arcimboldo. He proposed to 
                                                                                                                                                  
84 Park 1984, pp. 16-40; the essays by Katharine Park and Eckhard Kessler in Park and Daston 2003a. 
85 Garin 1988, pp. 3-20. A guest of honour was Jean Starobinski, who in 1970 had proposed some ‘Jalons pour 
une histoire du concept d’imagination’. See Starobinski 1970. 
86 De Rosa 1997. 
87 Tirinnanzi 2000. 
88 Giglioni 2000. 
89 Pennuto 2008. 
90 Lucia Pappalardo 2014, Turnhout: Brepols, 2014 
91 Dewender and Welt 2003, with a useful article by Christel Meier on psychology in encyclopedias between the 
Middle Ages and the early modern period. For the other volumes, see http://www.ruhr-uni-
bochum.de/imagination/publikationen.htm . 
92 Land 1986, pp. 207-217. Land took up the topic again, notably in Land 1994a, pp. 13-24 and pp. 57-70; Land 
1994b, esp. pp. 90-97 and pp. 101-111. 
93 Fermor 1993, esp. pp. 29-40. Fermor focuses on fantasia in Vasari’s language and in the light of fifteenth-
century criticism. Her assessment that fantasia ‘retained a decidedly rational slant’ is difficult to subscribe to. 
94 Colette Nativel in Junius 1996, pp. 453-80. See also: Nativel 2002, pp. 219-231. More recently, see van Eck 
2016 (online publication); Bussels 2016, pp. 882-892. 
95 Pfisterer 2002a, pp. 56-57, pp. 73-79 and pp. 270-271.  
96  Ames-Lewis 2002, pp. 177-188, on artistic licence and commissions with a focus on Isabella d’Este’s 
correspondence; Löhr 2008a, pp. 148-179, partly translated (and expanded) in Löhr 2008b, pp. 163-190; Löhr 
and Weppelmann 2008; Seiler 2014, pp. 111-154. 
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understand fantasia as a form of wit, a humoristic talent for ‘seeking out and finding out the 
relation between things’.97 
In two important discussions, theories of the imagination were invoked to account for 
or better understand the development of pictorial genres now associated with fantasy. In his 
landmark study on the grotesque, Philippe Morel (1997) mostly turned his attention to the 
Platonic and, especially, magic conception of the imagination as capable of influencing 
matter.98 Morel proposed that the ‘prestige’ the imagination acquired in the fifteenth century 
‘authorised’ the development of an ‘autonomous field’, the grotesque, which emerged ‘at the 
intersection of medieval marginalia culture and the study of ancient décors’.99 Claudia Swan 
(2005) turned to the question of imagination to account for Jacques de Gheyn II’s incessant 
oscillation between naturalism and fiction. In light of the doctrine that witches are none other 
than demonic illusions instilled into the imagination, Swan proposed to consider artistic 
representations of witchcraft as assertions of the artist’s ability to master the phantasia’s 
iconic power.100 
A distinctive approach came from the Bildwissenschaft tradition. In 2000, Klaus 
Krüger and Alessandro Nova suggested that artists, as their practice became gradually 
recognised as an ‘epistemological project’ in its own right, contributed to the development of 
the notion of imagination through their works, ‘competing with philosophers’. 101  This 
postulate was at the core of an original book by Tanja Klemm, which interweaves the 
physiology of image perception and the imagery of perceptual physiology, under the single 




                                               
97 DaCosta Kaufmann 2009, p. 92. The main passages on fantasia are pp. 32-4, 91-4, 191-6. On Comanini’s 
distinction between ‘icastic’ and ‘fantastic’ imitation, see also Giglioni 2010 (online publication). And Oy-
Marra 2008, pp. 99-122. 
98 Morel 1997, esp. pp. 20-22. 
99 Morel 1997, p. 22. Interestingly, however, Morel is reluctant to associate the grotesque with the fantastique. 
Instead he uses the word imaginaire, a modern term employed notably by Jacques Le Goff to denote a set of 
collective myths and images shared by members of a society. See Le Goff 1985. On the other hand, worth 
noting is the (unrelated) statement made by Alessandro Nova in his review of the book: ‘in the renaissance 
philosophical play between immanence an transcendance, the imagination was the faculty which revealed the 
order of things under their appearances’. Nova 1999, p. 120.  
100 Swan 2005, p. 156. 
101 Krüger and Nova 2000, p. 7. In 2008, Marieke J.E. van den Doel defended a thesis on the place of Ficino’s 
theories of the mind and imagination in the iconography of Sandro Botticelli’s Primavera and four of 
Michelagelo’s presentation drawings (Ganymede, the Children’s Bacchanal, the Dream, and the Archers), and 
early modern art literature. Van den Doel concludes that these works are allegories of precise Ficinian 
psychological themes, and that Ficino’s influence can also be deduced from the early historiographers’ emphasis 
on melancholic artists. See van den Doel 2008. 
102 Klemm 2013. The book’s corpus, ranging from the 11th to the early 16th century, has two broad categories: 








1. Fantasia and Immaginazione in the Vernacular of the Artist 
 
 
He who wants to devote himself entirely to painting 
must first have his tongue cut off. 
 
   — Henri Matisse103 
 
 
Sometime between 1487 and 1490 Leonardo inscribed the word imaginatione five times in 
the word-lists he was compiling in the notebook today known as the Codex Trivulzianus (Fig. 
1.1, Fig. 1.2). 104  Considering himself an ‘omo sanza lettere’ (man without humanistic 
education), he was engaging in the exercise of word-compilation, a typically humanistic 
practice which had been recommended by Guarino da Verona and practiced, for example, by 
Boccaccio. In doing so, scholars argue, Leonardo was hoping to increase and refine his 
vocabulary in volgare.105 Aged about 25, he was training himself to become a trattatista.  
Nowhere in the Codex, however, did Leonardo record the word fantasia. This fact is 
both surprising and revealing. As we pointed out in our Introduction, fantasia was used 
repeatedly in Cennini’s manual. Immaginazione, instead, had not yet been employed in the 
literature devoted specifically to painting. In fact, when Leonardo used imaginatione in his 
Trattato della pittura he introduced this critical term in the theory of painting.106 How are we 
to explain Leonardo’s interest in imaginatione and his lexical disregard of fantasia? Was he 
                                               
103 Henri Matisse, Jazz, New York: George Braziller, 1984, pp. 9-10: ‘Qui veut se donner à la peinture doit 
d’abord se faire couper la langue’. 
104 Codex Trivulzianus, Codice no. 2162, Biblioteca Trivulziana (Castello Sforzesco), Milan, fols. 35, 68, 84, 
94, 100 in Marinoni 1944, I. For the new pagination of the manuscript, 1982. In the second of these occurrences, 
Leonardo wrote inmaginatione, a spelling not uncommon in Tuscan authors. It appears, for example, in 
Machiavelli’s manuscript of Lorenzo di Filippo Strozzi’s Pistola fatta per la peste. See Landon 2013, fol. 14v 
of the transcription. In a poem by Vasari, ’nmaginative is used. See Scoti-Bertinelli 1906, p. 272. In Girolamo 
Claricio’s authoritative edition of Petrarch, containing early discussions on Tuscan spelling (the ‘Osseruationi 
della Orthographia uolgare usitata da messer Giouanni Boccaccio’), we find ‘Il dolce Inmaginar’. See Boccaccio 
1521, unpaginated. 
105 In the much-debated question of the function of the Codex Trivulzianus, Augusto Marinoni’s hypothesis is 
now the most widely accepted. See Marinoni and Chastel 1980; Bambach 2003, p. 50; Marani and Piazza 2006; 
Vecce 2000, pp. 96-102.  
106 Our claim is limited to painting; it does not apply the literature on architecture. Francesco di Giorgio Martini 
made interesting use of the terms imaginatione and imaginativa. On this, as well as Filarete’s vocabulary of 
imagination, see Kemp 1977a, pp. 364-366; Riyāḥī 2015, pp. 75-112. 
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deliberately trying to move away from a terminological tradition in order to hone a new 
vocabulary – and if so, why?  
Augusto Marinoni, in his fundamental study on the Codex Trivulzianus, argued that 
Leonardo’s lists reveal his need to overcome the limitations of his native volgare, ‘a living 
language almost restricted to the world of tangible things’; as the omo sanza lettere set out to 
‘meditate and write down his meditations’, he tried to assimilate ever more ‘abstract and 
“incorporeal”’ terms which designate ‘ideas and concepts of which reflective thinking and 
science nourish themselves constantly’.107 In this light, Leonardo seems to have felt the 
necessity, as an aspiring art theorist, to reflect on and to record words related to cognition. 
Immaginazione was among the words worth recording, yet this was not the case of fantasia. 
Imaginatione appears to have possessed qualities which fantasia lacked, despite these two 
words generally acting as synonyms in psychology. 
The present chapter aims to provide an overview of the meanings and uses of these 
two terms in the language of artists. It takes the divergent appraisal of immaginazione and 
fantasia as its starting point and moves on gradually from Leonardo’s late-Quattrocento 
parlance to the writings of the early printed trattatisti up to the middle of the sixteenth 
century. In the course of the analysis, we shall be particularly attentive to the rise of new 
terms, and the significance this has for the articulation of discourse on artistic practice. Of 
particular relevance is the question of whether a limited vocabulary related to mental activity 
impacted the way theorists were able to approach and handle certain theoretical problems, 
and in what way the new problems which presented themselves around 1500 called for a 
terminological expansion. Leonardo’s innovative use of imaginatione may be due to the fact 
that this term afforded new possibilities for thinking about problems which had hitherto been 
ignored in the theory of painting. According to the Sapir-Whorff hypothesis, ‘the background 
linguistic system of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas 
but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the programme and guide for the individual’s mental 
activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade’.108 
While we cannot wholly endorse this view — notably its consequences regarding the 
impossibility of conceptualizing certain issues for lack of appropriate words to describe them 
— we shall borrow its fundamental approach of treating language as an instrument or 
affordance for dealing with practical or intellectual experience. We suggest that many 
                                               
107 Marinoni 1944, I, p. 270-1. 
108 B.L. Whorf & J.B. Carroll, Languages, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings, Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1956, cited in Fromkin 2014, p. 22. Along similar lines, Michael Baxandall proposed that ‘the seeds of much of 
the heavy-footed sixteenth century theoretical discussion of art lie in humanist Latin and its vocabulary having 
categorized creative ability in a certain way. The words were their system.’ Baxandall 1971, p. 17. 
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trattatisti operating in volgare, a language still largely free of theoretical tradition with 
regards to the figurative arts, became aware of the potential shortcomings of their vernacular 
terminology at the threshold of the sixteenth century. These shortcomings were particularly 
acute with regards to problems of imagination. The chapter examines the place of fantasia 
and immaginazione in the mutations of their linguistic system. Taking our cue from 
Leonardo’s word list, we begin with immaginazione. 
 
1.1.  The Currency of Immaginazione between Poetry and Psychology 
 
Leonardo’s inscription of imaginatione in the Codex Trivulzianus suggests that he might 
have been unfamiliar with this word. What currency did imaginatione have at the time? Was 
it an inkhorn term — one as unusual, for example, as the highly Latinizing speculare which 
neighbours it in one of Leonardo’s lists? Italian literature offers evidence in favour of the 
view that imaginatione was not a common word, and that it actually belonged to an elevated 
register. In one dialogue of his Marmi (1552), Anton Francesco Doni stages a conversation 
two pazzi (fools), Carafulla and Ghetto, who discuss the shape of the moon.109 Ghetto tries to 
suggest to his firend that he should ‘imagine’ a line encircling a sphere. Yet he mistakes the 
verb imaginarsi for mangiarsi, to eat, until Carafulla corrects him: 
 
- ... bisogna mangiarsi una linea 
- Mangiarsi, o imaginarsi.110 
 
Elsewhere, Ghetto’s linguistic incompetence leads him to mispronounce other words 
belonging to an elevated register: he says minisperi instead of [h]emisp[h]eri (hemispheres), 
scorzone instead of orizzonte (horizon), and he speaks of timologia (for etimologia).111 
 Is Ghetto’s malapropism an indication that imaginatione belonged to a higher register 
than an uneducated speaker could master? Could it be that Leonardo was only learning this 
word when he inscribed it in the Codex Trivulzianus? Despite the Marmi being chiefly 
humorous, Anna Siekiera’s recent study of the sociolinguistic value of this text proposed that 
Doni’s aim was a ‘rendition of the language of others’ such that ‘we may speak of a real 
                                               
109 Doni 1552, p. 63. It it worth poiting out that this dialogue is a follow-up to the famous conversation between 
Carafulla and Ghetto where the former, only nine years after the publication of Copernicus’s De revolutionibus 
orbium coelestium (1543), conjectures the heliocentric worldview (Doni, I Marmi, p. 18: ‘Il sole non gira, noi 
giriamo’). This passage is regarded as the earliest trace of Copernican heliocentrism in Italy. See Omodeo 2014, 
pp. 25-27. Pietro Daniel Omodeo, Copernicus in the Cultural Debates of the Renaissance, Leiden: Brill, 2014, 
pp. 25-7; Boffito 1898, pp. 23-28. 
110 Doni, I Marmi, I, p. 63. 
111 Doni, I Marmi, I, pp. 62-3 and p. 19. 
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linguistic characterisation of the personages with precise social and cultural physiognomy’.112 
Doni was the proponent of a movement of linguistic naturalism which reacted to Pietro 
Bembo’s advocated classicisation of Tuscan. His prose sought to reflect the ‘uso cotidiano’ 
(everyday usage).113 He was trying to ‘use the words that I heard spoken all day long’, as his 
friend Giambattista Gelli once put it.114 Doni himself gives a certain documentary dimension 
to his Marmi by presenting his text as a collection of conversations overheard near the marble 
steps of Santa Maria del Fiore in Florence (which give the book its title).115 We may regard 
Ghetto’s malapropism on imaginare, then, as a testimony to the fact that the word still 
belonged to a literary of learned register — one comparable to etimologia and emispero with 
which Ghetto also struggles. 
 This is not to say that imaginatione was a scientific term. By the fifteenth century, 
immaginazione was current in Tuscan poetry. The word occurs in Dante and Boccaccio, and 
in popular religious manuals such as the Vita Cristiana of Simone Fidati da Cascia (written in 
1333). 116  It could also be found in Luigi Pulci’s famous Morgante, one of Leonardo’s 
favourite books during his youth.117 In fact it is likely that Leonardo encountered the term 
during his school years already. If we are to believe Vasari, Leonardo received about the 
same education as Botticelli and Bramante: three years of primary school learning reading 
and writing, followed by three years at the so-called abaco focusing on arithmetic.118 As part 
of this programme, he certainly studied the Fior di virtù, a moralising text which probably 
belonged to the core curriculum alongside the Legenda aurea, and which Leonardo recorded 
in his library.119 The very first chapter of this text, titled ‘Dell’amore’, contains an epitome of 
Aristotelian sense perception which mentions the imagination: 
 
                                               
112 Siekiera 2012, p. 60, p. 65. 
113 These are the words of Agnolo Firenzuola in his attempt, in the Ragionamenti, to characterize the ‘natural 
novella’. Cited in Siekiera 2012, p. 46. 
114 Giovan Battista Gelli, dedication of the Sporta (1543), cited in Siekiera 2012, p. 47: ‘Io ho usato quelle 
parole che io ho sentito parlar tutto il giorno [...]’. 
115 Doni, I Marmi, I, pp. 5-7: ‘Darò principio a raccontare le historie udite’. Doni presents himself as a bird 
flying over Florence, able to hear all kinds of conversations and witness stories. 
116 Dante, Vita nuova, 26, 1: ‘Appresso questa vana imaginazione’; Boccaccio, Decameron, Day 2, Novella 1: 
‘Ed in questa immaginazione fermatosi [...]’; Boccaccio, Laberinto d’Amore, no. 249: ‘A te non poterono esser 
note, ne per veduta, ne per immaginazione’. ‘La quiete della anima si è, quando ella adora ed ora sanza varietà 
di varii pensieri e immaginazioni e assalimenti e distrazioni, che soleva avere in quel tempo.’ In the Vita 
cristiana, imagination has a negative connotation. See Simone Fidati da Cascia, La vita cristiana (c. 1333), in 
Levasti 1935, cap. XIII, pp. 637-8, quoted in Stowell 2015, p. 106, n. 149. Stowell misquotes the beginning of 
the citation (‘ora sana varietà’). 
117 Luigi Pulci, Il Morgante, Canto 19, stanza 55: ‘o facea caso l’imaginazione’. 
118 On Leonardo’s education, see notably Kemp and Pallanti 2017, pp. 85-100; Feinberg 2011, pp. 5-32; Kemp 
2006; Arasse 1997, pp. 35-72. 
119 Grendler 1995, 13-16; Grendler 1989, pp. 275-304. The Fior di virtù is recorded in Leonardo’s book lists of 
c. 1495 and c. 1504. See Descendre , pp. 592-595. On the abaco, see Ulivi 2013. 
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Il primo Principio dell’amore discende, e procede da gli occhi, secondo Aristotle 
nel libro d’Anima, di Senso, e Sensato, perche prima la volontà della persona si 
moue per questa conoscenza, poi si mue la memoria, e si conuerte in piacere, e 
dapoi l’imaginatione delle cose, c’hà pensate per qu[e]sto tal piacere, si muoue.120 
 
The teacher’s declamation of these lines in the abaco school were certainly Leonardo’s first 
encounter with the notion of immaginazione as a faculty of the mind. He must have been six 
or seven. 
 By the sixteenth century, painters came in ever closer contact with the vocabulary of 
imagination as the study of poetry became fashionable among aspiring pictores docti. The 
reading of the tre coronati certainly played an important role, especially because these poets 
were learned by heart. Varchi once said that Bronzino had ‘tutto Dante nella memoria’.121 
Michelangelo featured as an authority on Dante in Donato Giannotti’s Dialogi (1546).122 We 
know that Bronzino and Pontormo quarreled over the exact wording of verses by Petrarch 
because they both claimed to know the verses by heart (it was Pontormo who got it 
wrong).123 The only book recorded in the inventory made at Benvenuto Cellini’s death is a 
‘Dante in penna’.124 These poetic readings, in particular the Divine Comedy, familiarized this 
generation with a more elaborate terminology of vision and imagination.  
In addition to this lexical immersion, the study of poetry also led to rudimentary 
insights into psychology. Renaissance commentaries on the Comedy, for example, gloss on 
passages such as ‘O imaginativa’ (Purgatorio 17, 13) or ‘O alta fantasia’ (Paradiso 33, 142) 
by expounding the different faculties of the mind. 125  A reader of Cristoforo Landino’s 
commentary, for example, would have learned that the front part of the head is the seat of a 
faculty (potentia) called apprensiua or senso commune or phantasia, the middle one called 
imaginatiua or cogitatiua or estimatiua, and in the rear memoria, and that by imaginatiua 
Dante refers to this middle power which judges the truth or falsity of phantasms.126 The 
                                               
120 Fior di virtu historiato vtilissimo a fanciulli  1628, Cap. I: Dell’amore, p. 2v. We cite from the earliest 
edition we were able to consult; it seems this text remained very stable over time. The passage could be 
translated as: ‘The first cause of love stems from and begins in the eyes, according to Aristotle in his book 
on the soul, the senses and the sensed, because the primordal will of a person is moved by this 
cognisance, which then moves the memory, and is converted into pleasure, and from there the 
imagination of the things cognised through this pleasure is also moved.’ 
121 Letter by Benedetto Varchi cited in Beuzelin 2013, p. 80. 
122 Rubin 1995, p. 167. For the dialogue, see Giannotti 1939. 
123 Beuzelin 2013, p. 79. 
124 Cole 2002b,p. 7 and n. 18 p. 170. One author noted that Cellini was a fine connoisseur of Dante. 
125 The most relevant passages of the Divine Comedy are: ‘Alta fantasia chi mancó possa’ in Parad. 33, v. 142; 
‘Poi piovve dentro a l’alta fantasia’ in Purg. 17, 25; ‘O imaginativa che ne rube’ in Purg. 17, v. 13-14; ‘e se le 
fantasie nostre son basse’ in Parad. 10, v. 46; ‘ne fu per fantasia già mai compreso’ in Parad. 19, v. 9; ‘che la 
fantasia mea nol mi ridisce’ in Parad. 24, v. 24. 
126 Alighieri 1529, unpaginated, ad Purg. 13, 17: ‘Et nella prima parte del capo pongono una porentia, laqual 
chiamano apprensiua, o phantasia, o senso commune. Nella seconda pongono imaginatiua, o cogitatiua, o 
estimatiua. La tertia memoria. Et in questo luogo pone il poeta la imaginatiua per la estimatiua, el cui officio e 
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exposition is cursory yet particularly sensitive to terminology, as Landino attempts to fit 
Dante’s choice of words into a scientific framework. His association of fantasia with the 
common sense rather than imagination is unusual; most specialists (including Gianfrancesco 
Pico, Varchi and Gelli) take fantasia and immaginazione as synonyms. A later commentary 
by Alessandro Vellutello proposes that Dante sometimes uses fantasia and imaginativa with 
equal value.127 As for the content of Dante’s text, it shows the imagination in a bad light. 
Dante regards it as an imperfect faculty tied to the body which, in its materiality, prevents the 
intellect from ascending to the higher spheres.128 The fantasia’s weakness causes the poet to 
fail in his quest.129 ‘Our fantasie are too low for such a height’, writes Dante, ‘for no eye has 
ever seen intensity beyond the sun’s’; at this level the alta fantasia ‘failed power’.130 
 Mid-sixteenth-century artists are more likely to have been in contact with the 
terminology of imagination through these literary sources than directly through scientific 
literature. Trattatisti aside, few Cinquecento painters seem to have read about psychology. As 
far as we know, Rosso Fiorentino owned books by Pliny and Vitruvius.131 The only book 
which we know with certainty to have belonged to Vasari is a commented edition of Petrarch, 
and he probably owned a small library focused on vernacular poetry, and including Pliny and 
Vitruvius.132 Bronzino mostly read verse; as a reader of Latin, he owned a copy of the 
Supplementum Chronicarum (a history book), but we do not know whether he possessed 
scholarship on perception or the mind.133 The prevalence of vernacular poetry in the libraries 
of artists who came of age in the 1510s and 1520s distinguishes them from their Quattrocento 
forefathers, who were more easily drawn to medieval encyclopaedias. Lorenzo Ghiberti had 
traditional knowledge of faculty psychology, which he drew from his reading of Roger 
Bacon’s Perspectiva.134  It seems that Andrea Mantegna possessed a copy of Vincent of 
                                                                                                                                                  
aiutato dalla ragione considerare le cose, che el senso comune riceuendole de gl[’] exteriori, ha collocate nella 
imaginatione, che e el secondo senso, & giudicate se sono uere, o false, o buone, o ree.’  
127 Alighieri 1544, unpaginated, ad Purg. 17, 13: ‘Esclama adunque a la sua imaginatiua, laqual è uno de gli 
interiori sentimenti, intesa nondimeno per la cogitatiua, o uogliamo dire essistimatiua, perche al poeta è 
conceduto alcuna uolta di torre una per un[’]altra potentia de l[’]anima, come ueggiamo ancora che fa qui di 
sotto de la fantasia, oue dice, Piouue dentro a l[’]alta fantasia Vn crucifisso e cet. Laqual intende per questa 
medesima’. 
128 Convivio, 3, 4, 9-11, in Alighieri 1964, vol. 1, p. 294. 
129 See Rak 1984, pp. 793-794, compares the Commedia to a ‘scala di fantasticazioni’. 
130 Paradiso 10, v. 46 and 33, v. 142, cited from: Alighieri 2011.  
131 Franklin 1994, pp. 314-15. 
132 Rubin 1995, pp. 150-1. On the books usually possessed by Florentines, see Ciappelli 2014 pp. 30-53 (chap. 
2: ‘Books and Readings in Florence in the 15th Century’); Bec 1984; Christian Bec, Les livres des Florentins, 
Florence: Olschki, 1984;  
133 Cropper 2004, p. 17. 
134  Ghiberti 1998, 3.6.1-3.7.1, pp. 112-118. Ghiberti’s discussion mentions fantasia, imaginatione and 
imaginativa, however Ghiberti does not use these notions to make any point about art or artistic practice.  
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Beauvais’s Speculum naturale, a book which discusses the imagination. 135  Leonardo, to 
whom we shall come later, probably learned about psychology from the work of Mondino de’ 
Luzzi (c. 1270-1326). It is worth noting, however, that some public libraries were available to 
painters, such as that of the convent of San Marco which opened in 1457;136 Vasari would 
have had access to the rich library of his friend and mentor Vincenzo Borghini, which 
contained the works of Aristotle and his commentators, and multiple encyclopedias.137 As we 
shall discuss in greater detail later on, the terminology of imagination also cropped up in 
classic humanistic texts which were widely referenced by trattatisti, such as Quintilian’s 
Institutio Oratoria. 
 On what other occasions could an artist come into contact with technical knowledge 
on faculty psychology? The artists who frequented the Accademia Fiorentina in its early 
years would have been exposed to discussions of the soul by Varchi, Gelli and Bartoli.138 
Finally, one area of the artist’s education worth considering is anatomy. Would brain 
anatomy be part of an artist’s training in the Cinquecento? The focus of an artist’s anatomical 
training lied in muscular and osteologic structures.139 There was generally little or no interest 
in the internal organs, and flayed bodies were more often kept together than dismembered.140 
Baccio Bandinelli once claimed he knew how to dissect the brain, however he was writing to 
a potential patron and might have bluffed in order to impress.141 As for artists who read about 
anatomy, the inner senses are discussed in a number of Latin printed manuals.142 It is worth 
noting, however, that by 1543 Vesalius launched a serious attack against the doctrine of the 
three ventricles, described as ‘falsehoods’ of people who do not observe nature; the words 
                                               
135 The book is listed in an inventory of the Mantegna family library by Andrea’s son Ludovico four years after 
the master’s death. Signorini 1996, p. 114. Imagination is discussed in Beauvais 1494, Lib. 25, Cap. 197 and 
198, p. 311r. 
136 Beuzelin 2013, pp. 81-2.  
137 Testaverde Matteini 1983, pp. 611-643. 
138 The inner senses were a frequent topic. See for example Giambattista Gelli’s Capricci del bottaio (1548), a 
cooper’s conversation with his own soul. For an example of poetic exegesis digressing toward a discussion of 
the soul, see Benedetto Varchi’s lecture on the first Sunday of December 1543 sopra la seconda parte del 
venticinquesimo canto del Purgatorio, which was titled Sulla creazione ed infusione dell’anima razionale. The 
discussion of fantasia contained therein can be found in: Varchi 1858, Vol. 2, p. 319. 
139 Jacobs 2005, chap. 3. Other aspects of the function of anatomy for artists are the focus of recent publications: 
Cuir 2016; Stoichita and Portmann 2013. Exhibitions devoted to the question have also given rise to relevant 
books and catalogues, among which: Laurenza 2012; Cazort, Kornell, and Roberts 1996. On Renaissance 
anatomy more generally (without specific emphasis on its function for artistic pedagogy), see: Hallam 2016; 
Kusukawa 2011; Bohde 2003, pp. 10-47; Carlino 1999; French 1999; Cunningham 1997; Sawday 1995. For a 
recent overview, see Pierguidi 2017, pp. 33-64. See also the references quoted in the course of my discussion. 
140 Jacobs 2002, pp. 437-8. 
141 Bambach 2000-2018, http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/anat/hd_anat.htm (October 2002), consulted on 25 
August 2017. See also Mayor 1984, p. 49 (chap. ‘Artists as Dissectors’). 
142 See for example 1521, p. CCCCXXVIIIr; Berengario da Carpi 1518; Benedetto 1527, Liber IIII, Cap. X: De 
cauis cerebri, p. I.iii(r). For an overview, see Singer 1956, pp. 261–274.  
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imaginativa and phantasia are wholly absent from the Fabrica’s account.143 Thus it seems 
unlikely that the study of anatomy would have constituted a major source of information 
about imagination for artists. 
 One figure, however, stands out for his exceptional interest in neurology and the 
theoretical and aesthetic conclusions he drew from it, namely Leonardo. Of all Renaissance 
artists, Leonardo had the deepest interest in the physiology of perception, and it comes as no 
surprise that he was the first to position imaginatione in the theory of painting. For these 
reasons, he will be the focus of our next section. As we shall see, however, Leonardo’s 
idiosyncratic views are not representative of the broader sixteenth-century attitude to 
fantasia. On the contrary, his approach will, in many ways, be the one against which the early 
Cinquecento will react. As such, Leonardo should represent a prelude to our discussion. 
 
1.2.  Imaginatione in Leonardo 
 
Studying imagination from a terminological perspective is particularly fruitful in the case of 
Leonardo. Indeed, we find a curious ‘terminological divide’ in Leonardo’s work on the inner 
senses, running, to put it simply, between Leonardo the anatomist and Leonardo the art 
theorist. The art theorist uses imaginatione as a cornerstone of his paragone argument for the 
superiority of painting over poetry. Leonardo the anatomist, on the other hand, engaged in 
fascinating speculation about the shape and function of the brain and its so-called 
‘ventricles’. Yet the anatomist never uses the terms imaginatione or fantasia to refer to the 
functions of these ventricles. This is the case even if Leonardo’s paragone arguments are tied 
to, and sometimes dependent on his understanding of the inner senses. How can we explain 
this divide? In this section, we attempt to address this question by presenting the peculiarities 
of Leonardo’s views on imagination, starting from his anatomy and then moving on to his art 
theory.  
 Leonardo made a series of drawings of man’s cerebrum, starting around 1487 and 
coming back to this question around 1493-4 and again around 1504-7. He may have dissected 
a human brain around 1508-9; in any case he did anatomize the head of an ox, on which he 
used an unprecedented method of injecting wax into the brain to reveal its cavities. This 
experiment led Leonardo to believe that the front ventricle was split into two horn-like bodies 
pointing backwards (Fig. 1.3). It is worth underlining the immensely innovative character of 
                                               
143 Vesalius’s only mention of imagination is in his summary of the doctrine he disproves, according to which a 
‘second ventricle’ is able ‘to imagine, reason, and think about the object of perception’. He recounts learning 
this as a student by copying a brain cell diagram ‘from I don’t know which Margarita philosophica’ — 
certainly Gregor Reisch’s (1503). See the translation in Catani and Sandrone 2015, p. 48. 
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Leonardo’s use of drawing here: not only did he sketch with unprecedented naturalism in the 
field of anatomy, but he also pioneered key means of anatomical representation, including 
cross-sections, exploded figures and transparencies.  
 Yet for all the meticulous observation his work implies, Leonardo never questioned 
the time-honoured doctrine of the ventricles which Vesalius would shatter few years later. 
Leonardo integrated ventricles in all of his representations of the cranial nerves.144 He mainly 
assigned three faculties to them: imprensiva at the front, senso commune in the middle and 
memoria at the back.145 ‘Surrounding objects send their images to the senses’, Leonardo 
explains in another sheet, ‘and the senses transfer them to the imprensiva. The imprensiva 
sends them to the senso comune, and from there they are established in the memory, and are 
there more or less retained according to the importance or power given to the object.’146 He 
once proposed a model which collocated two powers in the same ventricle: intelletto 
cohabitated with imprensiva at the front and volonta with senso commune in the middle 
(visible on the section of the head seen from above at the centre of Fig. 1.4).147  
 The term imprensiva is unusual. It has long been regarded as Leonardo’s own 
coinage.148 In fact, it is more likely that Leonardo was referring to the apprensiva. As we 
have seen in Landino’s commentary quoted above, apprensiva was another name of the 
perceptual or ‘apprehensive’ sense located in the front ventricle.149 Leonardo generally spells 
                                               
144 The main drawings are: W12626r (c. 1485-90); W12627r (c. 1485-90); W12603r and v (c. 1493-4); the 
‘Weimar sheet’ in Schlossmuseum Weimar (c. 1504-6); W19127r (c. 1508-9); W12602r (1509-10); and 
W19070v. See Keele and Pedretti 1978-80. 
145 For an overview covering the most important drawings of Leonardo’s studies on the inner senses, see Keele 
1983, pp. 60-69. A more concise overview can be found in Kemp 2006, pp. 107-110. However Kemp’s 
indication of ‘fantasia’ in his caption to fig. 15 (W12603r) is misleading. The original drawing marks the 
ventricles with three letters, ‘o’, ‘m’, ‘n’, which are devoid of caption. 
146 C.A. 245 cited from Keele 1983, pp. 67-68. 
147 In W12626r, dated c. 1487. 
148 See Ackerman 1978, p. 139 (‘neither Kemp nor I have found the concept of the imprensiva in other writers’); 
Keele 1983, p. 62 (‘the term was introduced by Leonardo himself’); Farago 1992, p. 181 n. 6 (‘a term probably 
coined by Leonardo’); Fehrenbach 2015, passim (‘Leonardo’s creation of a new psychological agent, the so-
called impressiva’). In 2005, Monica Azzolini proposed that Leonardo borrowed the term impressiva from 
Pecham’s Perspectiva. In this text, impressiva had a wholly different meaning, that of an image impressed on 
the eye. See Azzolini 2005, p. 505. 
149  Note also that a typographical error in the 1478 edition of Mundinus’s Anathomia (a book known to 
Leonardo) reads ‘apprehensia’ in relation to the first inner sense of perception. See de’ Luzzi 1478, pp. 42-3: 
‘[...] imaginativa quae est apprehensia’, cited in Park 1974, p. 38 n. 1, who suggests to correct as ‘apprehensio’. 
Leonardo, who read the Anathomia, may have misunderstood this passage. The term apprehensiva was used in 
the psychological writings of influential authors, such as Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and John of La 
Rochelle. In Berengario’s Isagoge breves, the senses are: apprehensiva (=sensus communis), cogitativa, 
memoria (Park 1974, p. 40). One passage in Thomas Aquinas contrasts vis apprehensiva, voluntas and vis 
motiva (Summa contra Gentiles 3, 10). This may explain why in W12626r Leonardo placed volunta in the 
second ventricle, and joined imprensiva and intelletto in the first ventricle. Furthermore in Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa theologia I, q. 83, a. 4, resp., intellectus is said to belong to apprehensiva intellectiva, one of the 
potentiae intellectivae. I cite both Thomist passages from Alighieri 1970, vol. 2 , pp. 431-434 (commentary ad 
Purg. 18, 59-63). Azzolini also noticed the presence of apprehensiva in medical theories. She proposed that 
Leonardo ‘fused’ the term impressiva from Pecham’s optics with medieval physiology. See Azzolini 2005, p. 
508. 
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it inprensiua. This could be a case of Tuscan pronunciation of the in- compound as a nasal 
vowel (/ɛ/̃) hardly distinguishable from the a.150 Dante’s Divine Comedy has an occurrence of 
apprensiva (Purg. 18, 22) which in some manuscripts of the textual tradition was spelled 
‘inprensiua’.151 Furthermore, Leonardo regarded this front ventricle as the first to retain the 
sensory impressions, being ‘impressed’ by them like wax by a seal, as many scholars have 
pointed out.152 He may have confused the spelling when the term was explained to him 
orally, not unlike the copyists of the Commedia working from dictation. Leonardo’s unusual 
spelling would thus indicate that he did not owe his knowledge of psychology exclusively to 
books, but that he may have learned from discussing with the learned community in Florence, 
certainly the savants at the Medici court.153 
 One of the originalities of Leonardo’s ventricle allocation is the position of the senso 
commune, which he places in the middle ventricle instead of the front. This choice seems to 
depart from the tradition.154 Furthermore, it allowed Leonardo to propose that the olfactory 
and auditory nerves be connected directly to the senso commune without passing through the 
imprensiva, a model we can see in W12626r (Fig. 1.4) and W12627r (Fig. 1.6). This model 
seems to be unique to Leonardo’s brain anatomy, and it constitutes perhaps his most original 
contribution. He did not hold this view throughout his life, as we can see from another, more 
traditional proposal where he connected the auditory nerves to the front ventricle in the same 
way as the optical nerve (Fig. 1.5, to be contrasted with Fig. 1.6). It also contradicts his 
explanation of sense perception in the passage from C.A. 245 quoted above. How can we 
account for this new idea? 
 In this unusual arrangement (Fig. 1.4 and Fig. 1.6), the imprensiva ventricle serves 
exclusively the sense of sight. Among the many possible reasons behind Leonardo’s choice, 
the paramount place he attributed to sight (virtu vissiva) over all of the other senses certainly 
played a key role.155 For Leonardo, sight is the cornerstone of scientific enquiry. It is man’s 
                                               
150 Sampson 1999, p. 247, proposes that ‘nasal vowels were much more widespread in earlier times than 
nowadays’ in Italo-Romance dialects of Northern Italy. 
151 Cortona, Biblioteca Comunale e dell’Accademia Etrusca, 88 (probably of the first half of the fourteenth 
century), Purgatorio 18, 22, cited in Alighieri 1966, p. 297. 
152 Most recently Fehrenbach 2015, p. 73. 
153 On Leonardo’s relationship to the intellectuals at the court of Cosimo il Vecchio and in fifteenth-century 
Florence more generally, see in particular Feinberg 2011. 
154 Even though Mondino’s Anathomia placed apprehensiva at the ‘front’ of the first ventricle, and sensus 
communis in the ‘middle’ of the same first ventricle, a passage Leonardo may have misread. Leonardo 
references Mundinus. See Kemp 1971, p. 119, and records in his booklist a copy of Ketham’s Fasciculus 
medicinae, a compilation which contains Mundinus’s Anathomia. 
155 Another reason may be the anatomical centrality Leonardo attributed to the senso commune. Leonardo was 
persuaded that the senso commune, as the ‘captain’ of the nervous system, was located at the centre of the skull, 
and that its position could be calculated precisely at the intersection of two perpendicular straight lines 
intersecting the skull in its middle. See Kemp 1971, p. 118. Thus connecting the ears straight to the senso 
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principal means for apprehending the complexity of nature because the eye, ‘prince of 
mathematics’ and ‘senso massimo’,156 is more reliable and more accurate than any other 
sense.157 The eye delivers the information with more immediacy and more quickly thanks to 
its greater proximity with the first ventricle: ‘the fastest sense is the one which is closest to 
the imprensiva, namely the eye, superior and prince of the other senses.’158 Thus it is not 
surprising to read elsewhere that ‘the imprensiva is quicker [in responding] than the 
judgement’, which is located in the senso commune. 159  In other words, the imprensiva, 
affords the eye a fast-track and privileged access to the mind, whilst the other senses all pour 
their information into the shared senso commune. The quality of their input is so inferior that 
for Leonardo ‘it is a sin against nature to wish to transmit by the ear what should be 
transmitted by the eye’.160 
 Where does imagination fit into this framework? As we have said, Leonardo never 
uses imaginatione or fantasia in his cerebral anatomy. A Renaissance savant placed in front 
of Leonardo’s drawings — although it is doubtful that this ever happened in Leonardo’s 
lifetime — would probably have interpreted them in the following way: a charitable 
‘Mondinian’, for example, would have argued that imprensiva was Leonardo’s umbrella-term 
for phantasia and imaginativa taken together; most other physicians, in particular partisans of 
Reichs’s Margarita or Hundt’s Antropologium, would have suggested that Leonardo forgot 
to indicate the imaginative powers (fantasia, imaginativa) at the rear of the senso commune 
— being, however, baffled by his relocation of senso commune in the middle ventricle.161 
 Yet Leonardo uses imaginatione in a wholly different sense. To understand it, we 
must cross the ‘terminological divide’ and move from his anatomy to his aesthetics — 
although, as we shall see, these two fields of enquiry are wholly inter-dependent. 
Imaginatione is introduced in the notes on the paragone between painting and poetry.162 In 
                                                                                                                                                  
commune may have seemed more ‘organic’ to Leonardo; indeed, notice how in W12603r (Fig. 1.5) Leonardo 
had to draw the ears too forward on the head due to the need to connect them to the front ventricle. 
156 Trattato (Cod. Urb.), ch. 22 in Farago 1992, p. 218. 
157 According to Azzolini 2005, p. 507, Leonardo may have sided with some fifteenth-century anatomists who 
believed that the fact that the eyes occupy the highest position in the body is evidence for the supremacy of sight 
over the other senses 
158 C.A. 245, cited from Azzolini 2005, p. 507: ‘Quello senso più veloce nel suo officio, il quale è più vicino alla 
impressiva, è l’occhio superiore e principe delli altri’.  
159 Ms. A fol. 26v, cited from da Vinci 2001, p. 67. 
160 Trattato (Cod. Urb.), chap. 23, in Farago 1992, p. 225. 
161 Our speculation is based on Reisch’s and Hundt’s illustrations rather than their text. In recent times scholars 
have increasingly called attention to the occasional discrepancy between text and illustration, expressing the 
possibility that it may be a deliberate expression of doctrinal eclecticism. Sachiko Kusukawa, whom I thank for 
discussing this question with me, is currently undertaking such a work on inner sense diagrams. 
162  Leonardo’s notes on paragone have, for the greatest part, come down to us through the Bibliotheca 
Vaticana’s Codex Urbinas Latinus 1270, the most important source for Leonardo’s work as trattatista. This 
manuscript was probably produced around 1550 by Francesco Melzi, Leonardo’s pupil and the heir to his 
literary remains, with the help of an amanuensis. It constitutes a compilation from a variety of notes by 
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this context, it designates a kind of inner vision peculiar to poetic expression, and opposed to 
the ‘outer vision’ characteristic of painting and scientific observation. 
 Leonardo seems to have been working on these ideas around 1489-92, namely at the 
same time or only few years after his earliest drawings of the cerebrum. His reflections on 
paragone have two aims: to establish painting as a science, and to make a case for the 
superiority of painting over poetry.163 His approach to poetry is very much conditioned by 
classical poetics. He treats poetry as an imitative art whose aim is to feign (fingere) events 
and natural phenomena, and he entirely avails himself of the ancient rhetorical understanding 
of speech as a production of images (enargeia). 164  Both painting and poetry, then, 
communicate through images. In that sense, they are both treated as sciences.165 And since 
‘the more useful science is the one whose product is more communicable (communicabile)’, 
it is on the ground of ‘communicability’ that the comparison between poetry and painting 
takes place.166 Leonardo’s key argument is that poetry does not communicate as well as 
painting, because it does not deliver its images to the eye, but only through imagination. This 
imaginatione is a form of vision, yet one which takes place ‘without likenesses’ of external 
things. 167  Its inferiority results directly from the physiology that underpins it, framed 
according to Leonardo’s cerebral anatomy: 
 
The imaginatione does not see as excellently as the eye sees, because the eye 
receives the species or similitudes of objects and gives them to the impressiva, and 
the impressiva gives it to the senso comune, and there it is judged; but the 
imaginatione does not come out of the common sense, except to go to the memory 
where it stops and dies if the imagined thing is not of great excellence.168 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Leonardo, most of which are now lost in the original. The Codex bares the title Libro di pittura. It later became 
known as the Trattato della pittura. For a detailed discussion, see Pedretti 1964, pp. 95-174. For a shorter 
overview, see Farago 1992, pp. 159-166 and pp. 3-17. Key scholarship by Jean-Paul Richter, Carlo Pedretti, 
Ladislao Reti and Michael W. Kwakkelstein for understanding the history and structure of Leonardo’s writings 
has been usefully compiled in Farago 1999, pp. 153-229 and pp. 315-328. 
163 The earliest extant manuscript by Leonardo containing the relevant passages dates from c. 1492. This is the 
text of chapter 15, which is contained in Ms. A. See Farago 1992, p. 162.  
164 See for example: Leonardo, Trattato (Cod. Urb.), ch. 14 from Farago 1992, p. 197: ‘It is a more worthy thing 
to imitate things in nature, which are actual similitudes in fact, than to imitate facts and the words of men in 
words. And if you, poet, want to describe the works of nature with your simple profession, by feigning different 
places and the forms of various things you will be overcome by the painter’s infinitely [greater] proportion’. 
165 Leonardo clearly treats poetry as a form of science in Trattato (Cod. Urb.), ch. 14, in Farago 1992, pp. 196-7, 
and again in ch. 15, pp. 202-3.  
166 Leonardo, Trattato della pittura (Cod. Urb. 1270), chap. 7, in Farago 1992, p. 185. 
167 Ibid.: ‘poesia le dà [= le sue cose] sanza essa similitudine, e non passano alla impressiva per la via della virtù 
vissiva come la pittura.’ 
168  Leonardo, Trattato della pittura (Cod. Urb. 1270), ch. 15, from Farago 1992, pp. 199-201 (with our 
emendations): ‘Non vede la imagginatione cotal eccellentia qual vede l’ochio, perché l’occhio ricceve le spetie, 
overo similitudini de li obbietti, et dà lle alla impressiva et dà essa impressiva al senso comune, et li è giudicata. 
Ma la imaginatione non esce fuori d’esso senso comune, se non in quanto essa va alla memoria, et li si ferma et 
li muore se la cosa imaginata non è de molta eccellentia.’ 
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The passage is difficult to interpret, notably due to uncertainties of transcription 169  and 
grammatical irregularities. 170  I would argue that Leonardo shifts from one meaning of 
imaginatione to another in the same sentence. Speaking at first of the faculty or organ 
(‘imagination does not see as excellently as the eye’), he then refers to the faculty’s content 
(‘the mental image does not leave the common sense’). As Gianfrancesco Pico would later 
point out, the term imagination ‘denotes the power itself just as much as its product, which 
latter is the only thing the Greek word seems to signify.’171 In most other situations, however, 
Leonardo, like most sixteenth-century authors, prefers imaginativa (etymologically an 
abbreviation of vis imaginativa) for the power or faculty: ‘Poetry is found in the mind or 
imaginativa of the poet.’172 
 Leonardo illustrates his demonstration of the inferiority of poetic imagery by an 
analogy which follows the model of Plato’s so-called ‘Divided Line’ in the Republic: ‘An 
immaginatione is to an effect as a shadow to the body which casts it. And the same relation 
exists between poetry and painting, because poetry casts its products in literary imaginations 
[nella immaginatione de lettere] while painting produces them really outside of the eye.’173 
He probably owes this image to Ficino or some of Ficino’s followers in Florence.174 
 Where would the imaginativa have been located in Leonardo’s brain diagrams? 
Certainly in the same ventricle as the senso comune on the side of memoria, namely 
                                               
169 A long-standing tradition originating in the 1817 princeps reads the Codex as ‘imaginatione non esce fuori 
d’esso senso comune’ (imagination does not come out of/leave the common sense), while Claire Farago 
proposes to read ‘non esse fuori…’ (does not exist outside the common sense). Up to this day, scholars do not 
agree. Fehrenbach 2015 cites from Farago but corrects back to ‘non esce fuori’. Azzolini 2005, p. 505, retains 
Farago’s correction. The old transcription, which I retain, clarifies Leonardo’s use of imaginatione in the second 
half of the sentence: he does not speak of the faculty or ventricle, but only of the mental image produced by 
such faculty.  
170 Leonardo speaks of the ‘spetie, overo similitudini’ in the plural and then in the singular within the same 
sentence: ‘l’occhio ricceve le spetie, overo similitudini de li obbietti, et dà lle alla impressiva et dà essa 
impressiva al senso comune, et li è giudicata’. We would expect him to write ‘et li sono giudicate’. 
171 Pico della Mirandola 1971, chap. I, p. 27. 
172 Leonardo, Trattato della pittura (Cod. Urb. 1270), chap. 15, from Farago 1992, p. 200: ‘Si trova la poesia 
nella mente overo imaginativa del poeta’. 
173 Leonardo, Trattato della pittura (Cod. Urb. 1270), chap. 2, from Farago 1992, p. 178 (translation is mine): 
‘Tal proportione è dalla immaginatione a l’effetto qual’è da l’ombra al corpo ombroso. E la medesima 
proportione è dalla poesia alla pittura, perché la poesia pon le sue cose nella immaginatione de lettere e la pittura 
le dà realmente fori de l’occhio [...]’. Leonardo’s use of the term effetto for images processed by sight is 
interesting. It testifies to a hylomorphic understanding of images: visual images are actual, in effect or in act 
(Leonardo uses ‘in atto’ in Trattato chap. 15), while the images contained in text are only in potency (the 
imagination actualizes them).  
174 The image of the shadow is particularly pervasive in Ficino. See Tirinnanzi 2000. We find in Ficino’s texts 
examples such as: ‘le cose sustantiali sono corpi, e le imaginabili, sono imagini, & ombre di corpi’ or ‘l’ombre 
anchora, che egli esser quasi a le imaginationi simili dice [Platone], [...] sono imagini di corpi, & hanno assai la 
medesima natura che hanno quelle, dalle quali esse deriuano.’ See Ficino 1548, p. 184r-v. Note that in Codex 
Huyghens Leonardo also uses an analogy inspired by the Divided Line, claiming that ‘according to Plato’ the 
eye is to the microcosm what the sun is to the macrocosm (Summers 1987, p. 73, n. 3). The source of these 
reflections is the analogy known as the ‘Divided Line’ expounded in Plato, Republic 6, 509d-511d. Klein noted 
that High of Saint Victor already compared the imagination to a shadow cast be the light of the ratio. See Klein 
1956, p. 21, citing Hugues of Saint-Victor, De unione corporis et spiritus, in Patrologia latina, 199., column 
288. 
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according to the second proposal we have made above.175 Leonardo regards immaginationi as 
residing within the senso comune, yet he specifies that they are not delivered to this ventricle 
by the imprensiva. Indeed, in sight the image of a body... 
 
...at least enters the senso comune through the eye. But the imaginatione of such a 
body does not enter into that senso [comune], but is born there in the tenebrous 
eye. O, what difference there is between imagining such a light in the tenebrous 
eye and seeing it in action outside the darkness!176 
 
Leonardo is the only artist to compare the imagination to an occhio tenebroso. He certainly 
borrows this image from fifteenth-century thinkers who associated it with misguidedness: in 
one retelling of the Allegory of the Cave, Ficino speaks of the ‘shadowed eyes’ of the cave’s 
prisoner;177  and Nicholas of Cusa uses the expression oculus tenebrosus in reference to 
spiritual delusion.178 Standing in stark contrast to the tradition (extending from Aristotle’s De 
anima to Pico’s De imaginatione and beyond) of associating imagination with light due to the 
etymology of phantasia, from the Greek phaos (light),179 Leonardo’s image doubly subverts 
the rhetorical belief in the ability of vivid language to bring a scene before the eyes of a 
listener (oculis subiicere). The eye of the mind’s vision is obscured; being in the singular 
(occhio) it highlights what Eva T.H. Brann calls the ‘monocularity’ of imaginative sight 
which ‘fits neatly in with the sizelessness and the aperspectivity that are so often observed in 
internal vision’.180 
 Fehrenbach links this metaphor to images of blindness in the Old Testament and the 
scriptures.181 Indeed, the image is best understood in the light of Leonardo’s own statements 
on blindness. The Paragone often contrasts painting with poetry by confronting sight 
impairment and hearing impairment. In this context blindness is presented as a ‘dark prison’ 
and ‘the sister of death’.182 ‘Certainly there is no one who would not prefer to lose his senses 
of hearing and smell than to lose sight’, writes Leonardo. ‘What would they do if such 
                                               
175 Kemp 1971, p. 134, already argued that ‘it is reasonable to suppose that immaginativa would have been sited 
with the sensus communis in the second ventricle’. 
176  Leonardo, Trattato della pittura (Cod. Urb. 1270), chap. 15, in Farago 1992, pp. 200-201 (translation 
emended): ‘[...] almeno entra per l’occhio al senso comune. Ma la imaginatione di tale corpo non entra in esso 
senso, ma li nasse in l’ochio tenebroso. O, che diferentia è a imaginarsi tal luce in l’occhio tenebroso al vederla 
in atto fuori delle tenebre!’. 
177 Translated as ‘occhi adombrati’ by Ficino’s Tuscan translator Felice Figliucci. See Ficino 1546, p. 268r. 
178 Serina 2016, pp. 214-15. 
179 Aristotle, De anima 429a; Pico della Mirandola 1971, chap. 1, p. 25. 
180 Brann 1992, p. 23. 
181 Genesis 27, 1; Isahia 32, 3; Psalm 69, 23-4; also mentioned are Augustine, Gregory the Great and the Golden 
Legend. See Fehrenbach 2015, pp. 74-6. 
182 Leonardo, Trattato chap. 15, in Farago 1992, p. 202. 
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darkness [tali tenebre] were to be their companions for life?’ 183  Leonardo understands 
‘poetry’ as text transmitted orally. Therefore the mental imagery triggered by poetry shares in 
this darkness. Paintings ‘pass to the senso commune by the most noble sense, which is the 
eye’ while poems ‘have to pass [there] by the less noble sense, which is [the sense of] 
hearing’.184 The ‘vision’ imparted by poetry is thus a blind vision. Leonardo, subverting 
Simonides of Coes, calls poetry ‘blind painting’.185 The fact that the imagination is a dark 
place will begin to have traction later in the sixteenth-century. Tasso writes that the poeta 
fantastico’s phantasms lie ‘in the darkness and fog of that which is not’.186 What Rudolf 
Preimesberger called the amica obscuritas, the Mannerist fascination for darkness as locus of 
creativity, really begins with the rediscoverers of the Roman grotesques and, we should add, 
with Michelangelo, the self-proclaimed guardian of ‘dark time’, for whom ‘only shade will 
do for sowing mankind, and nights, therefore, are more sacred than days.’187  
 This conception of imagination bears interesting ties with some of Leonardo’s 
anatomical hypotheses. Several passages of the Paragone suggest that poetic communication 
does not involve the impressiva. ‘Poetry renders what is natural without visual impressions, 
and [its objects] do not pass to the imprensiva by way of the virtù vissiva as it happens with 
painting’.188 Instead, poetry ‘passes through the ear to the senso comune’.189 If we are to 
understand these passages as meaning that poetry passes directly from the ear to the senso 
comune (where the dark eye of imagination produces the immaginatoini) without passing 
through the impressiva, then it seems that the paragone corresponds to only one among 
Leonardo’s anatomical models, namely that of W12626r (Fig. 1.4) and W12627r (Fig. 1.6). 
As we have explained above, in these experimental proposals from the late 1480s the 
auditory nerve goes straight to the senso comune, while only the eyes benefit from the faster 
and more accessible ventricle of imprensiva. If Leonardo is indeed implicitly referring to this 
particular anatomical configuration, it suggests that he may have tailored his anatomy to 
enhance the persuasiveness of his paragone argument. It seems clear, however, that Leonardo 
                                               
183 Leonardo, Trattato della pittura (Cod. Urb. 1270), chap. 25, in Farago 1992, p. 229. 
184 Trattato chap. 20, in Farago 1992, p. 215. See also ibid. chap. 19, p. 211: ‘If the poet acts through the senses 
by way of the ear, the painter [does so] by way of the more worthy sense of the eye’. 
185 Trattato chap. 18 and again chap. 19, in Farago 1992, pp. 206-7 and 208-9. 
186 Torquato Tasso, Apologia in difesa della Gierusalemme liberata (1585), cited from Scarpati 1985, pp. 435-6. 
187 Buonarroti 1991, no. 103, p. 233: ‘ma l’ombra sol a piantar l’uomo serve / Dunche, le notti più che’e’ dì son 
sante / quanto l’uom più d’ogni altro frutto vale [but only shade will do for sowing mankind / Therefore nights 
are more sacred than days, as man is worth more than any other fruit]’; and ibid no. 104, p. 234: ‘e a me 
consegnaro il tempo bruno, / come a simil nel parto e nella culla [and to me they allotted the dark time, wihch I 
resembled at birth and in the cradle]’. On amica obscuritas see Preimesberger 2011, p. 95. 
188 Trattati chap. 2, in Farago 1992, pp. 179-181 (with our emendations). 
189 Trattato chap. 7, in Farago 1992, pp. 184-7. See also ibid. chap. 22, p. 219: ‘the poet, who sends the same 
things [as painting] to the common sense but by the lesser sense of hearing, does not give the eye any pleasure 
other than the pleasure of hearing a thing recounted’. 
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ended up changing his mind and discarding the model of Fig. 1.4 and Fig. 1.6. According to 
Martin Kemp, this neural configuration ‘could not stand up to logical inspection and 
[Leonardo] seems to have rapidly abandoned it’. 190  The same shift can be felt in the 
paragone. Indeed, in one of the chapters of the Codex Urbinas of which we possess 
Leonardo’s original manuscript in Ms. A, Leonardo writes that with poetry the ear does carry 
impressions to the impressiva, however ‘in a very confused and very slow manner’.191 Ms. A 
is datable around 1492. This would confirm the hypothesis of Carlo Pedretti and others, that 
Leonardo’s early drafts on the paragone date of around 1490, being contemporaneous (and 
tailored to) his ocular-centric anatomies also datable c. 1490. Only a couple of years later did 
he revert back to a traditional view which includes the first ventricle in the processing of 
sounds, drafting Ms. A accordingly. 
 The consequence of our analysis is that Leonardo’s concept of imaginatione does not 
have anything to do with sight anymore; neither, in fact, does it have to do with painting as 
Leonardo understands it. This is even more striking in view of his ocular-centric anatomical 
hypotheses of c. 1490 (Fig. 1.4 and Fig. 1.6): here the first ventricle — where most 
physicians place imaginatio and/or phantasia — plays no role in imaginatione. Around the 
same time, Leonardo was recording the word inmaginatione in his vocabulary lists of the 
Codex Trivulzianus, no doubt premeditating this conceptual shift. It seems clear now why 
Leonardo did not include this term in his anatomical diagrams. The purpose of these 
drawings is to explain the mechanisms of sensory perception, and the journey of images from 
the outside world to the inner folds of the human mind. Leonardo’s imaginatione in not, 
strictly speaking, a perceptual phenomenon. 
 
1.3. Imaginatione in Its Broader Vernacular Context 
 
Put back in the context of sixteenth-century thought, Leonardo’s notion of imagination 
cannot be confounded with the imaginatio of faculty psychology. It corresponds rather to a 
terminology in volgare which does not regard imagination as a result of sensory perception, 
but rather as a form of ‘appearing’ in contradistinction with true perception. On the one hand, 
imaginatione can refer to mere illusion — in fact this is the sense of the noun’s only 
occurrence in Lodovico Dolce’s Dialogo della pittura (1557). 192  On the other hand, 
                                               
190 Kemp 2006, p. 108. 
191 Trattato chap. 23, in Farago 1992, p. 221. The passage exists in Leonado’s handwriting in Ms. A fol. 100v 
(Ashburnham I, 20r), datable c. 1492. See Farago 1992, p. 162 and n. 12. 
192 Dolce in Barocchi 1960, I, p. 153: ‘Questa è certa imaginazione di chi mira [...] e non effetto o proprietà della 
pittura’. 
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imaginatione can refer to an inner visualization which does not involve the external senses — 
a meaning much closer to our modern ‘imagination’.193 This notion of crops up in some 
sixteenth-century treatises such as Niccolò Franco’s Dialogo delle bellezze (1542): ‘Besides 
sight and hearing, other powers [uertuti] are able to grasp beauty, among which the 
imaginatione.’194  
 In this vein, imaginatione could also designate the act of mentally conceiving the 
artwork to be executed. This is what would later be conceptualized as disegno; indeed, as we 
shall see, a number of authors speak of the imagination as the seat of disegno. Its first 
theorization in vernacular under the term imaginatione seems to occur in treatises on rhetoric 
which elaborate on the orator’s use of imagination for immersing himself mentally and 
emotionally into the scene he is about to narrate, following the famous discussions of 
Aristotle’s Poetics chapter 17 and Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria book 6, 2.195 We have 
already pointed out the debt that Leonardo’s notion of immaginatione owes to the rhetorical 
idea of ‘putting before the eyes’ (oculis subiicere) through words. These ideas are expounded 
more fully in Daniele Barbaro’s Della eloquenza (1557), which notably proposes a parallel 
between eloquence and the art of the painter. The relevant passage, where a personification of 
art (Arte) proposes such a use of imagination to a personification of the soul (Anima), is 
worth quoting in full. 
 
Art: [...] but you have forgotten another power [uirtù] which is the unmatched for 
putting things before the eyes (a very necessary thing). Of this power — which 
has much affinity with the corporeal senses, and is very confused, as if it were the 
general mirror of all human sentiments [sentimenti], being therefore named 
imaginatione — of this power, I say, you have not said a word so far, because you 
have never exercised it. I was told that in the imaginatione the images and 
appearances received from the senses are stored. In it, furthermore, these images 
very often strangely transform, so much so that even dreams are not as confused! 
And because of that, many people are called fantastici and others think they are 
kings and lords, and it appears so real to them that they prompt laughter and 
compassion in those who see them. Some, as we say, build things in the air [uanno 
in aria fabricando], and they are so engrossed in their thoughts that everybody 
takes them for hysterics and madmen.196  
                                               
193 I think, for example, of statements such as ‘I’m not using my imagination, I’m talking from experience’ (a 
sentence pronounced by rhythm and blues singer James Brown in a speech following the death of Martin Luther 
King on 6 April 1968). 
194 Franco 1542a, p. 17r: ‘Sonui oltre il uiso, & l’audito altre uertuti che comprendono il bello, de la quali è 
quella de l’imaginatione.’ 
195 Overviews of the role of imagination between psychology and rhetoric in late antiquity are provided by: 
Sheppard 2014; Plett 2012; Webb 2009; Manieri 1998; Flory 1996. 
196 Barbaro 1557, pp. 13-14: ‘Ma tu scordata ti sei d’un altra uirtù, la quale per mettere le cose dinanzi à gli 
occhi (Il che è sommamente richiesto) non ha pari. Di questa uirtù, perche ella ha grande amicitia co i sensi 
corporali, & è molto confusa, come quella, che è lo specchio generale di tutti i sentimenti umani, & perciò è 
detta imaginatione; di questa uirtù dico, non hauendola tu ancora essercitata, non ne hai fin’ora alcuna parola 
mossa. Io odo dire, che nella imaginatione si riserbano le imagini, & le apparenze de’ sensi riceuute, et bene 
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Art (Arte) then goes on to describe how the imagination’s power may be harnessed to induce 
such emotions in an audience through mimetic sympathy. The subtext of the discussion is 
Horace’s dictum Si vis me flere, dolendum est primum ipsi tibi (If you would have me weep, 
you must first feel grief yourself, Ars poetica vv. 102-3):  
 
Firstly he [i.e. the artist] inwardly considers as best he can the thing that he 
wants his audience to feel. And if he wants to make others weep, he shall never 
keep his eyes dry. The same power can be seen in painting, where the artist first 
firmly paints in his imaginatione every form he wants to show on his canvas. 
And the prettier and stronger his imaginatione, the more illustrious and praised 
his painting.197 
 
The various aspects of Barbaro’s multi-faceted account of imagination — understood 
successively as specchio generale (mirror of the affects), potent hallucinogenic and vector of 
emotional transference — will be devoted ad hoc treatments in our forthcoming chapters. Let 
us focus, for now, on the lexical implications of this discussion. Barbaro’s imaginatione is a 
‘pre-painting’, a mental work of art for the hand to follow. As such, it has to do with the 
notion of invenzione, the textual description of a work of art’s subject-matter, composed in 
advance by a humanist to serve as programme for the artist to interpret.198 Imaginatione was 
also used in that sense. Michelangelo, in response to Pietro Aretino’s proposal of an 
invenzione for the Sistine Last Judgement, writes: ‘I cannot put your imaginatione in hand, 
which is so perfect that, if the Day of Judgement were passed and you had seen it in person, 
your words could not have described it better.’199  
 Let us summarize. Leonardo’s approach to imagination is word-sensitive. 
Imaginatione generally has a negative connotation. In his Paragone, it designates the mental 
‘viewing’ of images which results from listening to poetry as opposed to the sight of a 
painting. Poetry and language in general only afford images in potency. It is the task of our 
                                                                                                                                                  
spesso in lei così stranamente trasmutarsi, che i sogni non sono così turbati, et confusi, là onde molti sono detti, 
& riputati fantastici, altri si sanno Re & signori, & talmente par loro essere que’ tali, che si credono di essere, 
che riso & compaßione mouono à chi gli uede. Alcuni uanno, come si dice, in aria fabricando, et tanto si stanno 
nel lor pensiero fißi, che forsennati, & pazzi da tutti creduti sono.’ Barbaro is expanding on Quintilian, Institutio 
oratoria, 6, 2, 30. On Barbaro’s Della eloquenza, see Girardi and Signori 1997. 
197 Barbaro 1557, pp. 13-14: ‘Perche egli prima dentro di se si propone la cosa, che egli cerca dare ad intendere 
altrui, con quel migliore & più eccellente modo, che si può, & uolendo egli metter’ altri à pianto, non terrà mai 
gli occhi asciutti. Simile forza nella pittura si dimostra, lo artefice della quale ogni forma, che egli cerca di far 
uedere nelle sue tele, prima nella imaginatione fermamente si dipinge, & quanto più bella, & gagliarda è la sua 
imaginatione, tanto più illustre, & lodata è la sua pittura.’ 
198 For re-examinations of the role of invenzioni and iconographic programmes, see Koering et al. 2008. 
199 Michelangelo, letter dated 20 November 1537 to Pietro Aretino, in Buonarroti 1965, vol. 4, no. 955, p. 87: 
‘non posso mettere in opra la vostra imaginatione, la quale è sì fatta, che se il dì del giudicio fusse stato, et voi 
l’haveste veduto in presentia, le parole vostre non lo figurarebbono meglio’. The translation is from Parker 
2000, p. 72 (where imaginatione was translated as conception). 
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imagination to actualize them. In some cases, however, this actualization, done deliberately, 
is seen in a positive light. This is the case when a painter reviews memorized forms in order 
to train himself. In such positive cases, Leonardo uses the word imaginativa rather than 
imaginatione. Leonardo’s imaginatione is that of rhetoric and poetics rather than faculty 
psychology; it does not feature in his anatomy of the brain. His Paragone clearly pits itself 
against this rhetorical tradition, which increasingly gives imaginatione a central role. Given 
this sensitivity to terminology, we have all reasons to think that imaginatione belonged to a 
jargon of literary studies. Much like, for example, the word ‘momentum’ in today’s English, 
it had a conspicuously Latin root and shared a technical meaning in academic disciplines 
(‘quantity of movement’ in physics) with an everyday usage (‘impetus’). We find further 
evidence of this in the writings of the other artist who, immediately after Leonardo, makes a 
reference to imagination with reference to the rhetorical understanding of this term. 
Pomponio Gaurico, in his De sculptura (1504) written in Latin, affirms that the artist ‘should 
be endowed with the greatest imagination, in order to conceive the appearance of men 
suffering, laughing, ailing, dying, being challenged and so on, which is very necessary to the 
poets and the orators’. 200  Gaurico — like Quintilian, his model — keeps the word 
εὐφαντασίωτος in Greek.201 
 
1.4. Fantasia the ‘Equivocal’ 
 
Let us now turn from the word imaginatione to the word fantasia. Fantasia was a term much 
more widespread than imaginatione.202 It was pervasive, and as such its meaning is diffuse 
and hard to grasp. Indeed, unlike imaginatione it was freer of cultural heritage and deployed 
its meaning laterally through metaphors and associations. With the multiplication of its usage 
came a phenomenon of semantic expansion, as linguists term it, of such magnitude that in the 
sixteenth-century, the proper meaning of fantasia was an object of linguistic debate. In this 
                                               
200 Gaurico 1969, par. 9, pp. 58-59: ‘Scilicet quam maxime euphantasiotos esse debebit, qui uidelicet Dolentis, 
Ridentis, Ergotantis, Morientis, Periclitantis et eiusmodi, Infinitas animo species imaginetur, quod etiam Poetis 
ipsis et oratoribus quam maxime necessarium [...]’. Our translation is inspired by Chastel and Klein’s. 
201 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 4, 2, 29-30 cited from Quintilian and Russell 2001, vol. 3, pp. 60-1: ‘Quidam 
dicunt εὐφαντασίωτον qui sibi res voces actus secundum verum optime finget: quod quidem nobis volentibus 
facile continget [Some use the word euphantasiōtos of one who is exceptionally good at realistically imagining 
to himself things, words, and actions. We can indeed easily make this happen at will].’ On Gaurico’s sources, 
see Méndez 2013, pp. 141-159. 
202 We find further evidence of this in the fact that fantasia is much more often accompanied by an epithet than 
immaginazione. Spada’s Giardino degli epiteti gives no result for imaginatione, but records that fantasia has 
been called alta, bassa, confusa, formidabile, and stabile. Spada 1648, p. 265. The same distinction was 
observed between fantasie/fantaisie and imagination in the French of Pierre de Ronsard (1524-85). See Pigné 
2009, pp. 20-23. 
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context Jacopo Mazzoni proposed the first semantic analysis of the word in 1587 in his 
Difesa della Commedia di Dante. We shall take this text as the basis for our discussion, 
proposing our own analysis as a complement.   
 Mazzoni argues that Phantasia (as he likes to spell it)203 is an equivocal word (un 
Equiuoco). The aim of his extensive semantic research (some six chapters) was to argue 
against a school of interpreters of Dante who regarded the word fantasia in the Divine 
Comedy — typically the occurrence in in Purgatory 33, verse 142 (‘O alta fantasia, che 
mancó possa ...’) — as meaning ‘dream’ (sogno). In Mazzoni’s view, this led to catastrophic 
consequences. Indeed, the text to which Mazzoni was directly reacting, a 1570 pamphlet by a 
certain Ridolfo Castravilla, argued that the whole Commedia was no more than the 
description of a dream, and that therefore, lacking the essential poetic component of fiction 
(fabula), it did not deserve to be regarded as a poem.204 Mazzoni’s Difesa — in fact a 
colossal work in seven books, four of which remained in manuscript form — is a scholarly, 
methodical and extensive deconstruction of Castravilla’s opinion. Most of its Libro Primo is 
devoted to the analysis of the term fantasia. 
 Mazzoni proposes that fantasia belongs to the ‘sixth type of equivocacy’, namely the 
case in which a word comes from another language where it is already polysemic, 
transferring some of its polysemy into Italian.205 The Greek root phantasia, he writes, has 
four different meanings: a power of the soul (potenza), a form of the said power (forma), an 
impression (specie) received by this power, and a passion (passione). 206  Each of these 
meanings supposes a complex layering of sub-meanings. Mazzoni’s discussion is somewhat 
daedalian, yet we need not review it entirely here: he summed up his conclusions in a useful 
diagram (Fig. 1.7). 
 The Tuscan meanings of fantasia, according to Mazzoni, are chiefly three: power, 
dream or vision (sogno o visione), and poetic concetto. Mazzoni’s perspective, however, is 
limited to a literary approach to the question. Our own enquiry, encompassing art literature as 
                                               
203 The leading humanists of the sixteenth-century, in their critical editions of the Tre Corone, campaigned for 
the establishment of vernacular spellings as standard and more true. Girolamo Claricio’s landmark edition of 
Boccaccio of 1521, accompanied by the ‘Osseruationi della Orthographia uolgare usitata da messer Giouanni 
Boccaccio’, notes: ‘Fantasia non Phantasia come scriuono Greci, e latini, & non penso chel Bocc. tutti li nomi 
che con ph sono latinamente iscritti con f scriuesse in uolgare’. Boccaccio 1521, unpaginated. 
204 Castravilla’s underlying goal was to counter Benedetto Varchi’s statement that Dante was superior to Homer 
by excluding Dante from the category of ‘poets’. 
205 Mazzoni 1587, I, cap. 43, p. 145. The notion of equivocal was theorized by Aristotle at the beginning of the 
Categories, which distinguishes three types of utterances: equivocal, univocal and denominative. We owe the 
discussion of the differences between types of equivocals to commentators of Aristotle (such as Boethius, 
Ockham and Buridan). Equivocals were also discussed in Francesco Patrizi’s Della poetica (1586) with 
reference to Aristotle and Tasso. 
206 Mazzoni 1587, I, cap. 43, p. 145. By form (also abito or atto), Mazzoni means an act of exercizing the power 
of imagination, e.g. ‘my last imagination occurred yesterday’. By passion, he means dream or apparition. 
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well as informal utterances (e.g. in correspondence), revealed at least three additional 
meanings to Mazzoni’s, two of which belong specifically to the vocabulary of art, totalizing a 
number of six: 
1. fantasia as faculty, function, or power (‘usare la fantasia’) 
2. fantasia as content of the imagination (impression, specie)  
3. fantasia as organ (ventricle of the brain) 
4. fantasia as illusions, false visions (fantasma) 
5. fantasia as desire, intention (‘mutare fantasia’, ‘mi viene fantasia di...’, ‘haver 
fantasia di...’) or even idiosyncrasy (‘i modi, le arie, le maniere, i tratti e le fantasie de’ 
pittori’,207 ‘per sì strane sue fantasie vivendo stranamente’,208 ‘la fantasia femminile è 
un non so che’209) 
6. fantasia as a genre of design (or design idea), especially ornamental210 
 
The best way to see these various meanings at play in the parlance of artists is probably to 
turn to Vasari’s Vite (1550, 1568). As we have already pointed out, Vasari claims that he 
wrote this text ‘as a painter, and in the language I speak’ and chiefly with the aim ‘of being 
understood by my artists, rather than with the aim of being praised.’211 He boasts the use of 
‘the particular words and terms of our arts, rather than the pretty ones or those culled from 
delightful writers’.212 To my knowledge Vasari is the only practising artist to commit to this 
kind of sociolinguistic authenticity in his writings before Lomazzo. He was prompted to do 
so by Annibal Caro, who — for cultural reasons akin to Doni’s choice of orality in the Marmi 
discussed above — encouraged Vasari to adopt ‘una scrittura apunto come il parlare’.213 
 
                                               
207 Vasari, Vite, 1568, I, p. 242. Hereafter, we cite the Vite from the synoptic edition: Vasari 1966. So as to 
maximise clarity, we indicate the edition (1550/1568), the original volume numeration and the original 
pagination. 
208 Vasari, Vite, 1568, II, p. 27. 
209 Pietro Aretino, cited in Montemerlo 1566, p. 334. 
210 To these six, we may want to add a seventh, proposed by David Summers, namely that of fantasia as 
audacity (audacia), or freedom of surpassing decorum. This meaning, however, never found in early modern 
lexica, is often hard to distinguish from meaning 1 (power) or meaning 5 (intention). See Summers 1981, p. 
127-8. On bravura, see Suthor 2010. 
211 Vasari, Vite, 1550, p. 993. 
212 Vasari, Vite, 1568, I, p. 9. 
213 ‘Written language that matches spoken language’. Annibal Caro, letter to Giorgio Vasari dated 12 December 
1547, cited in Le Mollé 1988, p. 5. 
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1.5.  Fantasie, the Indeterminate Ornament 
 
Vasari uses the word fantasia in the sense of faculty,214 yet the most frequent employment he 
makes of this word is in the typically artistic meaning no. 6 mentioned above. Fantasia in 
this sense is particularly elusive and, to borrow Mazzoni’s term, equivocal. It generally 
follows a list of miscellaneous decorative motifs ending with ‘...and other fantasie’. These 
motifs include putti, sea monsters, garlands, festoons, fruits, trophies, masks, shields and 
bovine skulls — namely what was understood as the repertoire of all’antica ornament, be it 
figurative or semi-figurative. 215  They also encompass grotesques or  ‘grotteschine 
all’antica’;216 this is particularly interesting since, as we shall see further on (cf. Chapter 2), 
the fantasia was regarded as the faculty responsible for the design of the grotesques due to its 
arbitrary and combinatorial functioning. Rarely, fantasie designate strictly architectural 
elements.217 The term is equivocal insofar as it refers to all or any of the abovementioned 
ornamental motifs, and probably others, in an indeterminate manner.218 
In short, the word is an open-ended term. In the vocabulary of commissions and 
invenzioni, it represents what didn’t need to be named because it was left to the discretion of 
the artist, and therefore crystallized as an ornamental register whose content was not 
predetermined.219 A contract would use the term fantasie in such an indeterminate way, 
merely specifying the style (‘fantasie [...] in the manner [...] that we today call 
grottesche’).220 This indeterminacy affects the prescriptive use of fantasie (in contracts and 
invenzioni for future realisations) as well as its descriptive use (for talking about images 
already made). Similarly, Vasari uses altre fantasie for miscellanea, as if he were short of 
words to describe them in their abundance and variety. This decorative elusiveness recalls 
what André Chastel, in reference to the grotesque, called ‘nameless ornament’ (l’ornement 
                                               
214 Vasari, Vite, 1568, I, p. 26: ‘facevano [...] mostri o bizarrie che veniva lor comodo, e secondo che nasceva 
loro nella fantasia le metteveno in opera’. Vasari, however, prefers the word imaginativa to discuss the 
imagination as faculty. 
215 Vasari, Vite, 1568, I, p. 23-4: ‘la cornice sua col fregio et architrave appiccata [...] dentrovi o teste di buoi 
secche, o trofei o maschere o targhe o altre fantasie’; ibid. II, p. 582: ‘un fregio d’una sala pieno di festoni, di 
putti, di frutte et altre fantasie’. In rare cases, divinities or personifications can be fantasie, especially if small in 
size. See Vite, 1568, II, p. 432: ‘fece molte figurine alte due terzi e tonde, come Ercoli, Venere, Apollini, Lede, 
et altre sue fantasie’. 
216 Vasari, Vite 1568, II, p. 361: ‘ornamento di grotteschine all’antica, con varie storie e figurine piccole, 
maschere, putti, animali et altre fantasie’. 
217 Vasari, Vite 1568, II, p. 701: ‘richezza di balaustri, nicchie et altre fantasie’. 
218 It would be tempting to regard fantasia as meaning merely ‘idea’ in the sense of design idea or invention, yet 
Vasari at times clearly writes as if he is describing something precise and concrete, for example when he speaks 
of ‘fantasie of remarkable minuteness and delicateness [nuove fantasie di certe minuzie e delicatezze]’ (Vasari, 
Vite, 1568, II, p. 746). 
219 Ames-Lewis 2002, pp. 177-188; Settis 1981, pp. 706-761. 
220  ‘fantasie, colori et spartimenti [...] a la foggia e disegno che hoggi chiamano grottesche’. Francesco 
Piccolomini’s 1502 contract with Bernardino Pinturicchio for the fresco decoration of the library of the Duomo 
in Siena, cited in Acidini Luchinat 1982, Part 3, Vol. 4, pp. 161-203, p. 169. 
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sans nom).221 Because they were aware that the buried ruins in which they admired it were 
not true ‘grottoes’, Cinquecento critics were perplexed by the absence of a term for the 
repertoire of the grotesque; moreover, the unpredictable and uncontrollable variety of these 
images escaped language. This is also implicit in the art-critical meaning of fantasia as 
indeterminate ornament; it echoes the imaginative faculty’s assumedly unpredictable and 
erratic nature. 
One criterion seems to apply to all of these indefinite fantasie, namely a topological 
one. When they serve to adorn architecture, they are, for external ornament, often on top of 
an architrave;222 for internal ornament, they are situated in the margins of figurative tableaux 
— pinakes or quadri riportati — whose content remained subject to the rules of decorum. 
Scholarship has devoted much attention to the importance taken by these parerga the age of 
what has been called the ‘self-aware image’.223  
Inevitably, a literary vocabulary was deployed to describe these fantasie which had 
taken enough importance to titillate the interest of the humanists who conceived large 
decorative programmes. Yet the principle that these portions should be left to the artist’s 
invention tended to hold. This is well exemplified in the invenzioni Annibal Caro proposed to 
Taddeo Zuccaro in 1562 for the decoration of the Villa Farnese in Caprarola. ‘I have put 
these fantasie at random’, writes Caro toward the end of his iconographic programme for the 
bedroom, ‘to give an idea of the kind of inventions which you could make here.’224 Caro’s 
suggestions have a poetic quality in themselves: 
 
[...] se vi pare di farvi grottesche 
d’animali, fateci de gli uccelli che 
cantino, de l’oche che escano a pascere, 
de’ galli ch’annunzino il giorno, e simili 
novelle. Nel fregio della facciata da piè, 
conforme al le tenebre, vi farei genti 
ch’andassero a frunuolo, spie, adulteri, 
scalatori di fenestre e cose tali, e per 
grottesche istrici, ricci, tassi, un pavone 
con la ruota, che significa la notte 
stellata, gufi, civette, pipistrelli e simili.  
   Nel fregio della facciata destra, per 
cose proporzionate a la luna, pescatori di 
[...] if you’d like to put animal grotesques 
there, make singing birds, geese going out 
to graze, cocks crowing at daybreak, and 
similar stories. On the frieze of the lower 
façade, in accordance with the [theme of] 
darkness, make people who go hunting 
with torches, spies, adulteries, people 
climbing up windows and such things; as 
grotesques, porcupines, hedgehogs, 
badgers, peacocks displaying their 
plumage (which signifies starry nights), 
great owls and little ones, bats and the 
like. 
                                               
221 Chastel 1988. 
222 Vasari, Vite, 1568, I, p. 344: ‘sopra le colonne posano architrave, fregio e cornicione, [...] pieni di varie 
fantasie, e particolarmente d’imprese e d’arme de’ Medici e di fogliami.’ This is the façade of the chapel of 
Annunciation Chapel in Santissima Annunziata by Michelozzo. 
223 On Victor Stoichita’s concept of ‘self-awareness’, see Stoichita 1997. More recently, see Degler 2015; Guest 
2016. The problem of marginality in medieval art is examined, notably, in Camille 1992, and Wirth 2008. 
224 Annibal Caro to Taddeo Zuccaro, letter of 11 Nov 1562, in Barocchi 1971, III, p. 2454: ‘Ma in questa parte 
ho messe queste fantasie così a caso, per accennare di che specie invenzioni vi si potessero fare.’ 
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notte, naviganti a la bussola, negromanti, 
streghe e cotali. Per grottesche un fanale 
di lontano, reti, nasse con alcuni pesci 
dentro e granchi che pascessero a’ lume 
di luna, e se ’l loco n’è capace un 
elefante inginocchioni che l’adorasse.  
   E ultimamente nel fregio de la facciata 
sinistra matematici con i loro strumenti 
da misurare,225 ladri, falsatori di monete, 
cavatori di tesori [...] e per animali vi 
farei lupi, volpi, scimie, cuccie e se altri 
vi sono di questa sorte maliziosi et 
insidiatori de gli altri animali.226 
In the frieze of the right façade, in 
accordance with the moon, night-time 
fishermen, sailors using compasses, 
necromancers, witches and such things. 
As grotesques, a faraway beacon, nets, 
fish traps with fish inside and shells 
growing in the moonlight, and if the place 
allows, a kneeling elephant worshipping 
them. 
And lastly in the frieze of the left 
façade, mathematicians with their 
measuring instruments, thieves, money 
forgers, treasure diggers [...] and as 
animals I would do wolves, foxes, 
monkeys, dogs and others of this kind of 
malicious and insidious animals. 
 
 
Caro’s detailed recommendations thematically match the iconographic programme of each 
wall. Yet he insists that they are only suggestions, invitations to imagine: ‘Because those 
things don’t need to be written, I let you imagine them your own way, since I know painters 
are by nature prolific and charming in finding these bizzarrie.’227  
Caro’s identification of fantasia with the painter’s licence of invention is one of the 
most enduring significations of the term, going back to the Middle Ages. It finds clear 
expression in the famous letter of 1506 by Pietro Bembo to Isabella d’Este about Giovanni 
Bellini’s taste for autonomy. Isabella had promised Bellini to leave the ‘poetic invention’ 
(l’inventiva poetica) to him alone, yet she later changed her mind and turned to Bembo for 
the invenzione. The latter wrote to her that the invenzione should allow Bellini a lot of 
freedom, namely that ‘it will have to adapt itself to his fantasia’, because Bellini ‘does not 
like to be given many written details which cramp his style; his way of working, as he says, is 
always to wander at will in his pictures (vagare a voglia nelle sue pitture), so that they can 
give satisfaction to himself as well as to the beholder’.228 We should note that Bembo is 
quoting Bellini here (‘as he says’). The passage testifies to a remarkable awareness and 
                                               
225 For another invention of Annibal Caro mentioning many grottesche as scientific instruments (also called 
‘novelle’), see Barocchi 1971, III, p. 2468 in fine. 
226 Annibal Caro to Taddeo Zuccaro, letter 11 Nov 1562, in Barocchi 1971, III, p. 2454. 
227 ‘Ma per non esser cose ch’abbino bisogno d’esser scritte lascio che voi ve l’immaginiate a vostro modo, 
sapendo che i pittori sono per lor natura ricchi e graziosi in trovar queste bizzarrie’. Paola Barocchi notes the 
hierarchy in licence, however: ‘Ai letterati spettano le invenzioni ed ai pittori le sole bizzarrie; una distinzione 
del tutto favorevole ai primi’. 
228 Pietro Bembo, letter to Isabella d’Este, 1 January 1506: ‘La inventione [...] bisognerà che s’accomodi alla 
fantasia di lui che l’ha a fare, il quale ha piacere che molto signati termini non si diano al suo stile, uso, come 
dice, di sempre vagare a sua voglia nelle pitture, che quanto è in lui, possano soddisfare a chi le mira’. Cited 
from Land 1994b, p. 107. Translation from Chambers 1970, p. 131 (with my emendations). On the episode, see 
notably Ames-Lewis 2002, pp. 184-186; Land (op. cit.), pp. 106-7. 
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defence of the pleasures of artistic mind-wandering, understood as a free play of fantasia. It 
also comprises the idea that the pleasure experienced by the viewer in contemplating a 
finished work may be correlated to the pleasure of the artist in the act of making the work. 
More generally, what we see emerge here is the early association, implicit in the term vagare, 
between fantasia and the realm of improvisation. 
 There are illuminating parallel histories to both of these aspects. Taking fantasia as a 
genre of aesthetic production is an attitude we also see appear in music and literature. In 
sixteenth-century editions of the macaronic poet Teofilo Folengo (1491-1544), some poems 
are grouped under the label ‘Phantasiae Macaronice’ or simply ‘Phantasiae’.229 This is tied to 
Folengo’s tendency introduce his works as pure products of the imagination, which manifests 
powerfully in the opening lines of Folengo’s Baldus (‘Phantasia mihi plus quam phantastica 
venit...’);230 it belongs to a long poetic tradition going back to the troubadours and their 
‘hook’ openers — for example Jacopone da Todi’s (1230-1306) exordium ‘Udite nova pazzia 
/ Che mi viene in fantasia’231 — and still alive in the later sixteenth century — Gian Paolo 
Lomazzo opens his Libro de’ sogni by announcing that ‘mi venne in la virtú fantastica, una 
fantesia’.232 In music, the reference to a composition as fantasia is found as early as 1520 to 
denote the piece’s rule-breaking and improvisational character.233  
Both the literary and the musical forms shed light on the pictorial form. The poems 
concerned are often nonsensical and burlesque.234 This evokes the pseudo-morphic or quasi-
figurative nature of pictorial fantasie, which included arabesques and interlaces (for instance 
Isabella d’Este’s knot emblem called fantasia dei vinci).235 It also helps explain why so many 
grotesques were frankly comical and even scatophiliac: they were owning their affiliation 
with a lowly genre, and foregrounding it. The musical form, as we have said, denoted 
spontaneity and improvisation. This is also a quality that artists could claim for their 
ornament by calling it fantasie (in effect, spontaneity was a key component of the arabesque 
and the virtuosic power of unrehearsed flourishes). Furthermore, some critics used musical 
                                               
229 Folengo 1564. 
230 ‘Phantasia mihi plus quam fantastica venit, / historiam Baldi grassis cantare Camoenis’, ‘A fantasy, more 
fantastic than ever [rather: beyond fantastic], has come to me: to sing with the fat Muses the story of Baldus. 
Folengo 2007, I, p. 2. For the proposed emendation to the translation, see the review of this volume by Gregory 
Hays in The Sixteenth Century Journal, 39(3), 2008, p. 856. 
231 Carboni 1977, p. 251, no. 2881. 
232 Barocchi 1971, p. 3. On the particular moral value of phantasia-based poetry in the sixteenth century, see On 
this topic, see Vintenon 2017. 
233 Field 2001. For Praetorius, the musical Phantasia subitanea (sudden Fantasia) was synonym of a musical 
capriccio, namely a piece where one suddenly leaves a fugue or plays without any score at all. See Walker 
2000, pp. 115-6. 
234 Scholarship in Italian is increasingly ready to call these works nonsense (with the English word). See 
Antonelli and Chiummo 2009; Campione 2011, p. 31. See our discussion of linguistic nonsense in Chapter 2, 
and of amorphism in Chapter 4. 
235 On the fantasia dei vinci, see Kemp 1977a, p. 374. 
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metaphors when talking about the grotesques. Pirro Ligorio, for example, claims that 
although the grotesques seem discordant (pareno assymphoniche), they ‘make a 
symphony’.236 Ligorio uses the term assinfonia in another passage to criticise the figure 
sforzate of Mannerist painting: ‘fanno una assinfonia, una discordia d’infinite desinenzie’, he 
writes, taking the intermedial metaphor from the realm of music to that of poetry — 
desinenzie refer to the sounds of rhymes, likening these paintings a visual cacophony.237 One 
also finds explicit comparisons between musical or lyrical improvisation on stage and the 
making of grotesques. In his True Precepts (1587), Armenini relates the anecdote of a young 
Roman who was extremely talented at quickly making various figures (diverse bizzarrie) of 
putti, animals, mascarons and harpies. The youth is reported to have worked without 
preliminary drawing (senza aver fatto disegno) and with extreme speed (prestezza), ‘merrily 
and without thinking about it’ (felicemente e senza pensarvi). His performative mode of 
execution prompted his patron to affirm that the artist had the same level of ingegno as his 
court poet who could improvise verses.238 
These elements confirm that ornamental fantasie should not be understood simply as 
‘ornamental ideas’. Through this terminology, Cinquecento writers were referring to a genre. 
Predicated on the principle of licence, however, the genre of fantasie was rule-breaking and, 
having no predetermined content, it was also a non-genre or an anti-genre. Additionally, it 
was defined by its secondary importance (in the rule, the invenzione is devised by the 
humanist and the fantasie are left to the painter) and peripheral position (on friezes, frames, 
etc.); it was, in that sense, parapictorial.239 There is, in what the term connotes, something 
post-formal and post-classical — and it is not altogether unrewarding to compare the realm of 
fantasia to the features generally associated with post-modernism.240  
 Pictorial fantasie are sometimes associated with a particular kind of sensorial reaction 
akin to dazzlement, hallucination or hypnosis. Vasari describes some of the spaces of Giulio 
Romano’s Palazzo del Te in the following way: ‘Passing through this great loggia decorated 
                                               
236 Pirro Ligorio, Libro dell’antichità (Turin manuscript), cited from Dacos 1969, p. 163. 
237 Ligorio, Trattato della nobiltà dell’antiche arti, in Barocchi 1971, II, p. 1443. For dseinenzie, see the entry 
‘Rima’ in Vocabolario della Crusca, 1612, p. 711: ‘Somiglianza della terminazione, o desinenza delle parole’.  
238 Armenini 1988, Book 3, Chap. 15, p. 349: ‘il Conte [...] meravigliatosi forte della novità e prestezza di di 
questo fare, disse: io non stimo questo giovane di minor ingegno di quello del nostro poeta, che in Milano fa 
tanta quantit di versi all’improvviso’. Translation from Armenini 1977, p. 291. The bizzarie in question are 
described as ‘un candeliere’ full of ‘arpie, mascare, animali figurine, tabernacoli, puttini, fogliami’. 
239 In the later sixteenth century this peripheral position sometimes becomes inverted with the appearance of 
grotesque-dominated décors. The Sala della Biblioteca in Castel Sant’Angelo is an example. See Morel 1997. 
240 For another approach which proposed to compare Mannerism to the wake of the avant-guardes in the 
twentieth-century on sociological, economic and aesthetic grounds, see Falguières 2004. However inflated the 
term post-modernism has become, the fact that art-historical models of post-classicism and the political and 
moral climate it implies (from Heinrich Wölfflin to Eugenio Battisti) were used to theorize post-modernism 
raises worthwhile questions. 
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with stuccoes, as well as many arms and various other unusual ornaments (ornamenti 
bizarri), one arrives in certain rooms so full of different fantasie that the intellect is dazzled 
there (vi s’abaglia l’intelletto).’241 The verb abbagliare is regarded as the equivalent of the 
Latin allucinor by sixteenth-century dictionaries. 242  It is defined as a bewilderment or 
dazzlement, with an example from Cicero’s Epistles where allucinatio means dreaming or 
letting one’s mind wander. This effect of overwhelming the intellect is tied to the abundance 
(copia) and variety (varetà) of fantasie combined, which can ‘blind the eyes’. 243  This 
‘hallucinatory’ effect is remarkable if we take a step back and examine the semantic 
trajectory of the word fantasia. For most of the word’s history, it meant apparition or 
hallucination; Pico’s De imaginatione still speaks in these terms, and for the physician 
Jacques Guillemeau (1560-1613) hallucinatio and imaginatio are synonymous. 244  The 
semantic expansion it underwent in the early modern vernaculars led it to become not the 
mental apparition but its material expression in drawing or painting. This metonymic shift 
solidified as fantasie became the oft-cited pictorial ‘genre’ we have outlined. This genre is 
regarded as ‘hallucinatory’ by Vasari. In other words, it is regarded as eliciting mental 
fantasie — making the notion go full circle, from the mental realm to the material realm and 





                                               
241 Vasari, Vite, 1568, II, p. 332. Translation from Vasari 1991, p. 370 (with our emendations). The loggia in 
question is the Loggia di David; the ‘certain rooms’ are the Camera degli Stucchi, the Camera degli Imperatori 
and the Camera degli Giganti, the last-mentioned being the focus of Vasari’s attention in this passage. 
242 ‘Abbagliare’ and ‘abbagliamento’ in Minerbi 1553, p. Aii(r), which give ‘allucinor’ and ‘allucinatio’. The 
example is from Cicero, Ep. ad Quint. Frat. 2, 10, 1: ‘epistulae nostrae debent interdum allucinari’. 
243 This is expressed in another passage where Vasari uses ‘abbagliare’ for bedazzlement. See Vite 1568, II, p. 
992: ‘…conoscendo non poter fare cosa buona, se non con gran copia d’ornamenti, gl’occhi abagliando di chi 
avea a vedere quell’opera con la varietà di molte figure.’ 
244 Park 1984, chap. 7, § 5: ‘Hinc [phantasia] plures sub unica imagine numeros hallucinatur’, the phantasia 
‘hallucinates’ many images where there is only one (a passage we shall extensively comment on in chapter 5). 
Our reference is to Jacques Guillemeau’s Traité des maladies de l’oeil (1585); Guillemeau’s colleague, André 
Du Laurens, also calls hallucinations ‘imaginations’ in his Discours de la conservation de la veüe, des maladies 











… it cannot ever imagine anything which it 
hasn’t seen; if not as a whole, at least in its parts. 
 
– Gelli, The Circe (1549) 
 
 
In this chapter, we attempt to provide an overview of the beliefs most commonly shared by 
artists about fantasia and immaginazione in the sixteenth-century, in particular with respect to 
its role in the making of art. Our focus shall not so much lie on the questions of where and 
why the imagination exists, which have most concerned historians of the imagination thus far 
— namely the problem of where the imagination was located in the body, respectively in the 
ventricles of the brain, and what was its function. Rather, we look in particular at the question 
— of much greater relevance to artists — of how the imagination functioned, and what it was 
able to make.   
 
2.1. Fantasia’s Oxymorons 
 
An Italian artist looking for information on the imagination circa 1530 could have turned his 
attention to one of the psychology manuals in volgare that circulated among university 
students, curiosi and other laymen.245 We may take, as a starting point to our discussion, one 
of the most current of these texts: Melchiorre da Parma’s Trattato de anima (1499).246 In his 
discussion of the imagination, Melchiorre follows the medieval tradition (probably initiated 
by Al-Farabi 247 ) of distinguishing between the retentive imagination (which he calls 
                                               
245 On vernacular philosophy, besides the references quoted in our introduction, see Goyens, Leemans, and 
Smets 2008; d’Alverny 1994. On the figure of the Renaissance curieux or curioso, see Pomian 1987; on 
curiosity, Kenny 1998. 
246 On Melchiorre da Parma (d. 1520), also known as Melchiorre Frizzoli, and his text, see Senna 2005, pp. 11-
34. We quote from the 1537 reedition. 
247 Wolfson 1935, p. 93. It is attributed to Avicenna by Michelle Karnes in Karnes 2011, pp. 41-2. 
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imaginativa) and the manipulative imagination (which he calls phantasia or cogitativa, 
interchangeably): 
 
MICRO. Vorrei sapere qual sia l[’]atto 
e l’opera sua che mi facia conoscere 
l’anima. 
THEO. Dice il predetto che l[’]atto e 
l’opera della cogitatiua si e, far 
compositione delle specie e similitudini 
le qual si conseruano nella imaginatiua. 
E dice che nella imaginatiua si ritruoua 
la similitudine dil sol e la similitudine 
della verdura. E che per questo la 
cogitatiua puottia componere insieme 
quelle doe specie dil sol e dil verde che 
sono nella imaginatiua e farte cogitare 
el sol verde quantunque cossi non sia. 
MICRO. Adonque per la virtu 
cogitatiua pottia cosi cogitare le cose 
false como le vere. 
THEO. Questa sequella e verissima. E 
tu ben comprehendi che frequentemente 
cossi se fa. E questo si e perche essa 
cogitatiua truoua le specie delle cose 
sentite conseruate nella imaginatiua. Et 
accompagnando l[’]una con l[’]altra 
cogita il sol con la verdura il fuocho 
con la fredura l’asino con le coma di 
ceruo e con la coda di serpente e con il 
capo di leone e quantunque dette spetie 
non si conuengano insieme realmente: 
niente di manco quando tu cogiti l’una 
e l’altra la cogitatione tua si ha vno 
concetto composito de quelle, cioe de 
l’uno e de l’altro di che tu cogiti. 
MICRO. Vorrei sappere se qual che 
cosa si truoua nel mondo di fuora da la 
cogitatiua che sia composita de quelle 
specie disconueniente secondo quella 
tale compositione della cogitatiua como 
seria sol verde asino uolante fuoco 
fredo neue calda irco ceruo. 
THEO. Ben se rituoua nel mondo di 
fuora della cogitatiua tutte le cose delle 
specie residente nella imaginatiua delle 
quali specie la cogitatiua fe le dette 
compositioni. Ma non si ritroua cosa 
alcuna al mondo fuora della cogitatiua 
che sia composita secondo la 
compositione tale de quelle 
disconueniente specie. E pero tale 
Microcosmo (M): I would like to know 
what is the action and the operation of 
[the cogitativa], so that I can know the 
[human] soul. 
Theosebia (T): The aforementioned 
author [i.e. Albertus Magnus] says that 
the action of the cogitativa is to 
compose the impressions and likenesses 
which are conserved in the imaginativa. 
And he says that the imaginativa 
contains impressions of the sun and 
impressions of greenery. And therefore, 
the cogitativa can compose together 
these two impressions of the sun and of 
greenness which are in the imaginativa 
and make you think of a green sun 
although such a thing does not exist. 
M: The cogitativa, then, can think up 
false things as well as true ones. 
T: This conclusion is absolutely correct. 
And you understand, no doubt, that such 
a thing happens often. Because the 
cogitativa reaches out to the images of 
things perceived kept in the 
imaginativa. And bringing together one 
and the other, it can think up a sun 
covered in greenery, [or] fire which is 
cold, or a donkey with the antlers of a 
deer, the tail of a snake and the head of 
a lion, although these impressions do 
not fit together in real life. In truth, 
when you think of two things your 
thinking blends them into one conceit 
composed of both. 
M: I would like to know if there is a 
thing in the world out of the cogitativa 
which is composed of the ill-matched 
impressions of this kind of composition 
done by the cogitativa, such as for 
example a green sun, a flying donkey, 
cold fire, hot snow, or a goat-stag. 
T: You may in effect find in the outside 
world all of the impressions located in 
the imaginativa from which the 
cogitativa makes its compositions. But 
there is nothing outside of the cogitativa 
that corresponds to compositions of ill-
matched impressions such as these. 
 63 
compositione si adimandino chimere e 
figmenti a cui nientie corresponde in te 
extra. 
MICRO. Vorrei sapere, se cosi como 
questa cogitatiua fa compositione de 
disconueniente specie. Possa anchora 
fare compositione de conueniente 
specie. 
THEO. Ella puol fare compositione de 
tutte le specie residente nella 
imaginatiua cosi delle conueniente 
como discoueniente secondo ch’ella 
cogita. Ma conueniente compositione si 
e sotto raggione di verita e questo e 
quando la cogita la specie humana a la 
specie animalina insieme questa tal 
compositione e sotto raggione di verita: 
pero che ueramente lhuomo si e animal. 
E quando ella cogita la spetie humana e 
la spetie asinina insieme questa 
compositione si e sotto raggione di 
falsita se si douesse affirmar essere 
cossi pero che non e vero che l’huomo 
sia asino. 
MICR. Vorrei sapere si queste 
cogitatiua ha altro nome. 
THEO. Alcuni la dimandino cogitatiua 
e alcuni la dimandino phantasia o virtu 
fantastica.248 
Thus these compositions are called 
chimeras and figments, to which 
nothing corresponds out there. 
M: I would like to know whether the 
cogitativa, since it combines ill-matched 
impressions, can also combine matching 
impressions. 
T: It can compose using any of the 
impressions located in the imaginativa, 
both matching and ill-matched, 
depending on what it thinks up. We 
speak of an appropriate association 
when it is done according to reason; and 
this is the case when [for example] it 
thinks of the human ‘species’ and the 
animal ‘species’ together, because man 
is really an animal. But when it thinks 
of the animal species and the asinine 
species together, such a composition 
should be regarded as false, because it is 
not true that man is a donkey. 
M: I would like to know if this 
cogitativa has another name. 
T: Some people call her cogitativa and 
some call her phantasia, or virtù 
fantastica. 
 
We gather from this conversation between Microcosmo (the pupil) and Theosebia (his 
teacher) that the phantasia still belongs to man’s perceptual system, as it is informed by 
sense-impressions located in the imaginativa and brought there by the common sense which 
gathers sensoria from the five senses. It is a receptive faculty, not a productive one. Yet it is 
also at a remove from reality, as it possesses its own agency over images. As a consequence 
phantasia can err, a point which seems to be of high relevance to Melchiorre. Yet unlike 
other general handbooks of the period such as the Margarita philosophica, Melchiorre also 
appreciates the phantasia as a fiction-making power. He gives us a revealing catalogue of 
such fictions: a green sun, a chimerical creature, a flying donkey, ‘cold fire’, or ‘hot snow’.  
 The imagination composes: it can juxtapose, or break the real into fragments and 
combine it into new wholes. As we shall discuss in more detail further on, it is notable that 
the imagination doesn’t simply operate with images or visual sense-impressions, but also 
with what seems to be predicates, epithets or notions (Melchiorre calls the compound 
                                               
248 da Parma 1537, Lib. I, § 72-82. Melchiorre quotes the pseudo-Albertian Compendium theologicae veritatis, 
however the reference doesn’t match. 
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concetto). In that Melchiorre already highlights a certain poetic dimension of the imagination, 
which will also be addressed in this chapter. He appears to see the imagination as a generator 
of oxymorons (cold fire, hot snow), hinting at a series of stylistic qualities which will 
resonate with fantasia: hybridity, incongruity, contradiction, falsity, but also discordia 
concors and coincidentia oppositorum – an aesthetics not unlike that of the cadavre exquis. 
 The phantasia, however, does not seem to be able to create spontaneously. It makes 
do with what the imaginativa has stored; and what the imaginativa has stored, it received 
from the senses. Melchiorre insists on the fact that even if the compounds have no equivalent 
in reality, their individual parts do. In our discussion, we shall expand on the question of 
whether artists and trattatisti shared this view, and whether Melchiorre meant this as an 
explanation or rather as a statement of the limits of fantasia’s powers, which would remain, 
in the constitutive elements of its creations, grounded in reality. 
 
2.2.  The Teratogological Faculty 
 
Among the array of fictional fantasmi cited by Melchiorre, the most typical is the chimera.249 
In that he makes an ambivalent use of the term specie, meaning both ‘sense-impressions’ and 
‘species’, since the chimera can also be understood as a form of cross-breeding as it 
interbreeds different creatures (especially in Melchiorre’s references to ‘spetie humana’ and 
‘spetie asinina’ at the end).  
 The making of chimeras is of course at the heart of the locus classicus on decorum 
from the Ars poetica (verses 1 ff), which any painter would have known. In this passage, 
Horace does not explicitly refer to a particular faculty of the mind. Yet a number of artist-
writers associated Horace’s reference to the painters’ ‘placing together’ (iungere) of members 
from different animals with the activity of the fantasia, which may indicate their awareness 
of the understanding of fantasia as a ‘teratological’ faculty in the psychological literature. 
This was already suggested in Cennino Cennini’s Libro, where the assertion of the painter’s 
‘freedom to compose a figure [...] half-man, half-horse as he pleases, according to his 
imagination’ immediately followed the statement that painting requires ‘fantasia and skill of 
hand, in order to discover things not seen, hiding themselves under the shadow of natural 
objects, and to fix them with the hand, presenting to plain sight what does not actually 
exist.’250 Pomponio Gaurico’s allusion to the Horatian locus classicus also closely followed 
                                               
249 An overview of the place of the chimera in philosophical reasoning is given by Sillitti 1980, and Ebbesen 
1985, pp. 115-144 (up to the 14th century). Focusing on the early modern period, see Doyle 2012a, pp. 95-126. 
250 Cennini 2003, chap. 1. 
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his assertion that the sculptor should be euphantasiotos (‘imaginative’), a notion Gaurico 
borrowed from Quintilian’s discussion of enargeia. Horace’s statement, therefore, was not 
only read in its original sense as pertaining to licence and decorum, but also as an illustration 
of how the mind typically produces fiction, by association with the theory of the combinatory 
imagination.251  
 The figures of so-called grotesque ornament rediscovered in the ruins of the Domus 
Aurea at the end of the fifteenth century, being denounced by Vitruvius as ‘impossible’, were 
also subsumed under the classical trope of controversial hybridity. 252  They were called 
‘mixes (misti)’ (Barbaro), ‘mixtures (mescugli)’ (Cellini), ‘interminglings (entremeslements)’ 
(Vauquelin de la Fresnaye) and ‘chimeras (chimere)’ (Doni). By virtue of their very 
compositional mode, therefore, they were often termed fantasie, and were once interpreted as 
accidental confusions having taken place in the fantasia during sleep, in the tradition of 
understanding dream vision as a paradoxical activity of the imagination which presents the 
mind with a jumble of sensoria accumulated during daytime.253 This was the reading of 
Daniele Barbaro, commenting on Vitruvius’s treatise: ‘Just like the Fantasia in sleep presents 
us confusedly with the images of things, and often puts together diverse natures, we may say 
that the Grotesques are made in the same way, and without a doubt they may be called 
dreams of painting.’ 254  Cardinal Gabriele Paleotti, some twenty-five years later, also 
compared grotesques to a feverish nightmare in which ‘all the humors rush to the fantasia 
where they generate various confusions of things which in a dream the fantasia represents 
intertwined together in the enfeebled head of the sick man’.255 
 The act of assembling different animals’ limbs in a seemingly arbitrary fashion, all 
hovering against a homogenous white background as if they were mere ‘ideas’, was indeed 
the favourite compositional mode of sixteenth-century grotesques. These fantasie rapidly 
moved away from the binary, two-species grotesques imitated from examples of the Neronian 
period (typically half-woman, half-plant) to become more complex, multi-species 
compounds. This can be seen in the grotesques of the Vatican Loggias by Raphael and his 
assistants, which conflate human, animal, insect and floral elements (Fig. 2.1). In the Palazzo 
Farnese at Gradoli some four years later, the collages have evolved to incorporate ten kinds 
of elements or more, ranging from the artificial (ribbons and volutes) to the anthropomorphic 
                                               
251 Seiler 2014, pp. 111-154. Horace himself had already pointed in that direction by comparing his monsters to 
‘the dreams of a sick man’. 
252 On the valences of hybridity, see Lazarus 2016, pp. 149-183; Casanova-Robin 2009; Moffitt 1996, pp. 303-
333; Schmidgen 2013; Schmidt 2013. 
253 See notably Gallop 1996. 
254 Vitruvius 1556, Book VII, chap. 5, p. 188. 
255 Paleotti, Discorso, Lib. II, chap. 41, in Barocchi 1960, II, p. 444. 
 66 
(Fig. 2.2). Particularly significant are the grotesques painted by Luca Signorelli and his 
collaborators around 1500 in the San Brizio Chapel of the Duomo at Orvieto (Fig. 2.3). 
Signorelli visibly attempted to make his figures look as animated as possible, as if alive. His 
horse-monster seems to be rearing up while twisting its head backwards, rebelling against the 
sphinx-like chimera that rests on its back. Its heavy testicles rub on the stem of an impossible 
flower made of an infinite series of grafts and supporting a feathered homunculus. 
Empedocles, in the central oculus, is unable to pose for the viewer, as he seems frightened by 
these figures who seemed alive to him as well (Fig. 2.4).256 In spite of the liveliness of his 
figures, however, Signorelli clearly wants to signal that his monsters are mescugli of limbs 
and parts of independent origins. He achieves this by colouring every body part with a 
distinct hue, yet blending the tones together where necessary in order to illustrate their 
seamless fusion. Every limb, every joint, every layer of feathers displays its separate origin. 
Even the textures are distinguished, with the fur on the horse’s neck contrasting with the 
shiny shell of its arthropodic legs. By stressing this combinatorial strategy, Signorelli was 
probably trying to convey that his inventions were exercises of his far-reaching fantasia, 
precise in its knowledge yet free in its associations. The same strategy was observed in the 
composition of monster figures around 1500 by Claudia Swan, and in the making of medieval 
droleries by Michael Camille.257 
 
2.3.  Fantasia and Pictorial Composition 
 
The main verb used by Melchiorre to describe the activity of the virtù fantastica is comporre. 
The same is true of the other popular treatises expounding faculty psychology, from the 
Margarita philosophica (1499) to, for example, Antonio Maria Venusti’s Discorso generale 
(1562), a compendium of medicine and anthropology which owed its chapters on human 
proportion to the input of the painter Girolamo Figino: 
 
Fantasia has the power and ability to compose images with images, and intentions 
with intentions, and images with intentions. It composes images with images in 
three ways: by recognizing a thing as being [for example] either black or white; by 
composing various forms; and by creating chimeras.258 
                                               
256 Empedocles is evidently frightened by the apocalyptic scene taking place in the lunette above the panel. 
However the scene may also be read as a simultaneous statement by Signorelli on the frightening nature of the 
grotesques. This reading was proposed notably dy David Y. Kim in the paper ‘Un voyage souterrain dans 
l’image’ at the conference L’Europe des images, Collège de France, 5 June 2018. 
257 Camille 2000, p. 200; Swan 2015.  
258 Venusti 1562, p. 49r. For other instances of comporre describing the fantasia’s activity, see: Tommaso 
Porcacchi’s 1566 commentary on Orlando Furioso, Canto Settimo, cited in Emison 2004, p. 206, n. 80: ‘la 
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As Michael Baxandall has shown, the term comporre, anchored in the Latin compositio, had 
a rhetorical pedigree before it was applied to the visual arts.259 As such, it could refer to the 
arrangement of arguments, ideas or events, as much as figures, shapes or colours.260 Yet in 
view of the prevalence, in the psychological literature itself, of the pictorial metaphor 
portraying the fantasia as an inner artist, the usage of this term raises the question of the 
deeper, structural affinities which may have existed between the fantasia’s modus operandi 
as ‘bricolagist’ and the fundamental tenets of pictorial composition as they developed since 
the Quattrocento.261 The fantasia, as the examples cited hitherto make clear, is first and 
foremost a composer of body parts. Charles Hope has shown how, in the Renaissance up to 
Vasari, pictorial compositio was understood in a much narrower sense than its rhetorical 
counterpart, as referring principally to the design of the human (or, more rarely, animal) 
figure.262 In De pictura Alberti characterizes compositione as the ‘procedure of painting 
whereby, in a work of painting, the parts are composed.’263 The favoured ‘part’ or unit of 
composition for Alberti is the limb. His view is indebted to the ancient (most extensively 
discussed by Vitruvius) understanding of the figure as an arrangement of parts, providing the 
basis for a conception of beauty as concinnitas264 — which etymologically means ‘skilfully 
put together’ or, as one author put it, ‘attillato aggregamento’.265 ‘It is the task and aim of 
concinnitas’, writes Alberti, ‘to compose parts that are quite separate from each other by 
nature, according to some precise rule, so that they correspond to one another in 
appearance’.266 In short, Alberti’s ‘ontology of pictures’ has two peculiar features which 
resonate with the mechanisms of fantasia: the living figure (animal, predominantly man) is 
                                                                                                                                                  
Fantasia [...] compone imaginationi da se medesima; le quali non sono, & non possono essere mai’; Danti 1567, 
cap. XV: ‘la nostra imaginativa compone il particolare’; Comanini speaks of virtù fantastica as ‘l’ufficio della 
quale è di ricevere le specie apportate dagli esteriori sensi al senso commune, e di ritenerle, et ancora di 
comporle insieme’ (Figino, in Barocchi 1960, I, 392). 
259 Baxandall 1971, pp. 130-9. See also van Eck 2007, pp. 23-26. 
260 Fehrenbach 2003, pp. 178-83. 
261  The presence of the word comporre in expositions of the imagination’s workings was also noted by 
Puttfarken 2000, p. 52, and Quiviger 2000, pp. 45-57. 
262 Hope 2000, pp. 27-44. 
263 Alberti 2011b, Book II, chap. 35, p. 55. 
264 Tatarkiewicz termed ‘form A’ the archaic notion of form in ancient aesthetics, understood as an ‘arrangement 
of parts’, and probably originating in the Pythagoreans. See Tatarkiewicz 1980, p. 220 and pp. 222-8. The motto 
pulchritudo est apta partium coniuctio was still a defining understanding of beauty throughout the Middle Ages 
(ibid., p. 127). Recent discussions include: Konstan 2015; Carruthers 2013. 
265 Firenzuola 1552, pp. 11v: ‘concinità [...] quel vocabolo [...] quasi vuol dire uno attillato aggregamento’. In 
the definition of beauty given by Firenzuola, it is clear that we find ourselves in a combinatorial system of this 
kind; the parts are understood as existing separately, and beauty depends on the quality of their joining together: 
‘la belleza non è altro che una ordinata concordia e quasi una armonia occultamente risultante dalla 
composizione, unione e commissione di più membri diversi e diversamente da sé e in sé [...]; i quali, prima che 
alla formazione d’un corpo si uniscano, sono tra loro differenti e discrepanti’ (ibid., pp. 11v-12r). 
266 Alberti 1988, book 9. We will return to the role of imagination in the formation of perfectly beautiful human 
figures later on. 
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the archetypal constituent of a picture, and often implicitly subsumed under terms such as 
figura (or composto in Cinquecento literature); this approach to the figure entails reducing it 
to smaller components (parti, membra), the juncture of which represents the main challenge 
of the act of design. By analogy, most psychological accounts of fantasia understand the term 
specie as referring to a (human or animal) figure; and the fantasia’s chief task lies in the re-
assembling of the figure’s components. 
 Alberti did not specify whether he understood the task of compositio as taking place 
in the mind or outside of it in various acts of sketching on paper. He probably would not have 
framed the discussion in terms of fantasia, preferring faculties such as ratio (reason), 
ingenium and intellect, and the Ciceronian values of acumen and diligentia.267 Fantasia had 
too strong a connotation of irrational, chaotic compositional power; the terminology of 
Renaissance descriptions of the imagination oscillated, in fact, between composizione and 
confusione.268 But it is probable that Alberti’s views were understood by many as referring to 
an act of the fantasia. 
 This is the interpretation made by Vincenzo Danti, one of the foremost proponents of 
a classical ‘Vitruvian-Albertian’ view of composition in the Cinquecento, in his unfinished 
Trattato delle perfette proportioni (1567). For Danti, the fundamental element of any 
pictorial work is what he terms a composto, literally ‘compound’, understood as an aggregate 
of parts named membra (members).269 The very possibility of beauty hinges on the composto, 
as perfect proportions ‘cannot be found in anything unless it is composed of several parts’, 
called composto di parti.270 The composto is essential to Danti’s ontology; his praise of 
Michelangelo highlights the great master’s talent by quoting the ‘difficulty of his composto’ 
(difficultà del suo composto).271  
                                               
267 See notably Alberti 1988, 9, 5, p. 302: ‘When you make judgements on beauty, you do not follow mere 
fancy, but the workings of a reasoned faculty inborn in the mind [...] for every body consists of parts that are 
fixed and individual [...] if these are removed [...] or transferred somewhere inappropriate, the very composition 
will be spoiled that gives the body its seemly appearance’. On Alberti’s relation to mental faculties, see notably 
Kemp 1977a, p. 351; Marr et al. 2018. 
268 See for example Francesco Bonciani, Lezione sopra la prosopopea (1578), in Weinberg 1974, III, p. 242: 
‘…avendo noi varie cose conosciute, la fantasia nostra confonde talore la nature di esse’; Barabro: ‘la Fantasia 
nel sogno ci rappresenta confusamente le immagini delle cose, e spesso pone insieme nature diverse...’; da Schio 
[Daniele Barbaro] 1542, p. 17-8: ‘la Fantasia nel sogno ci rappresenta confusamente le immagini delle cose, e 
spesso pone insieme nature diverse...’; Gabriele Paleotti, Discorso (1584), II, chap. 41, in Barocchi 1960, II, p. 
444: ‘...si vanno generando nella fantasia varie confusioni di cose...’. All the italics in the above citations are 
ours. On confusione and its relation to capriccio, see Boschloo 2008, pp. 63-81. 
269 On the notion of composto, see also van Eck 2014, pp. 1-14; Payne 1998, pp. 273-94. 
270 Danti, Primo libro, in Barocchi 1960, I, p. 215: ‘L’ordine adunque intendo che sia come una causa o vero 
mezzo, da cui dependano tutte le perfette proporzioni: e che non possa haver luogo in alcuna cosa, laquale non 
sia composta di piu parti, anzi bisogna, che egli nasca da un composto di parti [...]’. 
271 Danti, Primo libro, in Barocchi 1960, I, p. 213. The notion of ‘composto difficile’ is explained later on. See 
Barocchi 1960, I, pp. 220-1: ‘Può la perfezione del composto ordinato, del quale si è di sopra detto, esser al 
mettere in atto facile, difficile et impossibile. Facile sarà quando esso composto averà in sé poche parti; dificile, 
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 In the last chapter of his text, Danti reveals his endorsement of the combinatorial 
understanding of imagination. In order to design a perfect being (in this case a perfect 
animal), Danti explains, one must observe the animal as it moves, and from these movements 
understand the purpose of each member, allowing us to conceive its perfect form; and ‘from 
the example of the perfect parts that we see in the universal of the species of each animal our 
imagination (imaginativa) composes the particular, perfect and proportioned animal of any 
species [i.e. appearance] in his mind.’272 
 
2.4.  Composite Perfection 
 
The question of the mental conception of a perfect form represents a particular challenge to 
any empiricist conception of fantasia. In the context of this question, we may expect the 
trattatisti to turn to a Platonic understanding of artistic creativity — whereby perfect form is 
the imitation of a transcendental Idea contemplated mentally by the artist. Toward the last 
third of the fifteenth century, the wave of Neoplatonism which took Italy (and Florence in 
particular) by storm offered much, in its approach to knowledge and art, to recast this 
dominant empirical view of mimesis, and to revive a transcendental understanding of 
phantasia which had access to higher, perfect forms. The spiritualist doctrines defended by 
Marsilio Ficino undoubtedly led some to affirm that the artist should aim for a work which 
goes beyond the imperfections of nature and tends toward an ideal of beauty in the sense of 
Plato’s supraterrestrial Form of Beauty. 273  Though it was tied to a number of ancient 
anecdotes about artists turning away from the observable world in order to reach a divine 
form (Phidias’s Zeus, Euphranor’s Poseidon), this view ran against the empiricist primacy of 
observation, and it would not be integrated into Italian art theory until the later sixteenth 
century.274 It undeniably left its mark on a generation of artists in the first decades of the 
Cinquecento nevertheless. Chief amongst them is Michelangelo, whose poems repeatedly 
suggest that the artist, while sculpting, follows a conceit (concetto) found in his intellect, with 
little reference to observation. Michelangelo’s poetry prefers the higher intelletto, mente or 
                                                                                                                                                  
quando n’averà assai; et impossibile, quando la mente, composta nell’idea una imagine, o non averà materia atta 
a ricevere quella forma, o vero la mano, per alcuna cagione, non la potrà mettere in atto’. 
272 Danti, Primo libro, in Barocchi 1960, I, p. 265: ‘dall’esempio delle perfette parti che nell’universale della 
specie di ciascuno animale si veggiono la nostra imaginativa compone il particolare, perfetto, proporzionato 
animale di qual si voglia specie nella sua mente.’ 
273 See in particular Toussaint 2017, pp. 146–173; Chastel 1996. 
274 Notably with Gregorio Comanini’s imitazione fantastica (a dramatic revaluation of the Sophistic imitatio 
phantastica probably found in Marsilio Ficino’s commentary to Plato’s Sophist, which Ficino, like Comanini, 
misunderstood), and the divine origin of Zuccari’s disegno interno, although both authors affirm, in other 
passages, the necessity of proceeding from sensory experience. Franciscus Junius’s De pictura veterum adopts a 
wholly transcendental view of phantasia as an imitation of the Idea. 
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ingegno and avoids the term fantasia – used once in a negative sense.275 The most important 
extant trace of Neoplatonic art theory resulting from this artistic reception of Ficinism, 
however, amply integrates fantasia in this visionary scheme. This is the extensive De pintura 
antiga by the Portuguese Francisco de Holanda, Michelangelo’s friend and one of his greatest 
admirers, completed in 1548. The treatise was left in manuscript form and not printed until 
the nineteenth century. It had no impact on the development of Italian art theory.276 The text 
nevertheless attributes an unusually central place to the imagination. One of the many 
definitions of art it offers is in chapter 2: ‘[painting] is great imagination [imaginação], which 
places before your eyes what was cogitated so secretly in the idea, displaying what was never 
yet seen, or perhaps never existed, which is more’. 277  The visionary conception to the 
imagination it adopts deserves to be quoted in extenso: 
 
The first starting point of this science and noble art [of painting] is the invention 
or order, or selection, which I call the idea, which must exist in the mind. And 
being the noblest part of painting, it is not seen from without or made with the 
hand, but only with great fantasy and the imagination [grande fantasia e a 
imaginação]. [...] When the most vigilant and most excellent painter wants to 
embark on some great enterprise, he will first form an idea in his imagination 
[imaginação] and he must conceive in his will the invention that the work is to 
have. He will fix and determine in his fantasy [fantasia] with great care and 
judiciousness the beauty, and the mode, the condition and the nonchalance or 
readiness of manner that he wants the figure or the historia that he decides upon to 
have; and after he has exercised his imagination [(verb) imaginado] at length in 
this meditation and rejected many things, and has chosen the most beautiful and 
purest of the good, when he has already thought it over very thoroughly in his 
mind, even if he has worked with nothing but spirit [espírito], without having put 
a hand to the work, it may seem to him that he has already done the greater part of 
it. [...] He will put his idea and conception [ideia e conceito] very rapidly into 
execution, before it is lost to him or diminished by any disturbance; and if it is 
possible for him to station himself with the stylus in his hand and do it blindfold, 
it would be better, in order to not lose that divine furor and image that he carries in 
his imagination [fantasia]. [...] When he has equalled the excellence of his fantasy 
and imagination [fantasia e imaginação] with that of his hand, then they must 
crown his head with laurels.278 
                                               
275 Buonarroti 1991, no. 285, p. 476: ‘Onde l’affettüosa fantasia / che l’arte mi fece idol e monarca / conosco 
ben com’era d’error carca / e quel c’a mal suo grado ogn’om desia [So now I recognize how laden with error / 
was the affectionate fantasia / that made art an idol and sovereign to me / like all things men want in spite of 
their best interests]’. The recipient of the sonnet, written in 1554, was Vasari. Michelangelo uses the verb 
immaginare several times in other poems — on which see our chapter 4 — but not the noun immaginazione. 
276 Hollanda 2013, in particular the introduction essay by Charles Hope. 
277 Hollanda 2013, chap. 2, p. 74. 
278 Hollanda 2013, chap. 14, pp. 95-6. For the original Portuguese text, see Hollanda 1984. See also chap. 15, in 
Hollanda 2013, pp. 96-8: ‘The idea in painting is an image that the understanding of the painter has to see with 
inner eyes, in the greatest silence and secrecy; and he has to imagine [imaginar] it and choose the rarest and 
most excellent one that his imagination [imaginação] and prudence can arrive at, like an example that is 
dreamed or seen in the sky or in some other place, which he must follow and then desire to emend and put forth 
with the work of his hands exactly as he conceived it and saw it in his understanding.’ Note that Charles Hope 
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De Holanda’s text, which Elisabetta di Stefano proposes to regard as the ‘only Neoplatonic 
artistic treatise of the Renaissance’, is exceptional in the freedom from sense perception it 
attributes to the imagination.279 Varchi, who was the first Cinquecento author to publish a full 
account of artistic creativity relying on the Platonic Idea (in the first of his Due lezioni, 1549, 
pronounced in March 1547), was resolutely attached to the fantasia’s dependency on the 
senses. Even Vasari, who took up the idea terminology in his 1568 definition of disegno, still 
regarded the concetto as tied to the observation of the visually ‘given’, as Panofsky 
observed.280 This is probably due to the greater traction of Aristotelianism in the third and 
fourth decade of the sixteenth century and the simultaneous decline of Ficinism. The early 
trattatisti of the 1540s and 1550s were certainly trying to align their statements with the most 
popular and respected view. 
 Therefore the most widespread accounts of the creation of perfect form rely on a 
combinatorial, rather than transcendental, imaginative process. This can be observed in 
relation to the oft-discussed method for making an image of a perfectly beautiful woman. The 
method used by Zeuxis for his Helen of Croton, made from the most beautiful body parts of 
five maids the painter had summoned as (partial) sitters,281 begins to be understood by some 
trattatisti as an act of mentally assembling the fragments in the imagination, rather than 
working from the life one sitter at a time and then arranging the drawn parts together. The 
interpretation certainly testifies to the currency of a combinatorial understanding of the 
fantasia. By internalizing the compositional act, locating it in the mind rather than in the 
hand, this reading corroborated the ennobling view that artistic images arise in the mind 
before any manual work takes place,282 whilst at the same time being consistent with the 
                                                                                                                                                  
has argued that idea in this passage does not refer to Platonic ideas, but rather to the kind of invention an artist 
can derive from looking at clouds, in the spirit of Leonardo’s famous remarks. This is convincing if the passage 
is read in isolation, but much less when read in the context of the chapter that immediately precedes it, where it 
is question of an idea ‘not seen from without’ and to be executed ‘blindfold’. See Charles Hope, ‘Francisco de 
Holanda and Art Theory, Humanism, and Neoplatonism in Italy’, in Hollanda 2013, pp. 45-64, p. 55. For a 
different reading of the passage, see Deswarte-Rosa 1991a, pp. 20-41; Deswarte-Rosa 1991b, pp. 45-65. 
279 Di Stefano 2004, p. 14. 
280 Panofsky 1968, p. 82. 
281 On the myth, see chiefly: Mansfield 2007; Reckermann 1993, pp. 98-132; Baxandall 1971, pp. 35 ff. 
282 Leonardo, Cod. Urb. 5r (McM 35), in da Vinci 1989, p. 32: ‘... ciò che è nell’universo per essenza, presenza 
o immaginazione, esso [pittore] lo ha prima nella mente, e poi nelle mani [whatever there is in the universe 
through essence, presence or imagination, he [the painter] has it first in his mind and then in his hands]’; 
Leonardo, Cod. Urb. 38v (McM 256) in da Vinci 1989, p. 225: ‘attenderai prima col disegno a dare con 
dimostrativa forma all'occhio la intenzione e la invenzione fatta in prima nella tua imaginativa [apply yourself 
first through draftsmanship to giving a visual embodiment to your intention and the invention which took form 
first in your imagination]’; Benedetto Varchi 1550, p. 18: ‘ma quello è solo vero Maestro, che puo perfettamente 
mettere in opera colle mani quello, che egli s'è perfettamente immaginato col ceruello [the only true master is 
one who can perfectly realise in a work what he has perfectly imagined in the mind]’; Pirro Ligorio, Libro della 
nobilità delle antiche arti, Archivio di Stato di Torino, Ms J.a.II.15, Vol. 29, fol. 28r: ‘essa [pittura] è prima 
nell’iddea di sapienti, di cogitanti, nella imaginatione [painting is first in the Idea of the learned, of the thinkers, 
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Neoplatonic view propounded by Ficino according to which beauty had no material form and 
could not appear to the senses. The idea is echoed in the claim, found for example in Giulia 
Bigolina’ Urania, that perfect beauty cannot be seen with the eye, but can only appear to the 
imagination.283  
 We have seen how Danti locates the making of the perfectly proportioned creature in 
the imaginativa. Francesco de’ Vieri was more precise, claiming that the universal Idea of 
beauty is found in the possible intellect (intelletto possibile) of the painter, while the 
particular form of a gracious woman (‘of Helen, of Laura, or of some similar individual’) is 
in his fantasia.284  
 The affinity between the forming of a perfect female figure and the fantasia’s unruly 
agglomerations is so strong that one author even nicknamed the ideal woman a ‘chimera’.285 
In his dialogue Delle bellezze delle donne (1548, republ. 1552), Agnolo Firenzuola assigns to 
the image of the ideal woman the iconic status of purely imaginary, since only an effort of 
the imagination can bring it into existence. The implicit message behind Firenzuola’s 
statement is that man-made perfect form is not an approximation of some eternal and 
universal Form. It remains a mere act of bricolage, a collage, a makeshift patchwork… 
 
…and there is really no better term for it than “chimera”, for just as the chimera is 
imagined and cannot be found (imaginata e non trovata), so also that beautiful 
woman we wish to create (fingere) will be imagined and not be found. And we 
will sooner see what one should have in order to be beautiful that what one has, 
without disparaging on account of this the beauty of you ladies here present or of 
others who are not here. Although they themselves do not embody complete 
beauty, nevertheless, they have enough of it to be complimented and considered 
beautiful. Now let us come to our chimera ...286   
                                                                                                                                                  
in the imagination’ (cited from Schreurs 2000, p. 429; translation from Coffin 2003, p. 141); Lomazzo 1973, II, 
p. 416: ‘... innanzi a tutte le cose solevano concipere nella sua idea la forma di qualunque cose si proponevano 
di fare, e prima che si ponessero a voler disegnare, tutta benissimo vederla con la imaginazione [before any 
undertaking they used to conceive in their mind the form of the thing they intedned to design and, before 
starting to draw, they would observe it clearly in their imagination]’; in an early form in Alberti, Della pittura, 
1, 24 in Sinisgalli 2006, p. 156: ‘Seguita ad istituire il pittore in che modo possa seguire colla mano quanto arà 
coll’ingegno compreso’ (Latin version: ‘quae mente conceperit’). 
283 Nissen 2011, p. 153. For Francisco de Holanda, this composite perfection could only be seen ‘with interior 
eyes in the greatest silence and secrecy’ (Hollanda 1984, p. 95). The question remains open of how the finished 
painting of the Helen, being material and visible, acheived perfect beauty. Some argued, logically, that it 
couldn’t. According to Lodovico Dolce, acheiving perfect beauty in a single figure was practically impossible 
due to God’s scattering of the most comely fragments too far and wide in the world (undated letter to Gasparo 
Ballini, first published 1559, in Barocchi 1971, I, p. 786). 
284 Vieri 1581, p. 10. The passage is cited in Hathaway 1962, p. 344. On de’ Vieri see Kraye 1997, p. 166 
285 Firenzuola 1992, p. 41 and p. 78. 
286 Firenzuola 1552, pp. 29-30: ‘ché meglio non potevate dire che dir chimera, percioché così come la chimera si 
imagina e non si trova, cosi quella bella che noi intendiamo fingere, si imaginerà e non si troverà; e più tosto 
vedremo quello che si vorrebbe avere per esser bella, che quello si abbia, non dispregiando per questo la belleza 
di voi che sete qui presenti o delle altre che non ci sono; le quali, se bene non hanno raccolto in loro lo intero, 
nondimeno ne hanno tal parte, che basta loro per esser accarezate e anche per esser tenute belle. Or vegniamo 
alla nostra chimera.’ Tranlsation (with our emendations) from: Firenzuola 1992, pp. 41-3. On the fragmentary 
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 Firenzuola’s metaphor is rich and layered. It speaks, first of all, to the uncanny 
affinity between beauty and monstrosity in the Renaissance. Firenzuola also exploits the 
polysemy of ‘chimera’: vain dream and formidable monster. Indeed, chimeras were regarded 
as portents (being both prodigies and monsters from monstrare, to show), which made them 
both sacred and majestic — maestà being, incidentally, one of the most distinguished 
expressions of feminine beauty for Firenzuola. The majesty of the chimera manifested 
powerfully in Florence at the time of the rediscovery of a statue of a Chimera unearthed in 
Arezzo few years after the publication of Firenzuola’s book, in 1553 (Fig. 2.5).287  This 
Etruscan bronze had a portentous aura. It was interpreted by the Medici court intellectuals as 
a panegyric to Cosimo I because it was, in essence, a capricorn (Cosimo’s zodiacal sign) 
grafted onto a lion (the Marzocco, symbol of Florence).288 The statue was both frightful — 
and indeed the mythological Chimera was the offspring of Typhon, a monster which had 
frightened Zeus himself — and irresistible. 
Yet Firenzuola’s ‘monster of perfection’, as Patrizia Bettella called it, also functions 
on a parodic level.289 Firenzuola was a prominent figure in the poetics of scpapigliatura, and 
versed in burlesque comedy. He once issued a satirical descriptio mulieris — a rather caustic 
one: 
 
First I want to talk about her hair 
Which looks like two skeins of raw yarn 
What shall I say then of that happy face 
Which shines like old tin [...] 
And here and there she has ears 
Much more beautiful than those of my big pail [...] 
What firm, big arms,  
As white as laundry,  
As soft as the cabbage of the valley290 
 
Firenzuola’s poem evokes Arcimboldo’s carefully arranged vegetable portraits (for example 
Fig. 2.6), which would also have been called fantasie. Both forms, literary and pictorial, may 
                                                                                                                                                  
conception of the female body, see notably: Bettella 1999, pp. 319-36; Lambert 1995, pp. 23 -53 (chap. 2: ‘The 
Woman of Parts’). 
287 On the statue, see notably Cianferoni, Iozzo, and Setari 2012; Gatto 2018, pp. 11-30. 
288 Simeoni 1560, pp. 44-47. 
289 Bettella 1998, p. 199. 
290 ‘Prima de’ suoi capei vo’ raccontare, / Che paion proprio due matasse d’accia [...] / Che dirò di quella allegra 
faccia / Che lustra, come fa lo stagno vecchio [...] / E di qua e di la tiene uno orecchio / Più bello assai di quel 
del mio secchione [...] / O che braccione sode a piena mano, / Bianche, che paion proprio di bucato, / Morbide, 
come un cavol pianigiano’. Agnolo Firenzuola, ‘Sopra le bellezze della sua innamorata’ (1549), cited from 
Bettella 1998, p. 198. On the genre of satyrical eulogy in Italian literature, see Tomarken 1990, chap. 4 ‘The 
Satirical Eulogy in Italy’ (pp. 80-101). On the Renaissance genre of descriptio mulieris, see Quondam 1991. 
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be interpreted as parodies of the method of imaginative inventio and dispositio of 
fragmentary excellences — Comanini compared Arcimboldo to Zeuxis, and called his 
Vertumnus ‘a new monster’.291 This attitude to the idea of formal perfection may be regarded 
as reflecting a certain exasperation with the Zeuxian combinatorial myth; we shall encounter 
the same exasperation in Francesco Patrizi later on.  
 The understanding of invention as an act of gathering remarkable fragments also had 
traction for theorists of literary invention. Erasmus, to name only the most influential, also 
invited authors to seek out the best bits of many different writers, to digest and assimilate 
them, and to forge their own style through this personal brew.292  The most frequent parable 
invoked to illustrate this was that of the making of a flower bouquet (the florilegium), or the 
work of a bee gathering nectar from many sources.293 This metaphor was also, certainly, 
associated with the combinatorial modus operandi of the fantasia. In any case, it was subject 
to the same kind of parody. We see this in the flower-head of Andrea Mantegna in the 
Camera picta (Fig. 2.7), recognized as a hidden self-portrait by Rodolfo Signorini.294 Jérémie 
Koering saw in this a metaphor of generation and growth, noting that ‘by showing only the 
head, the seat of phantasia, Mantegna emphasizes the role played by the vis imaginativa in 
the generation of a work’.295 Mantegna was also inscribing his visual joke in the literary 
commonplace of the bees and the flowers. His self-portrait essentially says the following: 
‘my head, like my work, is the product of my culling of the best flowers’ (note how no less 
than four different flower stems converge to give birth to the head); and perhaps, more 
crucially for us: ‘let my fantasia be your flower, the excellence from which you, painters, 
should draw’. The same kind of ‘speaking ornament’ can be seen at the centre of a grotesque 
composition on a maiolica plate of the mid-sixteenth century (Fig. 2.8).296 Here two birds are 
pecking at fruits and flowers which sprout from a modius-shaped hat on the head of a central 
Rückenfigur, who is visibly distressed by the ‘brain-picking’. This ornamental badinage is 
                                               
291 Gregorio Comanini, Il Figino, 1591, in Barocchi 1960, III, p. 206, for the Zeuxis comparison, and DaCosta 
Kaufmann 2009, p. 194. 
292 Moss 1999b, pp. 107-118. The most famous formulation of Zeuxis’s Helen topos, we should note, is due to 
Cicero, who used it as a parable to illustrate a point about the making of rhetorical compositions. Interestingly, 
Plato already compared the method to the act of painting monsters: ‘in defending their cause one must draw 
from many sources, just as painters depict compound creatures such as stag-goats’ (Republic, 6, 488a).   
293 The analogy of the bouquet must have been a common story in workshop pedagogy. We find it in Cennini 
about the apprentice’s finding of his personal style: ‘[...] you will find, if nature has granted you any imagination 
[fantasia] at all, that you will eventually acquire a style individual to yourself, and it cannot be but good; 
because your hand and your mind, being always accustomed to gather flowers, would ill know how to pick 
thorns’. Cennini 1954, p. 15. On the bees metaphor, see Quiviger 2003, pp. 317-21; and the classic von 
Stackelberg 1956, pp. 271-93. 
294 Signorini 1976, pp. 205–12. 
295  Koering 2015, p. 104. Also connecting this figure with artistic phantasia is Daniel Arasse, ‘Signing 
Mantegna’, in ibid., pp. 54-75. 
296 Hess 2002, no. 33, pp. 182-185. 
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certainly a reference to the expression beccarsi il cervello (to peck at one’s own brain), which 
in the sixteenth century was illustrated in broadsheets as a man with bird-shaped hands 
nipping at own cerebrum (Fig. 2.9). The expression was associated with lambicarsi il 
cervello (to distil one’s brain, illustrated on the same broadsheet) and broadly understood as a 
synonym of fantasticare.297 The same ‘canting grotesque’ can be seen on Palermo’s rustic 
Porta Nuova (built in 1583). On the frieze of the gate’s outer façade, two cranes — symbols 
of the city — feed on fruits coming out of the forehead of a mascaron. 
 
2.5.  The Limits of Fantasia 
 
Melchiorre da Parma insisted on the fact that, even if the fantasia/cogitativa’s compounds 
had no equivalent in reality, their individual parts did: ‘You may in effect find in the outside 
world all of the impressions located in the imaginativa from which the cogitativa makes its 
compositions. But there is nothing outside of the cogitativa that corresponds to compositions 
of ill-matched species such as these [green sun, flying donkey, cold fire, hot snow, goat-stag, 
etc.].’ Thereby, he hints at the main limitation affecting the early modern conception of 
imaginative work: the imagination, although able to ‘create’, remains bound to sensory 
experience. It must draw all its material from the senses, and its flights from reality may only 
lie in a rearrangement of parts previously perceived. We have already underlined, in our 
introduction, the central role that this idea played in Gelli’s assessment of the imagination’s 
weakness. We have seen, too, how Descartes shared this fundamental tenet and concluded 
from it that fictional painting could, at most, amount to a collage. For the French philosopher, 
this had an impact on painting’s capacity for novelty: ‘painters, even when they study with 
the greatest skill to represent sirens and satyrs by forms the most strange and extraordinary’, 
writes Descartes, ‘cannot give them natures which are entirely new, but merely make a 
certain medley of the members of different animals.298  His point rests on the distinction he 
draws between formae inusitae (‘des figures bizarres et extraordinaires’, in the Duc de 
Luynes’s authorized translation) and natura nova (‘des formes et des natures entièrement 
nouvelles’). In his view, the painter’s inventions are only seemingly original, but not new by 
nature or, in Descartes’s French, not entirely new. The argument raises the complicated 
                                               
297 In the Ercolano Benedetto Varchi regards ‘beccarsi il cervello’ as a synonym of ‘far castellucci in aria’. 
Varchi 1858, 1858, II, p. 61. 
298 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), First meditation, in The Philosophical Works of 
Descartes, Elizabeth S. Haldane (tr.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911. 
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question of the nature and conditions of iconic innovation. For Descartes, the novelty of 
imaginary images would be limited to a shift of parts, a ‘new’ juxtaposition.  
 Would Cinquecento art theorists have agreed? To our knowledge, no Italian author 
made so clear a statement about art. Descartes’s thesis, nevertheless, is deeply rooted in his 
understanding of the psychology of perception, and linked to the fundamental tenet of the 
imagination’s dependence on the senses. In the following sections, we enquire into the 
prevalence of this belief in Italy. We ask, fundamentally, whether a substantial strand of the 
Italian trattatisti would have agreed with Descartes, and whether they would have come to 
the same conclusion about painting. Ultimately, we enquire into the implication of these 
views for the Cinquecento understanding of novelty and innovation. 
 
2.6.  The Conditions of Pictorial Fiction 
 
There is no doubt, in the sixteenth century, that an artist can create things that cannot be 
found in nature. All writers testify to man’s ability to produce, through his art, works that 
‘nature never created’ (Leonardo),299 ‘things that nature herself cannot make’ (Gilio)300 and 
that she ‘will never make’ (Varchi),301 ‘new compounds, and things that seem as though 
rediscovered by art’ (Danti),302 or ‘the image of an imaginary thing which could only exist in 
the mind, and not in the outside [world]’ (Comanini).303 
                                               
299 Leonardo, Cod. Urb. fol. 15v and Farago 1992, chap. 27, p. 236: ‘natura mai le creò’. 
300 Giovanni Andrea Gilio, Degli errori de’ pittori (1589), in Barocchi 1960, I, p. 100: ‘arte facendo quello che 
la natura non può per se stessa fare’. See also Lodovico Dolce, letter to G. Ballini in Barocchi 1971, I, p. 782: ‘Il 
pittore [...] si dia sempre a finger quello che la natura, o non mai o di rado suol producere’. 
301 Varchi 1564, p. 27: ‘E Michelagnolo medesimo fece quello in questa parte co’marmi, che era non voglio dire 
impossibile à farsi dagl’huomini; poi che egli lo fece; ma che non fece mai di carne; nè mai non farà la Natura.’ 
See also Ariosto 1580, ad Canto settimo, 27-9: ‘la Fantasia [...] compone imaginationi da se medesima; le quali 
non sono, & non possono essere mai’. We may also think of Vasari’s description of a sea monster by Piero di 
Cosimo: ‘per la deformità sua è tanto stravagante, biz[z]arro e fantastico, che pare impossibile che la natura 
usasse e tanta deformità e tanta stranezza nelle cose sue [which by virtue of its deformity is so extravagant, 
fantastic and bizarre that one cannot possibly imagine Nature herself using such deformity and such 
strangeness]’ (Vasari, Vite, 1568, II, p. 24, translation from Vasari 1991, p. 115). 
302 Vincenzo Danti, Primo libro, in Barocchi 1960, I, p. 235: ‘fare nuovi composti e cose che quasi parranno tal 
volta dall’arte stessa ritrovate: come sono le chimere, sotto le quali si veggiono tutte le cose in modo fatte che, 
quanto al tutto di loro, non sono imitate dalla natura, ma sì bene composte parte di questa e parte di quella cosa 
naturale, facendo un tutto nuovo per sé stesso.’ 
303 Grigorio Comanini, Il Figino (1591), in Barocchi 1960, III, p. 255: ‘se ’l pittore dipingesse una chimera, o 
vogliam dire un capriccio non mai più da altro artefice imaginato et espresso, costui farebbe idolo di cosa 
imaginaria e che avrebbe il suo essere nella sola mente, e non fuori’. See also these bold statements by 
Francisco de Holanda, painting displays ‘what was never yet seen, or perhaps never existed, which is more’, and 
desenho ‘that which is not, so that it should be and should come into being, not only of those things that have 
already been made by the first uncreated understanding of God, who was the first to invent them but also of 
those things which have not yet been invented [inventadas] by us.’ See, respectively, Hollanda 2013, chap. 2, p. 
74, and Francisco de Holanda, De sciencia do desenho, 1571, cited in Charles Hope, ‘Francisco de Holanda and 
Art Theory, Humanism, and Neoplatonism in Italy’, Hope 2013, pp. 45-64, p. 55. For Shakespeare, ‘the 
imagination bodies forth the forms of things unknown’ (A Midsummer Night’s Dream, V, 1, 15-16). 
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 It seems, however, difficult to explain such a fact if we are to accept the conjunction 
of two principles frequently repeated in early modern philosophy, namely that: 
(A) the imagination’s content comes from the senses, and 
(B) nothing can be generated spontaneously (ex nihilo nihil fit), including in the 
imagination. 
 
Where does the imagination find its anti-natural images, if it must take them from nature 
itself? 
 Let us begin by reviewing these two principles and assessing their prevalence. The 
idea that the imagination must draw all of its content — the impressions (species) or fantasmi 
— from sensory experience (A) was current in sixteenth century treatises on art. The 
Venetian painter Paolo Pino writes that ‘the painter cannot [...] produce any effect from his 
imagination (imaginativa) if the object thus imagined does not come from the other intrinsinc 
[i.e. five] senses’.304 The statement is later repeated by the Tuscan painter and letterato 
Romano Alberti.305 Others, like Vincenzo Danti, affirm that all objects of art must be visible 
bodies. 306  This axiom ultimately goes back to Aristotle’s authoritative statement that 
‘imagination always implies perception’ (De anima, 3, 3, 427b16-18). Antonio Posio’s 
Thesaurus in omnes Aristotelis et Averrois (1562) has the following entry for ‘phantasia’: 
‘Phantasia inuenire sine sensu est impossibie’.307 
 The principle was often generalized to any work of the intellect, which depends on the 
imagination for its activity, and therefore on the senses. It persisted in scholastic thought as 
the oft-repeated phrase Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu (the so-called 
‘Peripatetic axiom’). 308  Benedetto Varchi, the first philosopher to make a substantial 
contribution to art theory, asserted this idea unequivocally in a lecture on poetics delivered 
before the Accademia Fiorentina in December 1553. He called the imagination ‘la virtù ch’a 
ragion discorso ammana’ (the power that offers reason matter judged), borrowing a verse 
from Dante (Purg. XXIX, 49), and explained: 
                                               
304 Pino, Dialogo della pittura (1548), in Barocchi 1960, I, p. 107: ‘ch’uno pittore non può nell’arte nostra 
produrre effetto alcuno della sua imaginativa, se prima quella, così imaginata, non vien dagli altri sensi 
intrinseci [...]’. 
305 Romano Alberti, Trattato della nobilità della pittura, 1585, in Barocchi 1960, III, p. 206: ‘non può produrre 
il pittore forma o figura alcuna dalla sua imaginativa, come dice un autore, se prima quella cosa, così imaginata, 
non vien dagli altri sensi intrinseci [...].’ 
306 Danti 1567, cap. XII, p. 33: ‘Tutte le cose che si possono imitare o ritrarre hanno bisogno di essere corpo 
visibile.’ 
307 Posio 1562, unpaginated (ad ‘Phantasia’). The statement is attributed to Averroes. For Francis Bacon, ‘of 
things that have been in no part objects of the sense, there can be no imagination, not even a dream’ (A 
Description of the Intellectual Globe, 1612, chap. I, in Bacon 2011, V , p. 504). 
308 On the importance of this principle, and of Aristotelian empiricism more generally, in early modern science, 
see Dear 2003, esp. p. 107. On the origin of the axiom, see Cranefield 1970, pp. 77-80. 
 78 
 
Human reason, in other words our intellect, cannot think nor comprehend 
anything if it isn’t presented or submitted to it by the fantasia, also called 
immaginazione [...]. Therefore necessarily whoever wants to think or 
comprehend must contemplate his phantasms [fantasmi], that is to say use the 
impressions of things recorded in his fantasia, and which Averroes and Dante 
himself call intentions and more commonly either thoughts [pensieri], concepts 
[concetti] or imaginations [immaginazioni].  
Yet the fantasia, and all of the other internal senses, cannot contain any 
impression, idea, form or intention if it is not carried and submitted by any of the 
five external senses [...]. And from this it follows that, in sum, the intellect 
cannot comprehend anything [...] if it isn’t either sensible or sensed, or at least 
processed by the senses and, through them, carried to the fantasia.309 
 
Varchi goes on to assert the universality of the second principle mentioned above (B), stating 
that ‘all philosophers concur on the fact that from nothing can be made’, quoting Lucretius’s 
De rerum natura as evidence.310 The principle of ex nihilo nihil fit was indeed prevalent in 
Pre-Socratic thought,311 and in Aristotelian312 as well as Epicurean metaphysics.313 In his 
Instrumento de la filosofia (1551), Alessandro Piccolomini places it among the ‘opinions 
accepted by all learned men and Philosophers’. 314  It was also sung by poets. 315  Some 
philosophers, including Nicoletta Vernia, even rejected creationism on the grounds of the ex 
nihilo nihil principle.316 Varchi’s line of argument suggests that this axiom rules out the 
possibility of a genuinely ‘creative’ fantasia beyond objections of the ilk of Descartes’s. 
Before we draw this conclusion, let us turn to discussions of creation ex nihilo in relation to 
the visual arts. 
                                               
309 Benedetto Varchi, Lezione Seconda: Dei Poeti Eroici (1553), in Varchi 1858, II, p. 702: ‘la ragione umana, o 
vero l’intelletto nostro non può ne discorrere nè intendere cosa nessuna, la quale non gli porga e somministri la 
fantasia, o vero immaginazione [...] È dunque necessario a chi vuole o discorrere o intendere, risguardare i 
fantasmi, cioè servirsi delle spezie delle cose la quali sono riserbate nella fantasia, chiamate da Averrois e da 
Dante stesso intentioni, e volgarmente ora pensieri, ora concetti e talvolta immaginazioni. Ora nè la fantasia, nè 
alcuno altro de’ sensi interiori, può avere in sè spezie, o idea, o forma, o intenzione alcuna, la quale non gli sia 
stata porta e somministrata da alcuno dei cinque sentimenti esteriori. [...] E qui nasce che l’intelletto non può 
intendere veruna cosa [...] in somma che non sia sensible, o vero sensata, o almeno proceduta dei sensi, e per 
mezzo loro nella fantasia venuta.’ 
310 Ibid., p. 703: ‘E però disse Aristotile: Tutti i filosofi si sono accordati, e convengono in questo, che di non-
nulla non possa farsi qualcosa: onde Lucrezio, che in molte cose discordò da tutti gli altri, seguitando Epicuro, 
in questa convene e cominciò la narrazione della maravigliosa opera sua da questa proposizione universale 
negativa: Nullam rem nihilo gigni divinitus unquam.’ The citation is from De rerum natura, 1, 150. 
311 Democritus in Diog. Laert., 9, 44: ‘Nulla diviene dal non essere e nulla perisce nel non essere [Meden te ek 
tou un ostos ginesthai mede eis to un on phtheiresthai]’. 
312  Metaphysics 12, 2, 1069b15-24 (Loeb transl.): ‘everything is generated from that which is.’ See also 
Metaphysics, 1009a31. Aristotle, Physics, 191a30-31: ‘what is does not come-to-be (since it already is), and 
nothing comes-to-be from nothing’. See Clarke 2015, pp. 129-150. 
313 Rankin 1968, pp. 309-12. 
314 Piccolomini 1551, pp. 231-2: ‘[...] [propositioni] che da tutti i dotti, et Filosofi son concedute.’ 
315 Du Bartas 1582, ‘Second Iour’, pp. 56-7: ‘Depuis que l’Eternel fit de rien ce grand Tout, / Rien de rien ne se 
fait: rien en rien ne s’escoule: Ainsi ce qui naist ou meurt ne change que de moule’. Translated into Italian as Du 
Bartas 1593, ‘Secondo Giorno’, p. 21v-22r: ‘Di nulla nulla non si face [etc.]’. 
316 Kessler 1988, p. 493. 
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2.7.  Fantasia and Creation ex nihilo 
 
If it was granted at all, the power of creation ex nihilo remained the privilege of God.317  One 
passage applied to the art of poetry, however, constitutes an exception. In his Della vera 
poetica (1555), Giovanni Pietro Capriano puts forth that ‘true poets must feign [fingere] their 
poetry out of nothing [di nulla].’318 His statement may be meant as a polemic response to a 
famous passage in Cristoforo Landino’s influential commentary on the Ars poetica:  
 
All human creations are made from matter. God creates from nothing (ex nihilo). 
The poet, even if he does not present us with something got altogether from 
nothing, yet, under the inspiration of a divine fury, feigns things in finely 
fashioned verses, so that he seems to produce something sublime and worthy of 
deepest wonder by virtue of his own fiction-making and as it were, from nothing 
(paene ex nihilo).319 
 
Landino’s use of approximative adverbs (paene, almost) recalls Alberti on the ‘quasi’ god-
like fame of painters (‘… quasi alteram sese inter mortales deum praesatret’).320 The recourse 
to periphrasis shows that theological correctness remained a sensitive point. By the same 
token, the epithet of divino, often applied to artists and chiefly to Michelangelo, was 
laudatory and nonliteral; as Stephen J. Campbell has shown, the formula was already 
somewhat clichéd by the second quarter of the sixteenth century, giving rise to satire (Berni 
mocked Michelangelo’s godly status by describing him as ‘that thing to which we are so 
devoted, yet which isn’t a woman … who whenever I see him makes me want to burn 
incense and attach votive offering to him’).321 
                                               
317  The fundamental affirmation of God’s ex nihilo creative act is in Macchabees 2, 7, 28. For explicit 
exclusions of ex nihilo creation in the arts see: William of Ockham, Quidlibet II, q. 9 ‘Utrum creatura possit 
creare’; Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologia, I, q. XLV, art. 8, 1, and conclusio. On creation ex nihilo, see: 
Fricke 2009, pp. 41-66; Langer 1990, chap. 5 ‘The Free Creator: Causality and Beginnings’, pp. 84-125; Prandi 
2012, pp. 21-40; Barasch 1998, pp. 37-58. On the origins of the doctrine, see the classic study May 1978. 
318 Giovanni Pietro Capriano, Della vera poetica (1555), from Weinberg 1974, II, p. 733. 
319 Horatius cum quattuor commentariis, Venice: B. Locatellus, 1494, fol. CLXVv, cited from Moss 1999a, pp. 
66-76, p. 67. 
320 On this see also Kemp 1977a, p. 393. A similar strategy relying on approximative adverbs can be found in 
Scaliger’s Poetices liri septem (1561), 1, 1: ‘It would seem that art not only tells us of things, as for example, 
the actor does, but also builds [condere] them, like some second God [velut alter deus]’ (cited from 
Tatarkiewicz 1974, III, vol. 3, p. 188). In Lancilotti, a female personification of Painting compares herself (i.e. 
the art form) to God, but suggests that a painter has no claim to such a title: ‘chi dir vorrà la Pittura / per dir 
corretto el proprio nome, dica / un altro Iddio e un’altra Natura [...] Finita ch’ha ’l pittor suo opra degna, / è 
adorata, e si figura Iddio. / In me, e solo in me, tal grazia regna’. See Lancilotti, Tractato di Pictura, 1509, in 
Barocchi 1971, I, pp. 774-5.  
321 Campbell 2002, pp. 596-620, p. 598. 
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 In his later commentary on the Divine Comedy, Landino expounds the term creare, 
defining it as ‘fare di nulla alcuna cosa’. He reserves this power to God, who created things 
‘without means (senza mezzo) and without matter’. After the initial act of creation, Landino 
explains, God endowed things with their own creative power. But this is ‘not ex nihilo, but 
out of some matter, as when for example a man, with his semen, begets another man; and this 
is called natura naturata.’322 
 To our knowledge, no Italian author explicitly attributes the power of creation ex 
nihilo to a visual artist. The idea was suggested implicitly in Leonardo’s remarkable 
paragraph in the Trattato della pittura describing the artist as ‘Lord and God (signore e dio)’ 
of any figure, beautiful or monstrous, he wishes to produce (produrre). 323  In fact the 
expression ‘signore e dio’ was corrected around 1550 by an annotator of the Codex Urbinas, 
who proposed ‘creatore’ for ‘dio’.324 This led scholarship to an unduly long controversy 
regarding Leonardo’s lack of use of the term creare.325 Panofsky believed that Leonardo 
‘assiduously’ avoided the word creare. He took issue with a striking quote in Ernst Cassirer’s 
Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (1927), attributing to Leonardo 
the sentence ‘la scienza è seconda creazione fatta col discorso, la pittura una seconda 
creazione fatta colla fantasia’. Panofsky (with the help of L. H. Heydenreich, Kate Steinitz 
and Carlo Pedretti) could not locate the passus — which certainly doesn’t exist.  
 Despite many authors repeating Panofsky’s claim, it was disproved as early as 1977 
by Martin Kemp, who found three occurrences of creare related to artistic practice on 
Windsor 19045r, and two examples of creatione elsewhere.326 The most significant use of 
creare precisely serves to illustrate a combinatorial understanding of man’s distinctive kind 
of productivity: 
 
Nature is concerned only with the production of elementary things (semplici) but 
man from these elementary things produces an infinite number of compounds 
                                               
322 Alighieri 1536, p. 335v, ad Paradiso, 3, v. 87: ‘Creare e fare di nulla alcuna cosa. Et questo fa Iddio senza 
alcun mezzo. Dippoi Iddio ha messe virtu nelle cose da lui create, le quali sono di nulla, ma d’alcuna materia fa 
cosa simile, come verbigratia l’huomo col seme suo fa un’altro huomo, e questa e dette natura naturata. [...] 
Adunque Iddio crea sanza mezzo, e sanza materia, e la natura face .i. la virtu messa nelle cose da Dio, fa di 
materia qualche cosa.’ One of the loci classici on which Landino may be drawing is the distinction between 
artifex and creator made by Ockham in Quidlibet II, q. 9 ‘Utrum creatura possit creare’. 
323 Leonardo, Cod. Urb. fol. 5r (McM 35), in da Vinci 1989, p. 32. 
324 Panofsky 1999, pp. 19-80, p. 71-72 (1963 version, original pagination pp. 173-4). 
325 Barasch 1998, pp. 37-58. 
326 Kemp 1977a, p. 383. See footnote 182: ‘Panofsky's statement that Leonardo uses creare in an artistic context 
on only one occasion is therefore incorrect.’ Panofsky’s claim was, in fact, that Leonardo never used creare in 
an artistic context. Note also the occurrence in Iacopo de’ Barbari’s undated letter on painting probably from c. 
1500, in Barocchi 1971, I, p. 69: ‘[...] la pitura [...] è una natura exanimata, la qual crea visibile quello che la 
natura crea palpabile e visibile’. 
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(composti), though he has no power to create (creare) any elementary thing except 
another like himself, that is his children.327 
 
Creazione is thus understood as the generation of novel form by re-arrangement of units 
(semplici) which pre-exist in nature, a view which comes very close to the combinatorial 
notion of fantasia.  
 Leonardo also appropriated the classical example found in Landino’s commentary on 
the Divine Comedy, of the artist’s own procreation as exercises of ‘creativity’.328 One aspect, 
however, seems to have eluded both Landino and Leonardo. The objections raised against 
human ex nihilo creation consist in one’s inability to freely generate matter (materia is the 
word used by Landino). The terminology situates the discussion on the terrain of 
hylomorphism (the articulation of reality in terms of matter and form). Yet it seems clear that 
the relevant question regards the artist’s power to bring about new form, not new matter. The 
fact that a painter, besides reproducing, growing hair and nails, giving off secretions and 
excretions, etc., cannot ‘generate’ an artistic likeness in flesh and bones, nor ‘produce’ by 
himself his pigments or canvas (or, for a sculptor, his marble), is obvious.329 The interest 
should lie in the generation of form in the mind, prior to its actualisation in (pre-existing) 
matter. 330  The misconstrual of the argument may stem from a particularly materialistic 
understanding of imagination, seen as a bodily organ in which impressions can be reduced to 
wax-like imprints, or movements of the spiritus. Other authors, at any rate, rehearse the 
misunderstanding.331 
                                               
327 Leonardo, Windsor 19045r (ca. 1510): ‘la natura sol s’astende alla produtione de’ semplici. Ma l’omo chon 
tali semplici producie infiniti composti, ma non ha potessta di creare nessuno semplici se non un altro se 
medesimo cioe li sua figlio.’ I cite the original and Edward MacCurdy’s translation from Kemp 1977a, pp. 377-
8. 
328 The inability to breed anything else than one’s own species marks the distinction between ‘specific agency’ 
and ‘unversal agency’ (God’s) in a lecture by Cosimo Bartoli in Bartoli 1567, p. 70v. On the topos of the artist’s 
children, see Land 2016, pp. 147-155. 
329 Sperone Speroni bothers to state this fundamental truth: ‘Dipingiamo e scolpiamo un uomo, o altro, e lo 
facciamo esser tale, che par vero uomo, ma vero uomo non è: il vero uomo è criatura della natura. E ciò avviene, 
perchè il subietto, intorno al quale si adopra l’arte, è cosa vera in effetto; però in essa non può introdursi alcuna 
forma sustanziale, ma ogni cosa, che vi si aggiunge, è accidentale, che alle sostanze, in quanto puote, si 
rassimiglia. La tela è tela, e carta carta, ove dipinge l’artefice, e marmo e legno sustanziale, ove sculpisce: e 
quella effigie o imagine, che al legno è giunta, è accidente.’ Sperone Speroni, Discorso dell’arte, della natura, e 
di Dio, republished in Kieft 1994, Appendix II, pp. 373-374, p. 373. 
330 An early author who, outside Italy, took this as his key example for affirming man’s creative power is 
Nicholas of Cusa, in a much commented passage found in De mente (1450), 5, 51. See Bouwsma 1993, p. 30; 
Mack 2005, pp. 18-19. Cusa uses the example of the spoon maker, who uses pre-existing matter, but brings 
about new form, since no form of a spoon pre-existed in nature in the origins. Note, however, that in his view 
painters and sculptors are excluded, because they imitate.  
331 We find the claim, for example, in Lomazzo (even if in his theory materia is defined somewhat allegorically 
as quantità proporzionata). See Gian Paolo Lomazzo, Trattato, 1584, in Barocchi 1971, I, p. 965: ‘[...] perché il 
fare e creare le sostanze de le cose, a come dicono i teologi, [è atto] di potenza infinita, la quale non si trova in 
alcuna pura creatura, è bisogno che ’l pittore pigli alcuna cosa in vece di materia, e questa è la quantità 
proporzionata, la quale è la materia de la pittura [since the act of making and creating the substance of things, as 
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 At stake in the creation of novel form ex nihilo is the production of form not based on 
a model available to the artist. On top of raising theological difficulties, the idea would clash 
with the imperative of mimesis, which was particularly strong in Leonardo, for whom 
imitation is paramount (the painter should ‘make the effects of nature through his fantasia’) 
and who, as we shall discuss further on, advises artists who seek to make frightful monsters 
to carefully observe different limbs of animals before compounding them together.332 
 The tendency in the art literature was rather to regard God’s cosmogenesis ex nihilo 
as a gesture which provided art with the model (i.e. nature) which all artists are required to 
imitate, while at the same time founding the very discipline of art. Thus God was regarded as 
the prime mover of all artistic creation, the Ur-artist from which all works draw.333 As Anton 
Francesco Doni writes in his Disegno (1548), ‘the first [disegno] was made by God [...]. 
From this first disegno each person began to copy’.334 God’s creation, in the eyes of Vasari, is 
the ‘primo esemplare’ and ‘vero modello’ of a long chain of mimesis. If the ‘finding’ 
(‘primieramente trovate’) of painting is generally attributed to the Egyptians and sculpture to 
Chaldeans, as Vasari reports, disegno and the ‘first form of painting and sculpture’ was 
‘discovered’ by God (‘Dio … scoperse’) as he shaped man.335 
Anton Francesco Doni notes that since God was creating ex nihilo, he did not need to 
imagine a project in his fantasia before giving birth to his initial design: ‘And I laugh’, writes 
Doni, ‘of those who say that God first made man of earth, and that he then coloured him in, 
and above all that he made him in the way an artist does when he first imagines a palace in 
his fantasia (the disegno), and then makes a model, in the same way they say that disegno is 
the father of painting and sculpture. I should like to find a trace of this first preparatory 
disegno, if it were only possible’.336  
                                                                                                                                                  
theologians say, is an act of infinite power, which cannot be found in any pure creature, [therefore] the painter 
needs to find something to act as matter; and this is porportionate quantity, which is the matter of painting]’. 
332 Cod. Urb. 24v-25r in da Vinci 1989, p. 32; Kemp 1977a, p. 380. 
333 On the figure of the deus artifex, see von Rosen 2016, pp. 51-76; Prandi 2012; Nahm 1947, pp. 363-72; 
Rüfner 1955, pp. 248-91. 
334 Doni, Disegno, 1548, in Barocchi 1971, II, p. 1907: ‘Egl’è piu sorti di disegnare. Il primo fece Domenedio 
[...]. Da questo primo disegno ogni persona cominciò a ritrarre chi è stato piu ualente & chi meno secondo la 
sorte.’ Also Doni, Disegno, 1548, p. 9v: ‘fu fatto Adamo & incarnato con quei uariati colori ch’hoggi fi uede 
colorato uaghissimamente l'huomo & la donna; allhora in tale atto mi pare che cominciasse la Pittura’. For a 
clear statement of the hierarchical difference between God’s creation man’s imitation of God’s creation through 
art, see for example Sperone Speroni, Discorso dell’arte, della natura, e di Dio, republished in Kieft 1994, 
Appendix II, pp. 373-374. 
335 Vasari, Vite, 1568, p. 67 (‘Proemio delle Vite’). 
336 Doni 1565, p. 189: ‘Ridomi di loro che dichino Domenedio fece prima l’huomo di terra, poi gli dette il 
colore, & inanzi che lo facesse a fece in quella forma che fa l’Artefice, il qual prima si imagina un Palazzo nelle 
fantasia (il disegno) & poi fa il modello, così dicono che’l Disegno è padre della Pittura, & della Scoltura. Io uo 
uedere, s’io sapessi mai entrar su la pesta di questo disegno.’ The passage first crops up in Doni’s letter to 
Montosorli of 1546, then in the Disegno, and later in the Foglie della Zucca. On the context of the ‘first 
drawing’ theory, see Pfisterer 2016, esp. p. 213 on this passage. In the same spirit, Benvenuto Cellini writes that 
God ‘fecie cieli e ’l mondo, e noi fé degni / delle sue mani, senza far disegni [must have made the heavens and 
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 Illustrations of the ex nihilo creative act (see for example Fig. 2.10 and Fig. 2.11) do 
not show God in the guise of an artist.337 Recent reinterpretations of Dosso Dossi’s Jupiter, 
Mercury, and Virtue (Fig. 2.12), however, invite us to reconsider the famous image through 
the prism of this particular question. Jupiter is shown in the act of painting the wings of 
butterflies, an unusual application to Greek mythology of the Christian parable of the dio 
primo pittore. Most authors agree that the theme owes to Leon Battista Alberti’s Virtus 
dialogue (at the time passed as a text by Lucian of Samosate), which tells a story involving 
Jupiter and Mercury putting the finishing touches to Creation — viz. catering for the 
blossoming of the cucumbers and the colouring of the butterflies’ wings.338 We should begin 
by pointing out that Jupiter is not working from a model; his canvas is on the edge of the 
composition and standing only before a grey tohu-bohu of nothingness, beyond the rainbow 
which frames the group of figures.339 In 2013, Marco Paoli proposed that Jupiter’s eyes are in 
fact closed, an interpretation which was taken up by Marcin Fabiański.340 Both authors argue 
for a strong polysemy of the picture, which would be showing simultaneously Alfonso I 
d’Este (as Jupiter) dreaming and, in a nod to the pseudo-Lucianesque dialogue, Jupiter in the 
creative act. Essential for us is the fact that Dosso – whether or not the latest readings are 
correct – did not regard Jupiter’s closed eyes as incompatible with his demiurgic gesture. 
This would suggest that he did effectively regard the condition of a dio pittore as 
categorically different from man-made painting, in that the reliance on a natural model, and 
imitation more broadly, is not required in the case of divine ex nihilo creation.  
 
2.8.  The Combinatory Imagination: A Pre-History 
 
Let us return to the paradox affecting the question of imaginative creation: the imagination 
can only know what the senses supply it, and nothing can be generated spontaneously. The 
                                                                                                                                                  
the earth, and made us worthy of his hands, without first designing them]’. See also Cellini 1968, Sonnet 13, p. 
893; Translation from Tylus 1993, p. 45. 
337 For a discussion of the adduced illustrations of creation ex nihilo, see: Rolet 2001, pp. 55-74. On the imagery 
of the deus artifex, see also Florian Métral, Les figures de la genèse. Représenter la création du monde dans 
l’art italien de la Renaissance, PhD thesis, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne (supervised by Philippe 
Morel), 2017. For images of the painter at work, see in particular Winner and Bätschmann 1992; Eschenburg et 
al. 2001; Mai, Wettengl, and Büttner 2002; Pfisterer, repertory of allegories of Pictura in Pfisterer and 
Wimböck 2011; Lecoq 2011. 
338 For a review of literature on the painting up to 1998, see Humfrey, Lucco, and Bayer 1998, no. 27, pp. 170-4; 
and more recently Fabiański 2015, pp. 113-124. 
339 This was already noted by Barasch 1998. 
340 Paoli 2013, p. 34; Fabiański 2015, pp. 113-124. Fabiański argues that the painting is simultaneously a 
representation of Alfonso d’Este (as Jupiter) dreaming, while Mercury protects his sleep from the intrusion of 
the first light rays of Aurora to the right. Giovanni Biasini earlier described Jupiter’s eyes as semi-closed, which 
she attributed to his effort of concentration. See Fabiański 2015, p. 115. 
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paradox seems to forbid the possibility of a creative imagination.  The combinatorial model 
of invention, then, appears to be an elegant solution to the problem. It is worth pointing out, 
however, that the combinatorial solution is not essentially early modern, and that the paradox 
was a cause of concern for thinkers since the very beginnings of the Aristotelian tradition. In 
this section, we give an overview of this doctrine’s development, and of the key sources 
through which it may have reached a Cinquecento audience. 
 The earliest solution articulated in classical thought which was available to the 
Renaissance reader is probably that offered in Lucretius’s De rerum natura 1, v. 732-48, one 
of the most widely disseminated texts in the sixteenth century.341 Lucretius did not believe in 
the existence of centaurs and other hybrid beings. Their presence in art and in our 
imagination, he argued, resulted from accidental mixings of simulacra, the appearances 
which inform our senses: 
 
Now listen, and hear what things stir the mind, and learn in a few words whence 
those things come into the mind that there do come. In the first place I tell you that 
many images move in all directions, and often combine: of things are moving 
about in many ways and in all directions, very thin, which easily unite in the air 
when they meet, being like spider’s web or leaf of gold. [...] Thus it is we see 
Centaurs, and the frames of Scyllas, and faces of dogs like Cerberus, and images 
of those for whom death is past, whose bones rest in earth’s embrace, since 
images of all kinds are being carried about everywhere, some that arise 
spontaneously in the air itself, some that are thrown off from all sorts of things, 
others that are made of a combination of these shapes. For certainly no image of a 
Centaur comes from one living, since there never was a living thing of this nature; 
but when the images of man and horse meet by accident, they easily adhere at 
once, as I said before, on account of their fine nature and thin texture. All other 
things of this class are made in the same way. And since these are carried about 
with velocity because of their extreme lightness, as I explained before, any given 
one of these fine images easily bestirs our mind by a single impression; for the 
mind is itself thin and wonderfully easy to move.342 
 
The Lucretian solution of an accidental shuffling of images and his exemplum of hybrid 
creatures represent the backbone of the way in which thinkers on the mind will approach the 
question of the imagination’s relation to fiction. 
 This combinatorial model, as we should term it, was adopted early on by 
commentators of De anima in order to complement their accounts of imagination. Indeed, 
Aristotle had not discussed phantasia in terms of creative powers. In the midst of a passage 
on the relation between imagination and opinion, however, he briefly evoked the 
                                               
341 On the Renaissance reception of Lucretius, see in particular: Butterfield 2016, pp. 45-68; Palmer 2014; 
Piazzi 2009.  
342 Lucretius Carus 1924, pp. 333-335. 
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imagination’s ability to ‘combine several images into one’ – which for him could explain our 
ability to take decisions by comparing different mental representations.343 The earliest trace 
of the application of the combinatorial model to Aristotle’s system we were able to find is in 
a commentary generally attributed to either John Philoponus (490-570) or Stephanus of 
Alexandria (7th c.): 
 
[T]he imagination always acts through the mediation of the senses. But this gives 
rise to a difficulty worthy of being raised. [...] Does not the imagination form 
representations of certain things sense has not seen? Sense has not seen a goat-stag, 
at least, or a man as tall as the sky, but still imagination forms representations of 
these things. [...] That is the difficulty. In reply to it we shall say that even when it 
forms representations, it again takes its starting point from sense. For it has seen a 
goat on its own and a stag on its own, and taking these simple starting points from 
sense it has formed the composite representation too. And if it also forms a 
representation of a man as tall as the sky, still, it has previously seen an individual 
man. This, then, is how this difficulty too should be resolved.344 
 
This archaic solution was adopted by the major authorities on psychology, from Avicenna to 
Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, 345  although more sophisticated models than the 
combinatorial one were also proposed.346 However combination seems to have imposed itself 
over time as the most cogent view. By the late thirteenth century, authors stated outright that 
‘the imaginative power[’s] [...] act is to move one form placed within the imagination to 
another, and to compound and divide them into chimeras and goat-stags’.347 
 It is worth noting that the early solution provided by Lucretius in the passage we 
quoted above did not clearly attribute the recombination of images to the imagination. The 
text is not entirely clear about where the visual tangle between, say, the appearance of the 
man and that of the horse, making the Hippocentaur, takes place: the species could be mixing 
inside of the eye, in the imagination or in the memory.348 Lucretius simply introduces his 
statement as the explanation of ‘whence those things come into the mind [in mentem]’. In his 
                                               
343 De anima, 3, 11, 434a9-10. 
344 Philoponus 2014, p. 84. 
345 Avicenna, Canon, I, I, 1, 5; Albertus Magnus, Summa de creaturis, pars 2, qu. 37 and 38; Thomas Aquinas, 
In lib. de anima comment., 3, 3, 633, and Summa theologiae, 1a, 78, art. 4 (citing Avicenna). For the emergence 
of this ‘compositive imagination’ see Wolfson 1935, pp. 69-133; Carruthers 2005, pp. 51-4. The Italian 
reception of the Arabic commentaries on combination, in particular by Gerard of Cremona and Girolamo 
Ramusio, is discussed in Hasse 2016. 
346 The Stoics, who were rigorous empiricists, considered a wider range of human ideas with no grounding in 
sensory experience, and explained them through a wider range of mental operations: ‘It is by confrontation that 
we come to think of sense-objects. By similarity, things based on thought of something related, like Socrates on 
the basis of a picture. By analogy, sometimes by magnification, as in the case of Tytos and the Cyclops, 
sometimes by diminution, as in the case of the Pigmy; also the idea of the centr of the earth arose by analogy on 
the basis of smaller spheres. By transposition, things like eyes on the chest. By combination, Hippocentaur. By 
opposition, death.’ Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 7.53, cited by Sheppard 2014, p. 13. 
347 Anonymous (arts master c. 1270), Questions on De anima I-II, in: Pasnau 2002, p. 27. 
348 They could even, arguably, be mixed in the air before they reach the eye. 
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1589 commentary on the passage, Girolamo Frachetta criticized Lucretius for having tied the 
recombination of images to the ‘soul’ in general terms, while he should have referred, 
according to Frachetta, to the imaginativa.349 Frachetta interprets Lucretius as locating the 
phenomenon in the spiritus which runs in (and between) the sense organs, and therefore feels 
the necessity to correct him: ‘I believe that this movement of the images should be attributed 
no less to motion of the spirits from which these images are presented to the phanatsia than 
to the power of the phantasia itself, which can form species as it pleases, as Aristotle states in 
book 2 of On the soul [...]’.350 In essence Frachetta is referring to Aristotle’s statement that 
the imagination is able to ‘recombine several images into one’. 351  We can infer from 
Frachetta’s keenness to rewrite the De rerum natura that the view according to which the 
imagination was a faculty of recombination was widely diffused and had much traction. 
 
2.9.  Fantasia and Innovation 
 
The combinatorial logic outlined so far was one of the predominant ways in which artistic 
invention was conceptualized. As far as figures were concerned, then, the generation of an 
original form was the result of a process involving the perception and understanding of the 
appearance of individual limbs seen in nature, their rescaling, and finally their conjoining 
with other body parts similarly recorded and understood. The sampling of elements from 
nature was regarded as a necessary step, even in the creation of wholly fantastical 
monsters.352 We know how Michelangelo, according to Ascanio Condivi, produced an early 
painting of monstrous demons in which he ‘would not apply colour to any part without first 
consulting nature’, choosing to ‘go off to the fish market, where he observed the shape and 
the colouring of the fins of the fish, the colour of the eyes and every other part, and he would 
                                               
349 Frachetta 1589, pp. 99-100 for the exposition of De natura, 4, vv. 722-767, and hereafter from p. 100: ‘Ma 
pecca in molte cose Lucretio, & primieramente, perciò che le imagini, che muouono l’animo, non trapassano ad 
esso per li pori del corpo. Ma per li sensi, & particolari, & commune, & per l’imaginatiua, dalla quale 
imaginatiua ne sono formate molte, mediante la memoria, che con essa è congiunta. Apresso pecca, percioche 
non l’animo, cioè l’intelletto, prende errore intorno le imagini, mentre dormiamo, ma l’imaginatiua. [Lucretius 
is wrong in many things, and firstly because the images which move the mind do not reach it by traversing the 
pores of the body, but through the senses, both particulars and common, and through the imaginativa, from 
which many [images] are formed, by means of memory which is joined to the imaginativa. Furthermore he is 
wrong because it is not the soul, namely the intellect, which errs in forming images while we sleep, but the 
imaginativa. Given that the intellect rarely operates imprefectly; but the imaginativa does]’.  
350 Ibid.: ‘Ma io stimo, che cotal mouimento delle imagini, sia da attribuire, non meno al moto di spiriti, da cui 
esse imagini sono presentato alla phantasia, che alla potenza di essa phantasia, la quale puo formare le spetia in 
quella guisa che vuole, come testimoenia Arist. nel lib. 2 dell’anima alla part. 153.’ 
351 De anima, 3, 11, 434a9-10 in our modern editions; see our discussion above. Franchetta seems to be either 
misquoting, or referring to an abbreviated edition. If so, we have not been able to trace the source he is using. 
352 For a discussion of this question, see Swan 2015, pp. 216-37. 
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render them in his painting.’353 Leonardo’s advice on ‘how to make an imaginary (finto) 
animal appear natural’ insists that a painter ‘cannot make any animal without it having its 
limbs such that each bears some resemblance to that of some of the other animals’.354 His 
Treatise on painting also contains a passage on the ‘Membrification (membrificazione) of 
animals’, recommending to ‘let the parts of living creatures be in accordance with their 
type’.355 Vasari tells the story of how Leonardo once tried to made a living ‘dragon’ from 
elements of nature itself: he collected scales stripped from reptiles, fixed them together in the 
shape of wings and attached them to the back of a live lizard, later adding a beard and a horn. 
 We could interpret these admonitions to anchor monsters in the real as expressions of 
the conviction that, as Peter Parshall once put it, ‘fantasy requires the glistening animation of 
nature in order to be made convincing’.356 However it could also be the case that given the 
early modern understanding of fantasia, this method for generating unnatural and 
unprecedented form was the only dialectic model available, or even thinkable. In any event, 
the artists’ statements shed light on their priorities with regard to imaginative practices: the 
emphasis lay on empirical knowledge and the quest for naturalness, while innovation in the 
sense of a proposal of unprecedented form was not considered as a worthy end in itself. 
Striking, however, is the consequence such a model of creation has for any understanding of 
formal originality. There is, under these terms, no true innovation; only a re-assemblage of 
pre-existing elements. Recursivity is inherent to all created images, which can be reduced to a 
sum of graphic elements already existent in nature or in previous art. In the next section, we 
shall see how this conception did not remain implicit, but was openly described by the 
Florentine sculptor Vincenzo Danti, who proposed an account of ‘new forms’ in art. 
 
2.10. ‘Mereological Novelty’  
 
Danti’s text is precious in that it provides an account of how artists produce novel form. This 
occurs in a passage in which he reviews all the things art is capable of doing: 
 
                                               
353 Condivi 1976, pp. 9-10. The anecdote was also recounted, although in less detail, by Vasari’s 1568 Life of 
Michelangelo. Michelangelo’s probably lost painting was a copy from a Temptation of Saint Antony by Martin 
Schongauer. 
354 da Vinci 1995, §415: ‘Come devi farparere naturale un anima-le finto. Tu sai non potersifare alcun animale, 
il qualenon abbia le sue membra, eche ciascuno per se non sia a similitudine con qualcuno degli altri animali.’ 
355 da Vinci 1995, §288 : ‘Sia fatto le membra alli animali convenienti alle loro qualità.’ 
356 Swan 2015, p. 234, n. 4 i.f.  
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There is no doubt that the art of disegno can, with painting, sculpture and 
architecture, imitate or portray all visible things;357 and not only celestial and 
natural things, but also artificial things of all materials. And, what is more, it can 
make new compounds (nuovi composti) and things that almost seem rediscovered 
by art: such as the chimeras which, as we can see, are made in such a way that 
with respect to their whole, they are not imitated from nature but rather composed 
(composte) of parts of this and that natural thing, making a thing new in itself (un 
tutto nuovo per sé stesso). I intend these chimeras as a genre, under which we 
should also place all kinds of grotesques, rinceaux and ornaments of all the 
buildings that architecture composes and of infinitely many other things that are 
made by art and which, as I have said, in their entirety do not represent anything 
made by nature, however in their parts represent this or that other natural thing.358 
 
We may begin by pointing out that Danti’s observation, unlike Leonardo’s quoted above, is 
not prescriptive but descriptive; it gives an account of the actual potentialities of art as Danti 
understands them.  
 Striking is Danti’s insistence on the fact that novelty arises from a re-arrangement, the 
components of which, taken individually, are not novel (nor invented) but drawn from nature. 
Innovation, again, is a pure matter of relation between parts and whole, and always reducible 
to something pre-existent and non-human. I propose to term this conception ‘mereological 
novelty’, as it merely implies a shift in part-to-whole relationships, as opposed to a notion of 
novelty as the appearance of something wholly unknown. 
 This ‘mereological’ conception shares an evident affinity with the early modern 
combinatory model of imagination. Given its ability to cull from the real, break into smaller 
units and recompose, the imagination — in contrast to the intellect, the ingegno or vision 
alone — would constitute the faculty of choice for artistic innovation. In a small tract on 
dreaming published under a pseudonym in 1542, Daniele Barbaro calls fantasia the ‘parte 
dell’anima che innova’ (the part of the soul that innovates or ‘renews’): 
 
Hor dei sapere 
Ch’una parte si troua 
Dell’anima che innoua 
                                               
357 I translate imitare by imitate and ritrarre by portray. Danti’s theory posits a cardinal distinction between the 
two: imitare is the act of representing things in all their perfection, if necessary by artificially bringing visible 
forms closer to their optimum; ritrarre is the representation of things exactly as they appear to the eye.  
358 Danti, Primo libro, in Barocchi 1960, I, p. 235-6: E non ha dubbio alcuno che l’arte del disegno può, con la 
pittura, con la scultura e con l’architettura, tutte le cose che si veggiono imitare o veramente ritrarre; e non 
solamente le cose celesti e naturali, ma l’artifiziali ancora di qual si voglia maniera; e, che è più, può fare nuovi 
composti e cose che quasi parranno tal volta dall’arte stessa ritrovate: come sono le chimere, sotto le quali si 
veggiono tutte le cose in modo fatte che, quanto al tutto di loro, non sono imitate dalla natura, ma sì bene 
composte parte di questa e parte di quella cosa naturale, facendo un tutto nuovo per sé stesso. Le quali chimere 
intendo io che sieno come un genere, sotto cui si comprendano tutte le specie di grottesche, di fogliami, 
d’ornamenti di tutte le fabbriche che la architettura compone e d’infinite altre cose che si fanno dall’arte, le 
quali, come s’è detto, nel loro tutto non rappresentono cosa alcuna fatta dalla natura, ma sì bene nelle parti 
vanno questa e quell’altra cosa naturale rappresentando.’  
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Dentro, ciò che di fuori 
Da i sensi esteriori 
Si scorge tutta via 
Quest’è la fantasia 
In cui confusamente 
Ogni forma, è presente359 
 
Now you should know 
That there is a part 
Of the soul which renews 
Inside, what from outside 
Through the external senses 
Appears constantly  
This is the fantasia 
In which confusedly 
Every form is present 
 
Barbaro acknowledges the provenance of images form the external senses, yet he sows the 
seeds of a notion of imagination as the power of innovation. He is, to our knowledge, the first 
to make so clear a statement.360  
 
2.11. Invenzione and Novità 
 
Daniele Barbaro’s characterization of fantasia as the part of the soul which innovates or 
renews (parte dell’anima che innova) suggests that an understanding of imagination as the 
faculty of innovation already existed — although only in nuce — in the early modern period. 
This raises the question of the aesthetic status of novelty in the period, and its implications 
for the appraisal of artistic fantasia.361 
 Much of the classical literary theory which informed Renaissance humanism did not 
encourage innovation.362 Horace advised writers to imitate their Greek predecessors and stick 
                                               
359 da Schio [Daniele Barbaro] 1542, p. 17-8. 
360 Medieval philosophers had already claimed that the imagination could generate ‘things never seen by the 
eye’, without however making reference to novità. See Agustine, Letters, 7, 3, 1; Saint Thomas, Summa theol., 
1a 78, art. 4: ‘formam [...] quem numquam vidimus’. Note, however, that the expression nuove fantasie was 
current at the time (see e.g. Vasari, Vite, 1568, II, p. 739: ‘nuove fantasie [...] alla grottesca’) 
361 Barbaro’s statement on fantasia, called ‘the part of the soul that innovates’ and in which ‘confusedly all 
forms are present’, were part of his attempt to capture the peculiarity of dream vision. In this respect it eerily 
anticipates Charles Baudelaire’s affirmation that ‘dreaming, which separates and decomposes, creates novelty 
[le rêve, qui sépare et décompose, crée la nouveauté]’ (Baudelaire 1973, II, p. 15, our translation). Baudelaire 
thought the same of imagination, in his famous Salon of 1859: ‘What a mysterious faculty is this queen of the 
faculties! Imagination [...] decomposes all creation, and with the wealth of materials amassed and ordered 
according to rules whose origins can be found in the deepest recesses of the soul, it creates a new world, it 
produces the sensation of something new [elle produit la sensation du neuf]’ (‘Salon of 1859’, in Baudelaire 
1981, p. 299). 
362 On novelty in early modern culture, in particular in relation to the visual arts, see: Pfisterer and Wimböck 
2011; Brüllmann, Rombach, and Wilde 2014; Laroque and Lessay 2001; Reckermann 1993, pp. 98-132. On the 
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to subject matters already treated by them, rather than ‘giving the world a theme unknown 
and unsung’ (Ars poetica, v. 128-130). Lucian regarded novel subject matters as merely 
sensational; novelty was a criterion unworthy of true aesthetic appreciation. His story of 
Zeuxis’s painting of a female hippocentaur serves to demonstrate the perils of originality: its 
newness so distracted mundane audiences from the true qualities of the painting that Zeuxis 
had to remove it from display.363 Lucian himself hoped novelty and imaginativeness would 
not be the only qualities that drew readers to his work:  
 
Someone might console me by saying “[...] he was praising your originality in 
following no exemplar, just as Prometheus at a time when no men existed 
fashioned them from his imagination [ἐννοήσας].” [...] Yet I am not at all 
satisfied to be thought an innovator with no older model to father this work of 
mine. No, if it were not thought graceful as well, I should certainly be ashamed 
of it, believe me, and trample it under foot and destroy it. The originality would 
be no help, as far as I am concerned, to prevent the ugly thing’s being 
obliterated.364 
 
Authors of the Renaissance, from Boccaccio to Baldassare Castiglione and Pietro Aretino, 
similarly acknowledged man’s tendency for being (as Castiglione put it) ‘cupidi di novità’.365 
This attitude was rooted in a culture — both literary and artistic — which emphasized the 
value of models, the practice of imitation as both natural and desirable, and the principle of 
authority, both scientific and aesthetic.366 It was reflected in the treatises of the time, starting 
with rhetoric and poetics. Marco Girolamo Vida encourages aspiring poets to ‘learn [their] 
invention from others’.367 For Julius Caesar Scaliger, ‘we have a method of expressing the 
nature of things, for we imitate what our predecessors have said in exactly the same way as 
they imitated nature’. 368  Turning to canonical sources thus also guaranteed a certain 
proximity to nature and truth; the making of art was also an act of recognition and recovery. 
                                                                                                                                                  
medieval situation up to the end of the 15th century, see Ingham 2015. In scientific culture, see: Park and 
Daston 2003b, pp. 1-17. Consider also: De Mambro Santos 2016, pp. 153-162. 
363 Lucian, Zeuxis or Antiochus, § 7 and 12. The story is mentioned by Gabriele Paleotti, citing the dictum quod 
argumenti novitas vinceret operis diligentiam. Paleotti, Discorso, Lib. II, Cap. XXXII, in Barocchi 1960, III, p. 
400. 
364 Lucian, To One Who Said “You're a Prometheus in Words”, § 3, in Lucian 1959, p. 421-3. 
365 Boccaccio, Fiammetta, 4, in Boccaccio 1952, p. 115: ‘Le cose nuove piacciono con più forza che le molto 
vedute’; Aretino 1960,p. 272: ‘Piacendo sempre le cose nuove come tu sai…’; Castiglione 1960, p. 4: ‘Come 
sono gli uomini sempre cupidi di novità’. According to Castiglione, this tendency was particularly strong in 
women. See ibid., p. 122: ‘gli occhi e gli animi, che nel principio son avidio di quella novità, notano ogni 
minuta cosa e di quella fanno impressione; poi per la continuazione non solamente si saziano, ma ancora si 
stancano’. This is the case, writes Castiglione, of ‘i populi, e massimamente le donne’. 
366 On the function of authority in Renaissance artistic and literary theory, see in particular Greene 1982. 
367 Vida 1976, line 751 in the version of 1517, line 542 in the version of 1527, cited in Langer 1999, p. 139 ad n. 
12. 
368 Poetices libri septem (1561), V, X, cited in Moss 1999b, p. 107. 
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In this regard fantasia, in its susceptibility to error, was a destabilizing force and its place was 
controversial. 
 In such a context novelty also had sensational overtones. In the foundational texts of 
volgare, ‘nuovo’ could mean strange, bizarre, dubious, questionable. It is in this sense that 
Boccaccio qualified the painter Calandrino’s strange habits as ‘nuovi costumi’; and that 
Florence was said to be full of ‘nuove genti’, bizarre characters.369 The early theorists of the 
genre of the novella in the Cinquecento reflected on these meanings of the nuovo and 
embraced them. Thus in a lecture of 1574 Francesco Bonciani invoked Boccaccio and 
Sacchetti’s use of the word in order to define the novella as ‘an entirely false and deceitful 
discourse’ of ‘stupid and unreasonable things’. 370  This comes close to the oft-repeated 
characterization of grotesques in the sixteenth century: they were disqualified as lies by 
Vitruvius, and Armenini called them ‘invenzioni piacevoli e nuove’.371 It should come as no 
surprise, then, that the word novella was also used in the sixteenth century to refer to 
grotesque ornamental motifs, as we pointed out in Chapter 2, section 2.2.372 The nuovo thus 
retained some of its sensationalistic connotations, while still evoking the realms of nonsense 
and bizzarria. 
 We find echoes of this throughout artistic literature. In architecture, Palladio writes 
that ‘though variety (il variare) and new things must please everybody, one should not, 
however, do anything that is contrary to the laws of this art [...]’.373  In relation to painting, 
we owe the most extensive discussion of pictorial novità to Gabriele Paleotti in a chapter of 
his Discorso (1582) devoted to ‘Paintings which bring novelty and are unusual’.374 According 
to Paleotti, ‘every novelty must be held in great suspicion.’ 375  The cardinal cites the 
                                               
369 Both translations are Wayne Rebhorn’s. See his discussion the passage in Boccaccio 2016, Day 8, Story 3, 
ad ‘nuove genti’. An earlier translation of the phrase ‘nuovi costumi’ as ‘naive behaviour’ was criticized by a 
reviewer in Romance Philology, 15, 1962, p. 486. For a discussion, see also: Fido 1977, pp. 77-90. Consider 
also the saying, drawn from Guittone d’Arezzo (13th c.), ‘che dubbitosa è cosa nova’ (how dubious is a new 
thing). 
370 Francesco Bonciani, Lezione sopra il comporre delle novelle (1574), in Weinberg 1974, IV, pp. 140-1: ‘un 
parlar al tutto falso e bugiardo’, ‘cose schiocche e fuor di squadra’. On the novella, see Ordine 2009. In fact, 
Boccaccio himself had criticized the understanding of the poet as ‘creator’ – through the purported etymology of 
poeta from poiesis – because it would foster the opinion that poetry is mere falsehood. See Rosen 2013, p. 16. 
371 Armenini, De’ veri precetti, in Barocchi 1971, III, p. 2597. 
372 Annibal Caro, letter to Taddeo Zuccaro, 11 Nov 1562, in Barocchi 1971, III, p. 2454: ‘E se vi pare di farvi 
grottesche d’animali, fateci de gli uccelli che cantino, de l’oche che escano a pascere, de’ galli che annunziano il 
giorno, e simili novelle’. Also in his letter of 15 May 1565 to Padre Fra Onofrio Panvinio, in Barocchi 1971, III, 
p. 2468: ‘...come per grottesche, instrumenti da solitari e srudiosi, come sfere, astrolabi [...] romitori e simili 
novelle’. 
373 Palladio 1997, Bk I, Chap. XX, p. 56, with ‘novelty’ substituted by ‘new things’ (for Palladio’s cose nuove). 
Other invectives against the so-called Mannerist ‘nuovo stile mandate dalla goffagine’, compared to the 
violence of ciminality, can be found throughout Ligorio’s Trattato della nobiltà dell’antiche arti. See for 
example in Barocchi 1971, II, pp. 1433-1447, esp. p. 1441. 
374 Gabriele Paleotti, Discorso, Libro secondo, Cap. XXXII ‘Delle pitture che apportano novità e sono insolite’, 
in Barocchi 1960, III, pp. 398-407. 
375 Ibid. p. 400. 
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aforementioned example of Zeuxis’s female hippocentaur painting as evidence, and speaks 
elsewhere of the ‘peccato di novità’ (sin of novelty). His position, however, remains 
ambivalent, and his own attempt at defining newness does not result in any clear-cut account. 
In fact, as a theologian steeped in philosophy, Paleotti is tempted to go as far as to question 
the very metaphysical possibility of innovation. Citing the dictum of Ecclesiastes 1.10, nihil 
sub sole novum, he denies any possibility of natural novelty, while recognising the existence 
of innovations in the works of men.376 He finally settles for ‘pittura nuova’ as meaning ‘an 
invenzione which has not since long prevailed among the people’, in other words a form 
which is returning into fashion after a sufficiently long lapse.377 Paleotti’s notion of novità 
does not, therefore, accommodate for any real invention of unprecedented character. His 
novità is ultimately a rebirth — a rinascita or renaissance. 
 The Renaissance often used the same language to describe the rediscovery of things 
lost, as well as original discoveries in the sciences and the arts.378 The multivalent use of the 
term ‘ritrovare’ (literally to find again) is emblematic of this tendency. The word is used to 
refer to recoveries (Saint Helena’s ‘ritrovamento della Croce’),379 archaeological discoveries 
(‘grottesche [...] alle grotte ritrovate’), 380  as well as proper findings, both artistic and 
scientific. The new remedies found by Cosimo I de’ Medici owed him the title of 
‘ritrovatore’.381 The passage from Danti expounded above speaks of chimerical novelties as 
‘rediscovered by art’ (dall’arte ritrovate). Vasari called Correggio a ‘grandissimo 
ritrovatore’.382 Michael Cole has pointed to the interchangeability of the terms for discovery 
(trovare) and invention (invenire), notably in Giovanni Andrea Gilio’s Due dialogi (1564) 
where the advancement represented by Michelangelo’s pictorial work is compared to 
Christopher Columbus’s (re)discovery of America.383 The finding of beautiful form was not 
                                               
376 Ibid., p. 398. Paleotti is in agreement with Leon Battista Alberti (without however referring to him), who said 
the moderns had discovered ‘unheard-of and never-before-seen arts and sciences without teachers or without 
any model whatsoever’. Alberti, On Painting, John Spencer (tr.), cited from Maiorino 1991, p. 3 ad n. 5. 
377 Paleotti affirms he uses nuovo in the same sense as when we speak of a genre of comedy which has lost its 
popularity, or a sartorial trend which has disappeared. Paleotti, Discorso, 1582, in Barocchi 1960, III, p. 399: ‘si 
dice comedia nuova quella che mai più non fu udita da quel popolo, e foggia nuova di vestire che mai più tra 
loro non si è usata. Onde e noi chiamiamo quella pittura nuova, che scopre una invenzione che più non è stata da 
quel popolo riguardata.’ 
378 On discovery, see Fleming 2011. 
379 Vasari, Vite, 1568, I, p. 196. Also ibid., II, p. 681: ‘Santa Elena che fa ritrovare la Croce’. 
380 Vasari, Vite, 1568, II, p. 577: ‘[...] grottesche furono dette dell’essere state entro alle grotte ritrovate’; ibid., 
II, p. 225: ‘ritrovò il Morto le Grottesche [...] fu il primo a ritrovarle’. 
381 Devlieger 2004, p. 163, and see pp. 163-7. The technical findings made in Francesco I de’ Medici’s fonderia 
were also referred to as things ‘ritrovate’. Ibid., n. 224 p. 204. 
382 Vite, 1568, II, p. 16. 
383 Gilio 1564, p. 31r, ‘De le parti morali appertenenti a’ Letterati Cortigiani’: ‘se tutti quelli, che per l’addietro 
hanno trouato cose noue, se ne fussero stati contenti de le presenti, ò de le passate, considerate vn poco di 
quanto bene, & vtile si mancherebbe il mondo? Se il Colombo se ne fusse stato contento di que’ termini, che i 
Romani, ò altri prima di loro posero al mare di Spagna, e d’Inghilterra, il nuouo mondo con tutte le sue 
ricchezze ancora si starebbe incognito? [...] Se il gran Michelangnolo Buonaroti, se ne fusse stato contento de la 
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unlike the uncovering of a reality already in existence, and which may have been discovered 
before but forgotten since; the Renaissance’s literary and artistic state of mind equated 
discovery with a form of ‘return’. According to Ullrich Langer, ‘the general consensus seems 
to be that nothing absolutely new can be invented, that is, “conceived” or “imagined”, as “all 
that is said has been said before” (a phrase from Terence oft cited).’384 In A.F. Doni’s Marmi, 
the sculptor Francesco Mosca (1531-1578) claims — in a context where the potentially 
satirical nature of his statement is difficult to assess — that ‘tutto quello che si scrive è stato 
detto, & quello che s’imagina, è stato imaginato’.385 
 We notice a change in perspectives on newness in the same years which see the 
emergence of concepts related to fantasia — particularly the idea of maraviglia. The 
philosopher Francesco Patrizi, one of the key proponents of the mirabile in poetics, was also 
one of the fiercest critics of what he regarded as the static and overbearing authority of 
artistic canons. In his Della retorica (1562), he denounced the doctrine of imitation by 
attacking the primacy of antiquity (antichità), which he compared to a bag (un sacco) in 
which one cannot see or breathe, but suffocates. He argued against the absolute authority of 
ancient models through a demonstration ad absurdum, mocking what Paleotti called ‘peccato 
di novità’ (and which Patrizi terms ‘peccato d’innouation’). He illustrates his point through a 
thought experiment which has to do with painting: ‘Imagine that, for example, Zeuxis had not 
made any other work than his Helen of Croton, or Apelles the image of Alexander; and that 
other painters, admiring the perfection of these works, [...] stunned by theses marvels, had not 
dared to go beyond the achievements of these two most perfect masters [...] they would not 
have produced anything other than Helens and Alexanders.’ 386  The art of painting, he 
concludes, would have been much the poorer, being reduced to mere copying (copiatura). 
                                                                                                                                                  
maniera del pingere de’ pittori del suo tempo; non sarebbe al mondo con tanto honore hoggi la pittura, ne si 
saperebbe la forza, ne la vaghezza de l’arte. [Consider a little how many good and useful things would be absent 
from the world if all of our pre- decessors who found new things had been content with the past or even with the 
present. If Columbus had been content with the boundaries that the Romans or others before them had placed on 
the sea of Spain and England, would the new world with all of its richness not still be unknown? And if the 
great Michelangelo Buonarroti had been content with the manner of painting practiced by the painters of his 
time, painting would not have the honor that it does in the world today, nor would one understand the force and 
beauty of art.]’ Cole likens this statement with Christof Jamnitzer, who compared himself to Christopher 
Columbus in his Neuw Grottessken Buch of 1610. 
384 Langer 1999, p. 141. Langer adds: ‘However, while this is true of poetic subject matter and of the distinct 
elements of a poem, this is not true of the whole of the composition.’ 
385 Doni 1552, p. 53. ‘All you can write has already been written, and all you can imagine has already been 
imagined’. 
386 Patrizi 1562, p. 56r: ‘Ora, mirate se per caso Zeusi, non hauesse fatto altra opra che quella Helena in Crotone, 
o Apelle l’imagine d’Alessandro. Et gli altri dipintori, ammirando in quell’opre la perfettione et de maestri, & 
dell’arte stessa, storditi dalla marauiglia, non fossero arditi di passar oltre, a termini di que due perfettissimi 
maestri, et di quella perfettissima dipintura, essi dipingendo, non haurebbono forse fatto altro che, quella 
Helena, & quell’Alessandro [...].’ 
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But if, by contrast, many had dared to apply Apelles’s ‘rules’ to other objects, art would have 
‘risen to great wealth’ (salita a gran richezza).  
 At this point of his argument, Patrizi bothers to make an excursus in order to 
specifically dismiss the possibility of making pictorial breakthroughs by recombining copied 
parts. The method he described, he writes, ‘should not be understood as the act of painting a 
portrait of me by taking a hand from Apelles’s Alexander, a cheek from Zeuxis’s Helen, and 
another piece from other works of theirs in order to form me entirely out of all of these 
parts.’ 387  A method of this kind could never suffice, furthermore, as it would still be 
impossible to form the image of other creatures such as ‘a lion, or a ship’ from these human 
parts. A lion or a ship made of body parts of Helen or Zeuxis, replies Patrizi’s interlocutor, 
would be no more than ‘a laughable or frightening monster’.  
 What the interlocutor had in mind may have been a form obtained through 
Arcimboldesque morphism, not unlike, perhaps, the famous Testa di cazzo. Patrizi does not 
dwell on the point any further. Note, however, the two emotional responses that such a 
‘monster’ is expected to elicit: humor and fear. These were the two key responses that other 
Mannerist critics associated with encounters with pictorial works of impressive fantasia. We 
have already seen fear at play in the grotesques of Orvieto, where Signorelli showed 
Empedocles recoiling before the painter’s powerful fantasie (Fig. 2.4). The rediscovery of the 
grotesques of the Domus Aurea, hidden in the depths of Rome’s ‘grottoes’, must have been a 
chilling experience; thrill and fear became central to the aesthetic explorations of the 
Mannerists, from the terribilità of Michelangelo’s formidable figures to the bizzarria of 
Rosso, Pontormo and Parmigianino. The other important response tied to a register termed 
fantastico is laughter. Laughter was associated with the visual puzzles subsumed under the 
genre of fantasie: the Arcimboldesque jokes evoked above, as well as the lusus naturae.388 
Patrizi’s treatment of the theme of (re)composition somewhat recalls Firenzuola’s in the 
monstrous descriptio mulieris we have discussed above. Both Patrizi and Firenzuola drift, so 
to speak, from a discussion of Zeuxian assortments to that of ominous monsters, from 
florilegium to pot-pourri.  
 Patrizi would go further in his praise of innovation in his Della poetica (1586), where 
he affirmed that the poet should ‘give to a thing a new form and appearance’.389 This text 
represents a turning point, since to our knowledge it is the first in the early modern period to 
                                               
387 Ibid.: ‘Et questo rassimigliamento, non intendo io cosi, ch’altri uolendo me dipingere, togliesse una mano 
dell’Alessandro d’Apelle una guancia dell’Helena di Zeusi, et un’altra cosa d’altre opere loro, si che di tutte, 
tutto me formassero [...]. Percioche questo, sarebbe copiature delle parti. [...] Et poi non si conuenerrebbe con le 
medesime copiate parti humane formare un leone, o une naue.’ 
388 We explore the fantasia’s relation to the lusus naturae in Chapter 4. 
389 Patrizi, Della poetica, cited from Platt 1992, p. 390 
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clearly articulate the relationship between mimesis and fantasia as antagonistic.390 Patrizi 
argues that the poet ‘possesses in his mind an exemplar which resembles nothing in the 
outside world’. He is able to express it convincingly to his audience, to make it almost 
enargeic, visible (‘paia altrui di vederlo’); yet he insists: ‘expression is not imitation’.391 
Painting, again, is his favourite analogy: ‘And by the same token the painter, with his colours, 
can depict something artificial or natural, he can just as well feign [fingervi] something which 
exists neither in art or in nature, but only from his fantasia; in the first case he will be called 
imitator or resemblance-maker, but not in the second: [he produces] only an expression of his 
fantasia.’392 
 Patrizi is the forerunner of a new attitude toward novelty and surprise, which also 
manifests in his theory of maraviglia which had a wider critical reception in the late-sixteenth 
century. It seems this new attitude is also surfacing in Florentine art criticism by the mid-
1560s. In the second edition of the Vite (1568), Vasari, who is usually known for his 
conservative taste, inserts a pointed praise of invention.393 He associates it with novelty and 
with marvel, as well as with capriccio and fantasia: 
 
Invention was always and always will be considered the true mother of 
architecture, painting and poetry, indeed of all the higher arts and of every 
wonderful thing accomplished by man, for the reason that it pleases the craftsmen 
much, and displays their conceits [ghiribizzi] and the caprices of fanciful brains 
[capricci de’ fantastichi cervelli] that seek out variety in all things; and their 
novelties ever exalt with marvellous praise all those who [...] give a form 
marvellous in beauty, under the covering and shadow of a veil, to the works that 
they make, now praising others dexterously, and now blaming them without being 
openly understood.394 
                                               
390 The opposition between mimesis and phantasia was clearly articulated in Philostratus the Elder, Life of 
Apollonius of Tyana, 6, 19. The antinomy has often been used in scholarly treatments of the turn of the sixteenth 
century, for example in Kemp 1977a; Mai 1996; Oy-Marra 2008; Swan 2005. This suits a historical account of 
the interest for fantasia in artists who loved grotesques and their rebellious relation to fifteenth-century canons 
of mimesis. However in terms of the development of art-theoretical discourse, we have found no openly 
antinomic account of the mimesis-fantasia couple before Patrizi’s Della poetica. 
391 Patrizi 1971, II, p. 88 : ‘così il poeta nella sua mente l’esempio havendo il quale a niun’altra cosa di fuori sia 
simigliante, ed egli nondimeno co’ versi suoi, così l’esprime, che paia di vederlo. Ma espressione non è 
imitazione.’ 
392 Ibid.: ‘E sì come il pittore può, co’ suoi colori, rassomigliare cosa di arte o di natura, così puo anche fingervi 
cosa che né in arte né in natura stata sia, ma da fantasia sua; nella primiera si dirà imitatore o rassomigliatore, 
ma non gia farà tale nella seconda: ma solo l’espressione de la fantasia.’ 
393 On invention, see Langer 1999, pp. 136-144; Langer 1990; Marr and Keller 2014, and the other articles in 
this issue; Greene 1982. 
394 Vasari 1891, I, p. 338 (emended). Vasari, Vite, 1568, I, p. 222: ‘Sempre fu tenuta e sarà la invenzione madre 
verissima dell’architettura, della pittura e della poesia, anzi pure di tutte le migliori arti e di tutte le cose 
maravigliose che dagl’uomini si fanno, perciò che ella gradisce gl’artefici molto e di loro mostra i ghiribizzi e i 
capricci de’ fantastichi cervelli che truovano la varietà delle cose; le novità delle quali esaltano sempre con 
maravigliosa lode tutti quelli che [...] con straordinaria bellezza dànno forma sotto coperta e velata ombra alle 
cose che fanno, talora lodando altrui con destrezza e talvolta biasimando senza essere apertamente intesi.’ These 
remarks introduce the life of ‘Lippo’, identified with Lippo di Benivieni (active 13th c.); Vasari’s text, however, 
conflates stories from the lives of other medieval Florentines named Lippo or Filippo. The remarks on capricci, 
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The kind of values underpinning this statement can be seen directly at play in the praise of 
Michelangelo given on the occasion of the master’s funeral in 1564. In his funeral oration, 
Varchi proposes to situate Michelangelo within a sweeping overview of the recent history of 
art. In this account, he employs the terms accrescimento (growth) and miglioramento 
(improvement) to refer to the changes brought about, for example, by Paolo Uccello and 
Masaccio (the latter’s new style, however, was still designated as ‘ritrovato’).395 In his 1568 
biography of Michelangelo, Vasari stresses the master’s role in breaking new grounds; the 
più vario e più nuovo modo developed by Michelangelo in the New Sacristy at San Lorenzo, 
its novità, is said to have stimulated younger artists to make nuove fantasie: 
 
[Michelangelo] created inside a composite decoration, in the most varied and new 
manner ever achieved by ancient or modern masters in some time, for in the 
novelty of its beautiful cornices, capitals, bases, doors, tabernacles, and tombs, 
Michelangelo departed in a significant way from the measures, orders, and rules 
men usually employ, following Vitruvius and the ancients, because he did not 
wish to repeat them. His licence has greatly encouraged those who have seen his 
way of working in order to set about imitating it, and new fantasie were 
subsequently seen, which exhibit more of the grotesque than reason or rules in 
their decorations. Thus artisans owe an immense and everlasting debt to 
Michelangelo, since he broke the bonds and chains that made them all continue to 
follow a common path.396 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
as André Chastel noted, have much more to do with Mannerist court art than the Trecento. See Giorgio Vasari, 
Les vies des meilleurs peintres..., André Chastel (tr.), Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1981, I, p. 341. 
395 Varchi 1564, p. 52. 
396 Vasari, Vite, 1568, II, p. 739, translation Vasari 1991, p. 454 (emended): ‘vi fece dentro un ornamento 
composito nel più vario e più nuovo modo che per tempo alcuno gli antichi e i moderni maestri abbino potuto 
operare: perché nella novità di sì belle cornici, capitegli e base, porte, tabernacoli e sepolture fece assai diverso 
da quello che di misura, ordine e regola facevano gli uomini secondo il comune uso e secondo Vitruvio e le 
antichità, per non volere a quello agiugnere. La quale licenzia ha dato grande animo, a quelli che ànno veduto il 
far suo, di mettersi a imitarlo, e nuove fantasie si sono vedute poi, alla grottesca più tosto che a ragione o regola, 
a’ loro ornamenti; onde gli artefici gli hanno infinito e perpetuo obligo, avendo egli rotti i lacci e le catene delle 
cose che per via d’una strada comune eglino di continuo operavano.’ Vasari admits the appeal novelty has to 
historians like himself in the opening of his 1568 life of Duccio, also using a rhetoric of growth and 
improvement: ‘Senza dubbio coloro che sono inventori d’alcuna cosa notabile hanno grandissima parte nelle 
penne di chi scrive l’istorie, e ciò avviene perché sono più osservate e con maggiore maraviglia tenute le prime 
invenzioni, per lo diletto che seco porta la novità della cosa, che quanti miglioramenti si fanno poi da qualunque 
si sia nelle cose che si riducono all’ultima perfezzione: attesoché, se mai a niuna cosa non si desse principio, 
non crescerebbono di miglioramento le parti di mezzo e non verrebbe il fine ottimo e di bellezza maravigliosa. 
[No doubt those who are the inventors of anything notable attract the greatest attention from historians, and this 
occurs because new inventions are more closely observed and held in greater amazement, due to the pleasure to 
be found in the newness of things, than any number of improvements made later by anyone at all in bringing 
these things to their ultimate state of perfection. For that reason, if no beginning were ever made, the 
intermediate stages would show no improvement, and the end result would not turn out to be the best and of 
marvellous beauty]’. (Vite, 1568, I, p. 203, translation from Vasari 1991, p. 43). 
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Vasari speaks as if Michelangelo’s work had had a liberating effect on the art scene. It 
boosted the confidence of young artists and inspired them to invent bolder fantasie. 
Significantly, their inventions are said to be alla grottesca. 
 As we have already pointed out, the grotesque was often associated with the idea of 
nuovo. In Vasari, nuove fantasie is a frequent paraphrase for grotteschi. Giambattista 
Armenini called grotesques ‘invenzioni piacevoli e nuove’.397 We have seen how Danti used 
them as the illustration of art’s possibility to generate newness. Annibal Caro, in his 
invenzioni for the Palazzo Farnese at Caprarola, even refers to grotesques as ‘novelle’ tout 
court, testifying to the deep affinity these forms entertain with the recombinatory 
understanding of innovation current at the time.398 
 
2.12. Fantasia as Machina 
 
The purity of God’s first divine work — created d’un tratto, in one breath — can be 
contrasted with the artificiality of all of man’s artistic works insofar as these combine diverse 
elements of nature into one. The human fantasia functions by arranging parts together, 
assembling building blocks in a mechanical way. Following this logic, products of the 
imagination were compared to a machine. For Doni, ‘many make a model of a palace in their 
fantasia, composing from many things, various and isolated: a machine (macchina) in their 
heads, which then comes out through their fingers’. 399  Doni’s metaphor, reflecting the 
combinatorial model of fantasia, echoes Vitruvius’s definition of the machine (from Daniele 
Barbaro’s translation): ‘Una machina è una perpetua e continuata congiuntione di materia 
[...]’.400  The passage is worth dwelling on, because Barbaro’s commentary also ties the 
statement to fantasia, and it utters for the first time the characterization of fantasia as 
‘principle of the arts (principio delle arti)’. Barbaro understands fantasia as man’s 
imaginative ability to cunningly harness the forces of nature: a faculty which works with the 
intellect, ‘habituated to mathematics’, and uncovers (va ritrovando) every mechanical 
                                               
397 Armenini, De’ veri precetti, in Barocchi 1971, III, p. 2597. 
398 Annibal Caro, letter to Taddeo Zuccaro, 11 November 1562, in Barocchi 1971, III, p. 2454: ‘E se vi pare di 
farvi grottesche d’animali, fateci de gli uccelli che cantino, de l’oche che escano a pascere, de’ galli che 
annunziano il giorno, e simili novelle’. Also in his letter of 15 May 1565 to Padre Fra Onofrio Panvinio, in 
Barocchi 1971, III, p. 2468: ‘[...] come per grottesche, instrumenti da solitari e srudiosi, come sfere, astrolabi 
[...] romitori e simili novelle’. 
399 Doni 1564, pp. 27r-27v: ‘ci sono molti che fanno il modello nella fantasia, d’un Palazzo, componendo di 
cose varie, & diverse, & sole; una macchina ne lor capi, la quale esce poi de lor ditta.’  
400 Vitruvius 1556, Book X, Chap. 1, p. 254. ‘A machine is a perpetual and continual conjunction of materials.’ 
Doni is also playing on the meaning of the verb machinare, to order and prepare, also to plot, to machinate. See 
"Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca"  1612, ‘macchinare’. 
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articulation necessary to build a contrivance. 401  The fantasia-machina analogy also has 
affinities with the conception of the work of art work as organism, namely as assemblage of 
parts akin to a living body. This conception is ultimately rooted in Plato’s Phaedrus 264c (‘a 
composition should be like a living being, with a body of its own as it were, and neither 
headless nor feetless, with a middle and with members adapted to each other and to the 
whole’) and Aristotle’s Poetics 1449a14 ff (‘one should give the plots dramatic construction 
in the same way as tragedies, that is, centre them around a single action which is whole and 
complete and has beginning, middles, and end, so that like a single whole creature it may 
produce its proper pleasure’).402 In various treatises published in 1552, 1568, 1571 and 1584, 
music theorist Pierre Phalèse defined fantasia as Automaton.403 
 Doni’s metaphor of the fantasia-product as macchina hits home, then. It also harks 
back — perhaps unwittingly — to one of the famous formulations of the deus pictor analogy 
from Castiglione’s Cortegiano: ‘And truly he who does not hold this art [of painting] in high 
esteem seems to me very alien to reason; because the machine of the world [...] may be called 
a noble and great painting, composed by the hand of nature and God.’ 404  The phrase 
macchina del mondo became widespread in the sixteenth century, being incorporated 
(without quotation) by Varchi in his lectures;405 a similar formula can be found in Francisco 
de Holanda’s De pintura antiga.406 Christopher Allen, Yasmin Haskell and Frances Muecke 
hypothesized that the phrase may have led Charles-Alphonse Dufresnoy to his 
characterisation of compositio as the elaboration of the ‘conceived machine (concepta 
Machina) of the picture’ (De arte graphica, 1668).407 
 
                                               
401 Ibid., p. 254-5: ‘La sollecitudine adunque, & il pensiero, che si ha da piegar la natura à nostra utilità, ci fa 
machinare, però uolendo noi tirar le pietre sulle fabriche, e alzar l’acque, che tutte sono cose, che di natura loro 
resistono all’uso nostro, è forza, che con la fantasia, che è principio delle arti dal fine inuestigamo la 
compositione dello instrumento, la doue la fantasia prendendo alcun lume dallo intelletto habituato nelle 
mathematiche, ua ritouando una cosa dopo l’altra, & legando insieme per communicar i mouimenti, fa quello, 
che pare ammirabile al vulgo [...]’. ‘The eagerness [...] to bend nature to out needs, makes us “machinate” [...] 
and it is a strength – together with the fantasia, which is the principle of the arts – which allows us to enquire 
into the composition of the instrument starting from its end. Here the fantasia, taking some lights from the 
intellect habituated to mathematics, discovers (va ritrovando) one thing after the other, and fixing together to 
communicate the movements, makes something that seems remarkable to the commoner’ 
402 van Eck 1994, p. 41. 
403 Lorenzetti 2009, p. 141. 
404 Castiglione 1960, Lib. I, Cap. 49: ‘E veramente chi non estima questa arte parmi che molto sia dalla ragione 
alieno; ché la machina del mondo, che noi veggiamo coll’amplo cielo di chiare stelle tanto splendido e nel 
mezzo la terra dai mari cinta, di monti, valli e fiumi variata e di sí diversi alberi e vaghi fiori e d’erbe ornata, dir 
si po che una nobile e gran pittura sia, per man della natura e di Dio composta’. 
405 Varchi in Barocchi 1960, I, p. 39: ‘Et in somma dicono che tutta la macchina del mondo dir si può che una 
nobile gran pittura sia, per mano della natura e di Dio composta’. 
406 Hollanda 2013, chap. 9, p. 89: ‘[The painter] shall copy painting from nature [...] and all other things, 
animate and inanimate, that we see in this great machine of the world’. On Holanda’s knowledge of 
Castiglione’s Cortegiano, see Hope 2013, p. 47, and Hope’s references to Deswarte-Rosa and Di Stefano. 
407 Dufresnoy 2005, p. 248. 
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2.13. Fantasia and Language 
 
Fantasia, then, records reality, breaks it up, and re-assembles it into new, unprecedented 
compounds. This modus operandi recalls sign systems other than images, composed of 
movable units, and in particular language. The fantasia’s creative activity could very well be 
described, in the terms of linguistics, as operating on the level of pragmatics (selection) and 
syntax (arrangement). Many Cinquecento thinkers show awareness of this affinity, and 
discussions of the fantasia often compare iconic invention with linguistic and literary 
invention. On the other hand, the sixteenth century witnesses the development of a strongly 
combinatorial conception of literary creation. In this section, we explore the possibility that 
the combinatorial model of fantasia endorsed by many was reinforced by the active 
discussion of how language, including literary language, is formed. 
 Renaissance authors often used linguistic examples in order to illustrate the fantasia’s 
compositional strategies. Their examples drew on various levels of language’s own 
combinatorial structure: the level of sentences, of words and morphemes, and even of 
alphabetical letters. Melchiorre da Parma, as we have seen, proposes that the imagination can 
generate ‘oxymorons’: cold fire, or hot snow. In the same way, a long tradition of faculty-
psychological accounts of the imagination mentioned the fantasia’s pairing of a noun and an 
epithet, rather than that between iconic snippets (e.g. mountains of emerald, or flying castles). 
In his Pitture (1564), Doni expounded man’s capacity to generate artistic fictions through the 
famous trope of the golden mountain:  
 
From the external senses a movement is caused in the sense [...] called 
imaginatione, and by virtue of this the fantasia, on top of the imaginatione, 
composes a golden mountain, from [the notion of] a mountain and [the notion 
of] gold, thus although it does not exist in reality, it can be imagined and 
painted.408 
 
Later in the century, Giordano Bruno’s De imaginum compositione (1591) contrasted the 
mental production of fictional images with the invention of words and sentences. His 
approach really consists in a comparison between iconic and linguistic creativity, in other 
words a form of inner paragone taking place in the ‘phantastic spirit’:  
 
                                               
408 Doni 1564, pp. 27r-27v: ‘Da le cose esteriori si fa il moto nel senso, però disse il Filosofo, che tutto il nostro 
sapere nasce da quello del senso in atto fatto fa poi il moto nel senso dicendolo ancora imaginatione, la fantasia 
oltre l’imaginatione compone per ciò che da un monte, & dall’oro: si fà un monte d’oro, se bene non si troua in 
fatto, si forma si dipinge.’ 
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This [phantastic spirit] is a certain world and inlet, as it were, brimming over with 
forms and species [...]. And, on the other hand, just as in nature innumerable 
species are composed of and coalesce out of small elements, so too by the action 
of this intrinsic cause not only are the forms of natural species preserved within 
this most ample inlet, but also they will be able to be multiplied there for the 
multiplication of the innumerable images conceivable beyond compare, just as 
when we figure winged centaurs from a man and a stag, or winged rational beings 
from a man and a horse and a bird, we can produce, by a similar mingling, the 
infinite from the countless, more ample than all the words which are composed by 
the various kinds of combination and coordination out of the numbered elements 
of many languages.409 
 
The imagination’s very own monsters are portmanteau words: think of Melchiorre’s 
hircocervo (goat-stag), or of the hippopardium (horse-panther), equicervus (horse-deer) or 
hippager (horse-goat) – they are also lexicographical chimeras, being products of word-
copulation. Melchiorre’s chimera was, in fact, a time-honoured monster: the hircocervus or 
τράγέλαφος (tragelaphos) appears to be the oldest known example of imaginary being 
discussed qua imaginary being. It was first cited by Plato in the form of τράγέλαφος through 
the blending of τράγος (goat, hircus) and the έλαφος (stag, cervus), and later taken up by 
Aristotle.410  Aristotle originally cited it in his discussion of the truth-value of language. 
There, the goat-stag was considered as a purely linguistic entity, an ‘empty word’ with no 
counterpart in the real world, devised for the sake of testing the relationships between 
language and nature. 411  The tragelaphos became a frequent feature in early modern 
discussions of the imagination. Giovanna Sillitti proposes that the very imaginativeness of 
thinkers over the years shifted the topos from the realm of linguistics to that of psychology 
because the vividness of the mental image of a goat-stag overturned its initial signification of 
‘empty being’ and ‘mere word’.412 
 In the sixteenth century, Jesuit thinkers such as Gaspar Cardillo Villalpandos who 
addressed the question of random linguistic combinations also drew analogies with the 
workings of the imagination. Villalpandos’s argument contrasted the making of nonsense 
words such a blyctiri or skyndapsos with the imagination’s invention of chimeras.413 It is 
                                               
409 Bruno 1991, Bk 1, Part 1, chap. 13. On the role of imagination in this text, see: Leinkauf 2010, pp. 15-34. 
410  Plato, Republic, 6, 488a; Aristotle, De interpretatione, 16a16; Prior Analytics, 1, 38, 49a24; Posterior 
Analytics 2, 7, 95b5. For a survey of the philosophical discussion, see Sillitti 1980. 
411  By the same token, Baruch Spinoza would later call the chimera a ‘verbal being’. Baruch Spinoza, 
Metaphysical Thoughts, Part I, Chap. 3, in Spinoza 2002, p. 183. 
412 Sillitti 1980, pp. 11-12: ‘Ma il capro e il cervo esistenti sembrano più atti a rendere conto della presenza del 
tragelafo come immagine mentale, che non dell’assenza di un tragelafo reale. Non c’è quindi da stupirsi se tale 
nome, per i commentatori greci d’Aristotele, finisce col significare non più un mere “non ente” (come voleva 
invece Aristotele), ma solo un’entità immaginaria.’ 
413 Doyle 2012b, pp. 19-66, p. 42 and p. 65. Since antiquity, blictyri and skyndapos are classical examples in 
discussions of meaninglessness. Although sometimes attributed by Aristotle, these examples seem to have been 
introduced by the Stoics. 
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worth pointing out that his reflection on the nature of linguistic nonsense is almost 
contemporaneous with Rabelais’s development of pseudo-nonsensical tongues in the 
Pantagruel (1532), such as lanternois for example.414 It may testify to an extension of the 
aesthetics of fantasia in the realm of language, visible in the extensive use of combination, 
permutation and corruption as a formal principles of invention. Bronzino, in his poetic work, 
was also a practitioner of nonsense. 415  The anagram, striving on the same kind of 
recombination, is also increasingly practised by sixteenth century authors (the Pantagruel, for 
example, was first published as the work of ‘Alcofrybas Nasier’, an anagram of Françoys 
Rabelais).416 These ideas permeate in artists’ approach to visual fantasie. For example, when 
Ligorio criticised the fantasticherie of the Roman Mannerists who, in his view, had gone 
beyond the pale of restraint, his critique — on top of highlighting the ‘frightening’ 
(spaventevole) character of these designs — hinged on the fact that these images ‘do not 
mean anything’ (non significano cosa alcuna).417 
 One of Rabelais’s main stylistic models was the Mantua-born Teofilo Folengo, a key 
proponent of scapigliatura known for his macaronic verse, a form of mock-poetry blending 
Italian and Latin. It has been argued that his macaronee, more than any other genre, form a 
verbal embodiment of the fantasia’s stylistics: hybridity, transgression and feigned 
irrationality.418 Folengo’s affinities with the mechanics of the imagination, as we have seen in 
our first chapter, are not just stylistic, but also explicitly thematised. He describes the Domus 
phantasiae in the Baldus as being filled with oxymorons: 
 
Hic phantasiae domus est, completa silenti 
murmure, vel tacito strepitu motuque manenti, 
ordine confuso, norma sine regola et arte. 
This is the house of phantasia, full of silent 
murmuring, of tacit clamor, of movement in 
repose, of chaotic order, of a norm with 
neither rules nor art.419 
 
                                               
414 In Rabelais, much of Panurge’s undecipherable speech was long thought to be nonsense, but found in the 
twentieth century to be a mix of polyglossia, cacography and word conflations. Malcolm 1998, p. 107. See also 
Pons 1931, pp. 185-218. 
415 Chiummo 2009. 
416 An earlier enthusiast of fantasia, Filarete (1400-1469), loved anagrams, e.g. ‘Onitoan Olivera’ (Antonio 
Averlino, himself) and ‘Iscofrance Notilento’ (Francesco da Tolentino, aka Filelfo). See Kemp 1977a, p. 365. 
417 Ligorio, Trattato della nobiltà dell’antiche arti, c. 1570, in Barocchi 1971, II, p. 1437. On this passage, see 
Schreurs, Antikenbild, pp. 149-150. 
418 Faini 2010, p. 30: ‘I due meccanismi della malinconia, quello cioè che produce le mésaillances grottesche 
della fantasia, e quello della cesistenza degli opposti, tendono a coincidere con i principi generatori del 
macaronico. L’accostamento di lementi impropri e reciprocamente incompatibili è in effetti la regola principale 
di questa lingua : il principio della malinconia viene quindi trasportato forse per la prima ed unica volta 
all’interno dei meccanismi espressivi [...] della comicità folenghiana.’  
419 Folengo 2007, Lib. XXV, vv. 475-8, vol. 2, pp. 472-3. Folengo may be drawing from the fourteenth-century 
psychological handbooks like Melchiorre da Parma’s, which present the fantasia as a generator of oxymorons. 
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They seem to result from the fact that in the phantasia not only images fly around, but also 
words: ‘All over the place, phantasms [phantasmae] flutter [...] the noun is here, and the verb 
too, the pronoun and the participle, with the rest of the gang following, namely, huc, illuc, 
istuc, hinc, inde, deorsum and sinistrorum and the whole clan of cuius.’420 Folengo treats 
images and words interchangeably in the realm of the imagination.421 He may have drawn on 
fourteenth-century psychological handbooks like Melchiorre da Parma’s, which present the 
fantasia as a generator of oxymorons. However his poetry may also have had visual sources. 
Some scholars have proposed that he borrowed themes from the description of the Domus 
Aurea’s ornament in Suetonius’s Life of Nero.422 This choice was certainly prompted by the 
rediscovery of the decorations of the Domus Aurea, emblematic of the fantasia’s monstrous 
interminglings, which he may have seen himself during his stay in Rome. The nexus between 
the visual language of fantasia and its verbal expression was made explicit and even 
theorized by one of Folengo’s most important followers, Anton Francesco Doni.423 Doni 
sought to transpose the aesthetics of the painted grotesques onto literature, with the aim of 
establishing a genre of alla grottesca poetics.424 He spoke of his writings as fantasie and 
castelli in aria, but also as libera mistura (free mix), an obvious nod to the imagination’s 
combinatorics.425 
 Literary criticism in the Cinquecento became increasingly mindful of the fact that the 
production of literature was fundamentally an operation of selection and recombination. In 
his Della poetica (1536), Bernardino Daniello expressed this by comparing poetry to the 
worker’s laying of carefully chosen bricks: 
 
In your writings, you should be careful to imitate the master bricklayers,  who, 
before they begin to build, choose this or that stone or brick [...]. And after having 
chosen them, they begin to adapt them and to compose them one with the other.426 
 
The understanding of literary creation as a form of re-assemblage led some to a form of 
scepticism regarding artistic creativity. Thus Doni, perhaps the trattatista d’arte who was 
                                               
420 Folengo 2007, Lib. XXV, vv. 479-489, vol. 2, pp. 472-3. 
421 Folengo’s taste for analogies between visual and linguistic form possibly owes to ancient models. Consider, 
for example, that Lucian of Samosata — the eminent model of Italian burlesque authors — had compared his 
own style of comedy to a centaur, calling it ubristotaton (‘highly outrageous’, ubris also being the etymological 
root of hybrid). Romm 1990, p. 84. 
422 Folengo 1997, vol. 2, p. 571. 
423 On Folengo being a model for Doni, see Rodda 2013, pp. 185-211. 
424 See Scholl, Vom “Grottesken“ zum Grotesken. 
425 del Lungo 1978, pp. 71-91. 
426 Bernardino Daniello, Della poetica (1536), in Weinberg 1974, I, p. 306-7: ‘non vi deveste sdegnare d'imitare 
nelle vostre scritture i mastri di murare, i quali prima ch’a fabbricar si ponghino [...] eleggono quelle pietre o 
que’ matoni [...]. E poi qu'essi scelte l'hanno incominciano ad adattarle e comporle insieme l'una con l'altra’. 
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most encomiastic about fantasia, also left some of the most fatalistic and cynical lines on the 
question of the nature of literary invention: 
 
The first to write made the first steps, and after a short while they had covered 
everything. Others have come and, with arms folded, read what the others had 
devised; pinching a mouthful of paper from one and a bite of scraps from the 
other, they strung together six words here and pieced together four others there, 
thus making a booklet – I dare not say a book or a tome. And us writers, we sit in 
front of a heap of books in which there are streams of words, and from these 
mixtures [mescolanze] we make other mixtures, and so from many we draw one. 
He who comes after us nicks this or that fact again and, reshuffling 
[rimescolando] words, forms another pile of balderdash and makes a work out of 
it. A thousand times per hour does this word-wheel turn: but one doesn’t depart 
from the alphabet, and nor does one deviate from speaking in the same ways and 
forms (you’ll only have me saying the same things!) as all the others in the past 







                                               
427 Anton Francesco Doni, Seconda libraria (1551), cited in Elena Pierazzo, ‘Introduzione’, in Doni 2003, I, p. 
xviii: ‘Quei primi che scrissono, presono i passi, e in poco tempo abbracciarono ogni cosa. Coloro che son 
venuti di mano in mano, hanno letto quel che hanno armeggiato gli altri, e pigliando un boccon di stracciafoglio 
da uno e da l’altro un’imbeccata di carta, ora infilzando sei parole e ora rappezzandone quattr’altre, facevano un 
libretto, per non dire libro o libraccio. Noi altri ci mettiamo inanzi una soma di libri, nei quali ci sono dentro un 
diluvio di parole, e di quelle mescolanze ne facciam dell’altre, cosí di tanti ne caviamo uno. Chi vien dietro 
piglia quegli e questi fatti di nuovo e rimescolando parole ne forma un altro anfanamento e ne fa un’opera. Cosí 
si volta questa ruota di parole e mille volta per ora: pur non s’esce dall’alfabeto, né del dire in qual modo e 
forma (le medesime cose mi farete dire!) che hanno detto tutti gli altri passati e di qui a parecchi secoli si dirà 



















3.1.  Introduction: Fantasia as Accidental and Unconscious Maker  
 
 
... la Fantasia nel sogno ci rappresenta confusamente le immagini delle cose, e 
spesso pone insieme nature diuerse ... 428 
 
... the Fantasia in dreams presents us confusedly with the images of things, and 
often combines together different natures ... 
 
In many ways, Daniele Barbaro’s influential phrase presented the fantasia as a maker of 
images in its own right. Unlike other bodily functions, the imagination is an inner sense 
which remains active during sleep, presenting the sleeper with images — in other words ‘re-
presenting’ them (rappresenta). Since the very inception of the notion of fantasia this 
experience was compared to a form of spectatorship, and spectatorship of the visual arts 
specifically — ‘when we merely imagine’, wrote Aristotle, ‘we are like people who are 
looking at a painting of some dreadful or encouraging scene’ (De anima 3, 3, 427b21-24, our 
italics). The imagination, furthermore, fortuitously mixes the species (in his statement, 
Barbaro, like Melchiorre, tantalizingly assimilates two meanings of species, ‘visible 
appearance’ and ‘animal species’ or natura). It interbreeds images, as Barbaro suggests, 
generating new form by accident. Fantasia is thus recognized as a creative force independent 
of the artist’s intention, in a sense leading a creative life of its own — a tendency for 
                                               
428 Vitruvius 1556, Book VII, chap. 5, p. 188. 
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personification emphasized by the capitalization of its initial F in Barbaro’s formula. The god 
Phantasos, brother of Morpheus, was figured as an artist.429 
  This idea of Fantasia as an accidental and unconscious maker must have fascinated 
Barbaro. In fact, he was interested in dream imagery before he even turned his attention to 
architecture. His first poetic publication was a mock homily titled Sermon of Dreams 
(Predica de i sogni, 1542), which we briefly evoked above (section 2.10). It had the form of a 
long dream account, issued under the suggestive pseudonym of Padre Hypneo da Schio.430 
The poem begins on the ‘sweet oblivion’ which fills ‘every human facture’ while asleep 
(ogni fattura humana, the word fattura being usually associated with the materiality of a 
work of art).431 It describes the cinematic spectacle which ensues: ‘sogni foschi’ (obscure 
dreams) and their ‘nocturnal images’ coming out of the two gates of sleep as if they were 
alive.432 
 
Effigie torte, & simulacri indegni, 
Vane chimere, ombre sottili, e spiriti 
Tentauan nel riposo i sensi pregni433 
 
Warped effigies and unworthy simulacra 
Vain chimeras, subtle shadows and spirits 
Tempted, during rest, the saturated senses 
 
Like autonomous ghosts endowed with free will, these after-images seem to act. Another 
word which Barbaro could have used to describe them is fantasmi, ‘these shadows or 
frightening images’, as a lexicon defines them, ‘which we are presented with (si ci 
rappresentano, literally ‘re-present themselves to us’) in the soul when we fall asleep’.434 
Fantasma by itself evokes the origin of such images in the fantasia. This made no doubt for 
Barbaro: 
 
Hor dei sapere 
                                               
429  So was, especially, Morpheus himself. See Ovid, Metamorphoses, 11, 635-9: Phantasos is ‘versed in 
different arts’. In the Villa Farnese at Caprarola Taddeo Zuccari represented Morpheus as a sculptor of masks. 
The invenzione by Annibal Caro can be found in Barocchi 1971, III, p. 2451. 
430 Hypnos is the god of sleep. 
431 For fattura see Vasari, Vite, 1568, I, p. 91; II, p. 114, 441 and 639. See also Dante, Paradiso, 3.33: ‘Tu se’ 
colei che l’umana natura/nobilitasti sì, che ’l suo fattore/non disdegnò di farsi sua fattura’.  
432 The gates of sleep are of ivory and horn (Odyssey 19, 560 ff; Aeneid 6, 893 ff), releasing respectively 
deceitful and true dreams. In the Predica de i sogni there are many gates, some of ivory, others ‘dal piu dur 
metallo’. 
433 da Schio [Daniele Barbaro] 1542, ‘Il Prologo’ (unpaginated).  
434 Alunno 1550, p. 338v: ‘Phantasma & Phantasme sono proprio quelle ombre o imagini spauenteuoli, che 
quando siamo per adormentarsi si ci rapresentano nell’animo; onde Phantasma significa ombra, o imagine, o 
uisione notturna’. Accarisi 1550, p. 216r: ‘Phantasma è uisione & spetie di sogno’. Minerbi 1553, p LXXXIIIv: 
‘Fantasma è una imaginatione falsa, per la quale i dormienti par vedere quello, che non è.’  
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Ch’una parte si troua 
Dell’anima che innoua 
[...] Quest’è la fantasia 
In cui confusamente 
Ogni forma, è presente 
[...] A donque questa forma 
[...] Produce questo effetto, 
Che sogno, è stato detto 
 
Now you should know 
That there is a part 
In the soul which innovates 
[...] This is the fantasia 
In which confusedly 
Every form is present 
[and which] produces this effect 
Which we have named the dream 
 
At the time of the publication of Barbaro’s Sermon, dreams were a passionate topic of 
discussion. In the 1530s and 1540s, a surge of publications made the subject of oneiric vision 
into a kind ‘editorial micro-genre’ in Italy, as Marco Paoli argued.435 Alongside Barbaro’s 
pamphlet, the wave encompassed literary efforts — Ercole Bentivoglio’s Sogno amoroso 
(1530), Lodovico Dolce’s Sogno di Parnaso (1532), Alessandro Caravia’s Sogno dil Caravia 
(1541) — philosophical treatises — Agostino Nifo’s commentary on Aristotle’s De somno et 
vigilia (1527), J.C. Scaliger’s commentary on Hippocrates’s De insominiis (1539) — as well 
as dream-books — for example Artemidorus’s Oneirocritica in its Latin (1539) and Italian 
(1542) translations.  
Visual artists, however, did not abstain from the debate. In the very year of the 
publication of the Sermon of Dreams, Giorgio Vasari produced a drawing showing a dreamer 
and his night vision (Fig. 3.1), the iconography of which is particularly original.  We propose 
to read Vasari’s drawing as the artist’s own response to this wave of scholarly interest in 
dreams, as constituting his own statement on the nature of oneiric images. Indeed, as we shall 
see his picture moves away from the long iconographical tradition of dream imagery through 
the way in which it depicts the fantasmi, namely not naturalistically but in the form of glyphs. 
This proposal will be interpreted in the light of the contemporary culture of dreams, Egyptian 
philology, and theories of the fantasia. 
 
                                               
435 Paoli 2011, pp. 29-57. 
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3.2.  A Hieroglyphic Dream 
 
Vasari’s drawing (Fig. 3.1), kept in the Devonshire collection at Chatsworth, shows a sleeper 
reclining on a sphinx, surrounded by riches, masks, vases, an owl and a terrestrial globe. The 
youth’s state of mind is reflected by a group of slumbering putti behind him. A dream is 
being instilled into his mind by a winged, long-tailed demon with a pair of bellows. The 
drawing aptly draws on a range of inevitable models: Michelangelo’s Dream (Fig. 3.2) 
provided the general idea and the fantasma of the moneybag, Albrecht Dürer’s so-called 
Dream of the Doctor (Fig. 3.3) is often regarded as the source of the bellowing devil, while 
the owl, the ugly mask and the figure’s contorted slouch may owe to the Night in the New 
Sacristy of San Lorenzo. Unlike in Dürer’s print, the incubus does not place the tip of his 
bellows inside the ear of the dreamer, an iconography which echoed the German expression 
Ohrenbläser (insinuator), but in the mouth. Vasari may be alluding to the early modern belief 
that this was the favourite means of entry into the body for demons, particularly at night as 
men yawn. 436  In any case, his composition speaks directly to the concern, voiced in 
Gianfracesco Pico’s De imaginatione (1501), that demons powerfully manipulate images. 
According to the Malleus Maleficarum, bad angels are capable of taking phantasms from the 
memory back into the imagination. Italian thinkers such as Ambrogio de’ Vignati and 
Giordano da Bergamo, moreover, emphasized the aerial nature of false demonic images.437 
This helps explain the presence of bellows in the drawing, which is frequent in the Northern 
iconography of influence and folly (follis being Latin for bellows or bag of air) but rarer in 
Italian imagery. 
 The content of the night vision is made accessible to us through a standard pictorial 
device: a white space behind (and around) the sleeper’s head, which serves as our window 
onto his mind. Shaped less like a smoky ‘first cloud of sleep’438 and more like a semi-circular 
disk, the device was compared to a ‘kind of speech bubble’, an interesting anticipation of the 
signal convention of comic book visual culture.439 Given its association with the pair of 
bellows, it is worth considering the possibility that Vasari’s bubble may actually have been a 
bubble, or bulla. The Aretine would thus be elaborating on the emptiness of dreams by 
reference to the famous homo bulla adage revivified by Erasmus and expressing how, as 
                                               
436 Röhrich 1967, p. 285. Röhrich points out that the polite covering of one’s mouth with the hand when 
yawning was originally a gesture for warding off demons. On the iconography of incubi in the Renaissance, see 
Simons 2014, pp. 1-8. 
437 Clark 2007, p. 126. 
438 Macrobius 1966, III, 7, p. 89. On this, see Göttler 2008, pp. xv-xxvii. On conventions for the representation 
of dreams, see Acidini 2013, pp. 20-29; Freedberg 1999, pp. 33-53. 
439 Corti and Davis 1981, p. 173, spoke of ‘una specie di fumetto’; Alessandro Cecchi in Rabbi-Bernard, Cecchi, 
and Hersant 2013, p. 184 remarked: ‘come in un ‘fumetto’’. 
 109 
Cinquecento Florentines would say, dreams are things in aria (groundless, ‘full of air’), 
echoing again their demonic malleability.440 
 The noteworthy originality of the drawing lies inside the bubble, in the way in which 
Vasari represented the dream itself. In lieu of the kind of ‘effigies’ and ‘simulacra’ of which 
Barbaro spoke, he chose a succession of seven simplified images of the same size which, by 
their subject and in conjunction with the sphinx beside the sleeper, appear clearly to stand for 
pseudo-Egyptian hieroglyphs. The dream, rather than an image, is made to be a sequence of 
signs — a text. Through this choice, Vasari moves away from the established tradition of 
depicting dreams naturalistically or ‘as they appear’. He also chooses not to render the 
fundamental verisimilitude of dreams, namely the fact that their falsity is often recognized 
only upon waking because they fool us, not unlike illusionistic paintings. This feature led 
some sixteenth-century artists to depict their dreams in a ‘first person’ view, like Giovanni 
Antonio Dosio or, earlier, Albrecht Dürer who recorded a nightmare as he saw it (‘wy ichs 
gesehen het’) (Fig. 3.4).441 Vasari was entirely aware of the illusionistic and painterly quality 
of dreams. In his Life of the painter Spinello Aretino, he recounted in detail the anecdote of 
how the painter, having made a most ‘contrafatto’ depiction of Lucifer, saw this very figure 
in a nightmare asking him why he had painted him so ugly. The vision was so frightening 
that Spinello almost died of a heart attack. He succumbed to trauma shortly after the 
experience. ‘Sometimes the imagination can do so much’, Vasari remarked.442 
 Why, then, did Vasari choose to depict his dream in the form of hieroglyphs? How 
did he come to this idea? The question is of particular interest if we recall that the idea of the 
‘hieroglyphic dream’ occupied a prominent place during the modern revival of dream 
analysis at the turn of the twentieth century. In his Traumdeutung (1900), Sigmund Freud 
proposed that dreams were a Bilderschrift,443 later adding that ‘the interpretation of a dream 
is completely analogous to the decipherment of an ancient pictographic script such as 
Egyptian hieroglyphics [...]’.444 The same idea was expressed by C.G. Jung.445 One dream in 
particular became emblematic of the modernist imagination: the ‘rêve hiéroglyphique’ 
experienced by Charles Baudelaire in 1856, which convinced the poet that dreams were, as 
                                               
440 "Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca"  1612, ‘aria’: ‘in aria, senza fondamento’. 
441 Giovanni Antonio Dosio, A dream (Sognio fatto adi 16 di Aprile 1564 la notte della domenica seco[n]da 
doppo pasqua), London: British Museum. 
442 Vasari, Vite, 1568, I, p. 218: ‘Tanto può alcuna fiata l’immaginazione’. 
443 Freud 1938, p. 319. In this translation, Bilderschrift was rendered as ‘in hieroglyphics’. Interestingly, the 
original edition of Brill’s translation (Freud 1915, p. 260) read ‘picture-writing’ rather than ‘hieroglyphics’. The 
later, standard translation by James Strachey et alii proposes ‘in a pictographic script’. See: Freud 2001, IV, p. 
277. 
444 Freud 2001, XIII, p. 177. 
445 Jung 1968, p. 93. Jung characterised this method of interpretation as ‘amplification’, namely the act of 
‘seeking parallels’. 
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he wrote, ‘an almost hieroglyphic language to which I do not possess the key’.446 How did 
Vasari, some three centuries earlier, come to share this intuition about the affinity between 
dreams and hieroglyphs? 
  
3.3.  Oneiric Philology at the Court of the Medici 
 
We may begin by pointing out that Vasari’s handling of the subject does not chime with the 
dominant understanding of Egyptian symbolism in the early sixteenth century. For Giovanni 
Pico della Mirandola, Marsilio Ficino and the first generation of emblem theorists, 
hieroglyphs were the synthetic expression of universal and immutable truths.447 They were 
regarded as the materialization of a holy language, a prisca sapientia (hiero- meaning 
sacred). Taking his cue from Plotinus, Ficino also posited that hieroglyphs (although 
unreadable) encapsulated information about the essence of things, not the superficial or 
transient. The context in which Vasari places them — in the slumbers of a profligate youth 
surrounded by worldly temptations, fumes and the mask of ugliness, and imparted by an 
incubus — is at odds with this Neoplatonic view. This is all the more surprising if we think 
that Vasari was steeped in this learned culture of symbolism.448 His drawing, then, may 
potentially be regarded as a critique. Julian Kliemann mitigated the tension by suggesting that 
Vasari’s pictograms may stand for the seven deadly sins — an interpretation to which we will 
return shortly. More recent readings associated the drawing with capricci and with 
alchemy.449 But the apparent tension remains. 
 In any case, Vasari’s iconography is exceptional in that it seems to be articulating the 
idea that dreams constitute a language rather than a form of experience. The confines of the 
‘bubble’ mark the boundary between the figurative space of the sleeper and the textual or 
glyphic space of his night vision. The picture-within-a-picture constituted by the dream 
therefore inaugurates a leap into a different semiotic mode. In Peircian terms, it allows for 
two different regimes to cohabit in the same image: the iconic (the sleeper’s world, 
represented naturalistically) and the symbolic (his glyphic dream). It testifies to Vasari’s 
belief that the dream fundamentally differs in nature from the visible world in that it has a 
                                               
446 Letter of 13 March 1856, in Baudelaire 1973, II, p. 338. On Baudelaire’s conception of hieroglyphs, see 
Labarthe 1999. 
447 On the early understanding of hieroglyphs, see notably the Introduction to: Horapollo 1993, chap. 5 and 
chap. 10; Curran 2007; Giehlow 2015 (orig. 1915). 
448 On Vasari’s culture of symbolism, see Fenech Kroke 2011. 
449 Mai 1996, p. 216, no. 26; Kanz 2002, pp. 167-9; Saß 2016, pp. 200-1. 
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semantic content, it can be read, being, as Hippocrates had affirmed in his canonical 
characterisation of dreams, a ‘sign’ (τεκμηρίων).450 
 This semiotic understanding of the dream was of cardinal importance to Cinquecento 
philologists. It provides us with the first dream-hieroglyph metaphor to which Vasari may 
have been exposed. As a child, Vasari was apprenticed to Pierio Valeriano Bolzano in 
Florence. Around 1524, he had the privilege of attending Valeriano’s Latin classes for two 
hours daily in company of the young princes Ippolito and Alessandro de’ Medici. Valeriano 
was one of the foremost scholars working on hieroglyphs at that time. Yet interestingly, his 
research also involved work on dreams. 
 In his magnum opus of symbolic exegesis, the Hieroglyphica (1556), Valeriano 
relates an important debate on the question of the applicability of dream-books for the 
elucidation of hieroglyphs. The discussion, to which he had participated in person, took place 
one evening in 1522 at the house of his uncle Fra Urbano in Venice. It involved Leone 
Leoniceno, Leonico Tomeo and Daniele Ranieri — all humanists of the circle of Aldus 
united by their desire to uncover the meaning of the ancient Egyptian script.451 In the course 
of the discussion, Leoniceno explained that the doctrine of dream interpretation has the same 
origin and epistemic value as Egyptian wisdom. Therefore, he argued, oneirocriticism could 
be used to supplement the insufficient textual sources for the decipherment of hieroglyphs.452 
Hippocrates — whose semiotic conception of dreams we mentioned earlier — was cited as 
an example. In response, Ranieri deeply thanked his friend for this insight, admitting he had 
felt ‘titillated’ by the desire to invoke dreams throughout their philological debate on 
hieroglyphs.453  
 Vasari’s pupillage under Valeriano started two years after this debate, and it is likely 
that the master shared this anecdote with his disciples, thereby enlightening the young Vasari 
on this particular property of dream imagery. In any case, the episode undoubtedly left a 
mark on Valeriano, who deemed the dialogue worthy of being recorded in his Hieroglyphica. 
He also proceeded to make ample use of oneirocritical material in the book, relying on 
Artemidorus and Synesius and frequently quoting the conjectores (oneiromancers) ‘whom we 
welcome in our company, since their lessons have much similitude with Egyptian 
                                               
450 Regimen, 4, 86. 
451 On this episode, see Giehlow 2015, pp. 203-5. 
452 Valeriano Bolzani 1556, Liber XXXIII, p. 236r: ‘...respondit Leonicenus, Ægyptiorum argimentum hoc 
latissime diffundi posse. Nam & Hetruscorum doctrinam de prodigijs, & ipsa Onirocriticarum commenta cum 
physica magna sui parte sint, ab Ægyptijs emanasse crediderim’. 
453 Valeriano Bolzani 1556, Liber XXXIII, p. 236r: ‘Tum Ranerius: Habendæ mihi sunt tibi Leonicene gratiæ 
non uulgares, qui coniectores mihi chariores esse facis, dum eos Ægyptiacum quid sapere docueris, quibus sum 
ab ineunte ætate mirifice delectatus. Dumque Vrbanus, atque mox Thomæus loquerentur, titillabat me cupiditas 
quædam, ut ad ea quæ dicebant, de somnijs quædam non incogrua subijcerem [sic]’. 
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hieroglyphs’.454 These texts lent themselves to his philological enterprise because they often 
gave the symbolic meaning of specific animals, plants or objects without reference to the 
context in which they had to appear. Most importantly, the symbolisms were premised on the 
principle of allegory, namely the assumption that a sign does not stand for what it represents 
or looks like (idem per idem reference), but for something else. Its reference should on 
principle be other (allos in allegoria means other), and generally non-obvious.455 This was 
also presumed to be the way in which the symbolism of hieroglyphs functioned.456 
 The idea that dreams were a medium for the revelation of deeper truths must have lent 
additional credence to this form of cross-disciplinary philology. One Renaissance poem even 
suggested that sleep could yield the keys to the decipherment of hieroglyphs. 
 
Ecco l’alta Colonna che sostenne 
Quel bel typo de la memoria antica 
Ogni figura, ogni mole, & fabrica 
Et varie foggie di segni contenne  
[...]  
In breve sogno tutto qui s’explica 
In sogno intendo ch’a l’autor avenne457   
 
This cryptic sonnet, published anonymously in 1546, begins with an ode to a ‘high column’ 
bearing ‘figures’ and ‘all kinds of signs’ — a clear allusion to an obelisk.458 The meaning of 
these ciphers, says the sonnet, will be ‘in a brief dream all explained’. The author of the text 
is not known, but it has been attributed to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, a philosopher who 
dealt with both hieroglyphs and doctrines of revelatory dreaming (notably Averroes’s 
copulatio theory).459 The poem appeared as an epigraph to the first French translation of the 
Hypnerotomachia Poliphili (1499), the famous account of Poliphilio’s dream in which the 
hero repeatedly stumbles upon classical monuments bearing complex hieroglyphic 
inscriptions.460  
                                               
454 Valeriano Bolzani 1556, Liber XXXII, p. 230v: ‘Conjectores (nam libenter hos in comitatum accipimus, 
quod eorum dictata magnum cum Aegyptiacis hieroglyphicis similitudinem habent)...’. 
455 Despite its difficulty, the fundamental essay on Renaissance cultures of allegory remains Gombrich 1972, pp. 
123-99. 
456  On the relation between ideogrammatic and phonetic symbolism in sixteenth-century understanding of 
hieroglyphs, see Brunon 1982, pp. 29-47. 
457 "Hypnerotomachie, ou, Discours du songe de Poliphile"  1546, epigraph. 
458 The column is also called a ‘fine type of ancient memory’ (bel typo de la memoria antica). Although at first 
glance typo means sort or kind, it may be a double entendre also referring to a typeface and, by extension, a 
writing system. Maria Ruvoldt already suggested that these ‘signs’ might be hieroglyphs. See Ruvoldt 2004, p. 
205, n. 61. 
459 Above the sonnet is the inscription ‘G. M. P.’ On Pico’s reaction to Averroes’s theories of divinatory sleep, 
see Giglioni 2013, pp. 173-93. 
460 The alta Colonna in the first verse is regarded as a reference to the Hypnerotomachia’s purported author 
Francesco Colonna. 
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 Both the Hypnerotomachia and its new epigraph illustrate the impalpable affinity 
between dreaming and reading (or the inability to read) hieroglyphs. They encapsulate how a 
peculiar virtue of oneiric experience, that of reconnecting us with lost memories, became 
emblematic of the Renaissance man’s perplexing quest to recover the lost knowledge of 
antiquity. Sleep was a space of supraterrestrial encounters. But it was a space of 
supratemporal ones as well — encounters with the future (in prophetic dreams), but also with 
the past, with ancestors (like in Scipio’s dream), and eventually with classical lore. 
 
3.4.  A Castle in the Air 
 
This understanding of Vasari’s hieroglyphic dream as a text to be interpreted prompts the 
evident question: what do these glyphs mean? The symbols have been identified by Julian 
Kliemann, from left to right, as an oil lamp, a tortoise carrying an obelisk (itself bearing 
hieroglyphs), a serpent, an upside-down castle, a boar’s head and a hand holding a 
moneybag. The last of these seems to have been borrowed with little change from 
Michelangelo’s drawing known as The Dream (Fig. 3.2).461  Erwin Panofsky understood 
Michelangelo’s Dream as being about the seven deadly sins, based on a description by 
Hieronymus Tetius from 1642. 462  This led Kliemann to propose a reading of Vasari’s 
symbols as the seven sins, in the following order: wrath (the lamp suggesting fire), sloth (the 
tortoise), envy (the serpent), pride (the castle), gluttony (the boar), avarice (the moneybag).463 
The reading is not entirely satisfactory, however. Lust is missing, and the fourth symbol — 
which appears to me to be a stylus — does not fit into the scheme. The upturned castle, 
moreover, resists interpretation. It stands out, not only because it is at the centre of the oneiric 
sequence, but also because it is the only glyph to have been turned on its head. It is also the 
furthest away from the pseudo-Egyptian repertoire which prompted critics to speak of 
hieroglyphs in the first place. Kliemann tentatively read it as an emblem of Pride, but he 
accompanied his proposal with a question mark. We will provide an interpretation of this 
glyph and offer a few additional suggestions to refine our understanding of Vasari’s drawing. 
 Vasari had something precise in mind when he drew an upside-down castle at the 
centre of his hieroglyphic dream: he was illustrating the phrase ‘castle in the air’ (castello in 
aria), from the expression ‘to build castles in the air’ (far castelli in aria). The expression 
                                               
461 In the Sogno, the moneybag is above the main figure’s left elbow. On this drawing, see chiefly Buck 2010, 
and Alberti, Rovetta, and Salsi 2015, I, pp. 187-205, with its bibliography. 
462 Vollmer 2010, p. 27. For a reading which proposes an alternative to the admonition against the vices, see 
Ruvoldt 2003, pp. 86-113. 
463 Kliemann in Corti and Davis 1981, p. 173. 
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was on everyone’s lips in the Cinquecento and, as we shall see, it was ripe with metaphorical 
connotations. Before we adduce Vasari’s visual source, let us first consider the phrase itself. 
Much like its English equivalent (attested since the sixteenth century), the expression far 
castelli in aria meant to imagine impossible or absurd things, to daydream, to linger over idle 
fancies, or to indulge in illusion or error.464 The activity was typically carried out in bed — 
‘what a beautiful thing … to lie in bed and make castles in the air’, wrote Alessandro Allegri 
— and associated with sleep, idleness, love, or mental illness.465 Vasari uses the phrase once 
in his 1568 biography of the eccentric painter Piero di Cosimo, who allegedly saw cities in 
the clouds and spent much of his time ‘letting his fancy roam (fantasticando) and building his 
castles in the air’.466 As we have already pointed out, philosophical literature on the soul 
regarded castles in the air as a typical product of the imagination or fantasia, often cited as an 
example alongside chimeric beings and golden mountains. The traditional list of examples 
was frequently repeated in the sixteenth-century; Benedetto Varchi, in his lectures, speaks of 
the fantasia’s ‘castellucci in aria’.467  
 Many authors from Vasari’s circle seemed to believe that the expression had been 
invented by Lucian of Samosata. In a letter to Cardinal Alessandro Farnese of 21 January 
1542, Paolo Giovio, Vasari’s mentor and friend, mentions his wish to realise ‘all the dreams, 
castles in the air and moral fables of Lucian’,468 and elsewhere he speaks of ‘false castles in 
the air, as Lucian says’.469 Anton Francesco Doni writes that ‘when Lucian plied his trade, he 
was making castles in the air’.470 He even proposes an etymology for it: in order to honour 
Jupiter, an elephant gifted the fortress that men had built on its back in times of war, and 
‘from this’, writes Doni, ‘Lucian began to create castles in the air, because he happened to 
see this elephant between the clouds with this castle’.471 
 The attribution of the phrase castelli in aria to Lucian is curious. For all the aerial 
expeditions and flying things featured in his writings, the Syrian satirist never literally spoke 
of building edifices in the air.472 In fact, the expression derives from the French ‘faire des 
châteaux en Espagne’ (or one of its variants, castles in Albion, in Asia, in Brie, etc.), which 
                                               
464 Röhrich 2006, II, p. 979 (Luftschloß). 
465 Alessandro Allegri, Rime e prose, I, Canzone 1 cited in Pittàno 1992, p. 137: ‘Che bella cosa/Ove nessun 
contraria/Starsi nel letto/E far castelli in aria’. 
466 Vasari 1996, II, p. 650. 
467 At the time the text was attributed to Albertus Magnus. There are slightly older examples of ‘castra in 
Hispania’, which are also thought to derive from the vernacular expression. See Nelson 1951, p. 167. 
468 Frey 1982, I, p. 124. On Giovio’s taste for Quattrocento imitators of Lucian, see Zappala 1990, p. 146. 
469 Quoted in Zappala 1990, p. 222. On Giovio’s Lucianism, see Michelacci 2004, pp. 274-5, and consider 
Zappala 1990, pp. 222-3; Panizza 2007, p. 78; Ligota 2007, p. 59. 
470 Doni 2017, I, p. 6: ‘Quando Luciano armeggiava, ei faceva castelli in aria’. 
471 Doni 2017, II, p. 435. On this passage, see Mattioli 1980, p. 183; Zappala 1990, p. 150 and p. 283, n. 16; 
Doni 2004a, p. 25, n. 7. 
472 This is confirmed by Zappala 1990, p. 222. 
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first appears in writing in the thirteenth century, notably in the Roman de la Rose.473 It has 
been proposed that it initially referred to the secluded faraway place that lovers dream of, the 
‘stronghold in which the consummate joy of physical love may be carried to its blissful 
end’.474 Only later was it adapted into Latin on the basis of the vernacular phrase. The earliest 
recorded occurrence of the Latin for ‘castle in the air’ dates from 1496, in the chapter devoted 
to the virtus imaginativa of a Philosophia pauperum (‘h[a]ec enim virtus facit castra in 
sp[h]era aeris’).475 The faulty attribution of the expression to Lucian is certainly due to the 
first Italian translation of Lucian’s dialogues, in which the Navigium (Πλοἶον ἢ Εὐχαί, The 
Ship or the Wishes) was retitled ‘Dialogo di alcuni che fanno castelli in aere’ by its translator 
Nicolò Leoniceno.476 The book enjoyed wide popular success, going through seven editions 
between 1527 and 1551. It was known to Giovio, Vasari’s mentor, who recorded Leoniceno’s 
authorship of the translation in his Elogia clarorum virorum.477 
 This famous translation of Lucian was also, certainly, the source of Vasari’s pseudo-
hieroglyph. The Navigium dialogue was illustrated by a woodcut showing four men 
contemplating a small upturned fortress floating in mid-air (Fig. 3.5).478 The building, like 
Vasari’s, is flat-based with a central tower dominating smaller turrets. It represents one of the 
castelli in aria — the vain dreams — of the young men in the centre of the composition. The 
dialogue tells the story of Licino (Lucian, on the left in the illustration) and his friends who 
witness the arrival into the Piraeus of a sumptuous ship from Egypt. They fantasise about the 
riches that the ship may contain, and begin to discuss their wildest dreams: being immensely 
rich, powerful and famous, or being able to fly or become invisible. The dialogue ends with 
Lucian denouncing these ideas as mere castles in the air because they expose his friends to 
crushing disillusionment, like Icarus falling from the sky or ‘like those who wake up from the 
sweetest of dreams’.479  
 The use of a small upturned fortress to represent the expression somewhat recalls the 
methods of proverb illustration. Finding such an image in Vasari is unusual. This glyph, 
                                               
473 Nelson 1951, p. 167; Mieder 2014, pp. 415-35. See also Gallacher 1963, pp. 324-9. Note also the phrase in 
Augustine, Sermones, II, 6, 8: ‘Subtracto fundamento in aere aedificare’. 
474 Gallacher 1963, p. 324. Others suggested that, for the French, any project of building a castle in Spain in the 
early 13th century was highly unlikely to succeed due to the Muslim rule over much of the peninsula. The 
expression may then have become ‘castle in the air’ when it disseminated out of France or when the relevant 
political context disappeared. See Morel-Fatio 1913, I, pp. 335-342. 
475 Nelson 1951, p. 167; Mieder 2014, pp. 415-35. 
476 Lucian 1527, p. 124v (table of contents), p. 28r (dialogue), and p. 30v (main passage on castles in the air). 
This translation is the work of Nicolò Leoniceno. On its genesis, see Panizza 2007, pp. 71-114.  
477 Panizza 2007, p. 78.  
478 Panizza 2007, p. 82. The style and quality of the engravings vary depending on the edition, but they all show 
an upturned castle floating in mid-air. The princeps — Lucian 1525, p. XXXIIv for our image — has the most 
detailed illustrations, which were also used in the 1529 edition and in slightly simplified form in the 1543 
edition. On the wide circulation of the book in Spain as well, see Zappala 1990, p. 114. 
479 Lucian 1527, p. 38r: ‘… come quelli che sareti suegliati da uno dolcissimo insogno …’. 
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however, belongs to a wider iconographic tradition, which remains little known. In the 
sixteenth century, the picture of the upside-down castle was widely diffused through popular 
broadsheets. It appears notably in various editions of a sheet devoted to the Cage of Fools. A 
vivid example engraved by Sebastiano di Re shows castles dangling from clouds (Fig. 3.6-1, 
Fig. 3.6-2), above the inscription ‘Men who in the air make castles, / Ruin them as soon as 
their thought vanishes’ (Quegli huomini ch’in aria fan castelli, / Finito quel pensier, ruinan 
quelli).480 By the early seventeenth century at the latest, the same image and proverb can also 
be found in prints titled Specchio della vita humana.481 It is worth noting that in all of these 
examples, the castles are not only shown in the clouds, but also upside down. This visual 
strategy no doubt reflects the motif’s subversive quality.482 An air-castle is an adynaton as 
well as a paradox. As such, it embodies an inversion of values dear to sixteenth-century 
intellectual culture. It is no surprise, then, that air-castles also crop up in broadsheets devoted 
to the theme of the World Upside Down. A small drawing from a series on this theme, Italian 
and probably mid-sixteenth century, represents the most detailed and perhaps the earliest 
depiction of the act of building a castle in the air (Fig. 3.7).483 It shows three men on clouds 
labouring before a large castle; in the background, three further silhouettes are at work on the 
ramparts. Meanwhile, roots are growing into the sky. When it appeared in a slightly different 
form in a German broadsheet of the seventeenth-century, this image of reversal was 
accompanied by the motto ‘Some believe in their jokes / and build castles in the air’.484 
 The wide currency of the phrase ‘castle in the air’ throughout Europe should prompt 
us to look beyond the borders of Italy. In German, ‘ein schloß in den lufft bawen’ is attested 
since 1541.485  In this light, the turreted castle carried by a hovering demon in Albrecht 
Dürer’s Recording of the Pious and Sinful Thoughts (c. 1500-15, Rennes, Musée des Beaux-
Arts, at the centre-right) may be an early case of Luftschloß.486 Similarly, Karel van Mander’s 
                                               
480 Alberti 2005, no. 14, p. 13, who lists four other versions or copies. The same print contains a striking 
illustration of the phrase beccarsi il cervello (to peck at one’s brain) showing a gentleman with his hands shaped 
like long-beaked birds picking at his own head. Varchi, in his Ercolano, considered this expression as a 
synonym of far castellucci in aria. See Varchi 1858, II, p. 61. The upturned cloudy castles, furthermore, can be 
found in a whole tradition of Gabbia de’ matti broadsheets. See Rigoli and Amitrano Savarese 1995, nos. 849, 
851, 852, 854; Bertarelli 1929, p. 19. 
481 Aschengreen Piacenti 1990, no. 12 (proverb at the bottom-left); Rigoli and Amitrano Savarese 1995, no. 453. 
482 On the symbolic value of upturned architecture, see Springer 2004, pp. 35-42 and 317-326. 
483 The series was engraved and published in London in the nineteenth century, where it was attributed to 
Giuseppe Porta (also known as Giuseppe Salviati). It resurfaced on the art market in 1992 and was sold as a 
work by Francesco Salviati. Among mondern scholars, Luisa Mortari once accepted the latter attribution. See 
Guarino 1995, pp. 130-32; Carissimi and Lapeyre 1992, no. 16; Lewis 1822, no. 26. 
484 Die Verkehrte Welt, mid-17th c., broadsheet engraved by Paulus Fürst, in Pelc 2013, p. 181, fig. 65, at the 
bottom left: ‘Manche seiner Witze traut / vnd in lüfften Schlösser baut’. The roots in the sky have been replaced 
by the sun and moon on thr ground. On this theme, see Kunzle 1978, pp. 39-94; Cocchiara 1981. 
485 Röhrich 2006, II, p. 979 (Luftschloß). 
486 On this drawing, see Brisman 2013, pp. 273-303, and its references. I am grateful to Alexander Marr for 
having brought this detail to my attention. 
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Allegory of Night (Fig. 3.8) in the same museum, which shows spiritelli painting castles in 
the clouds of a dream, is probably a visualisation of the phrase — although both Dürer and 
van Mander could have heard or read the expression in Italian.487 The vignette of the castle 
on clouds can also be found in scenes of quackery among the crotchets that get purged from 
the sick man’s imagination, such as in the Wonderful Workshop of Doctor Simplicissimus 
(Fig. 3.9-1 and Fig. 3.9-2).488 We also ought to consider other media, particularly maiolica, 
which was often used to illustrate proverbs and sayings.489  
A jug in the Fitzwilliam Museum in Cambridge decorated with a large castle sitting 
on a hill (Fig. 10) is certainly related to the motif.490 As it is frequently the case in Siennese 
maiolica from the first decades of the sixteenth century, the sky in the background is signified 
through groups of three blue dots. These extend all around the figure, clearly suggesting that 
it is hovering in the air. Of particular interest is the fact that this image is activated by the 
viewer when the object is used: as one tilts the jug to pour out its content, the castle upends, 
reminding of the famous illustration and signifying (literal and symbolic) emptiness. The 
playfulness of this object is better understood in the context of puzzle jugs and puzzle 
kitchenware more broadly. 491  Other examples of the same kind include jugs bearing 
reversible portraits of the pope-devil which, like in the case of the castello in aria, harness 
the natural rotation of the vessel to reveal the image’s double meaning when upended (Fig. 
3.11). 492 The Renaissance was particularly keen on the ribald humour of these everyday 
objects that would, as it were, crack silent jokes at the dinner table or in the kitchen. At 
banquets, ewers flipped and turned when drinks were served, but also when decanting and 
mixing the beverages, as visual evidence testifies (Fig. 3.12). The jug in itself was an 
essential constituent in the paraphernalia of burlesque lusus.493 In François Desprez’s zany 
Songes drôlatiques de Pantagruel (1565), at least six characters have body parts made of 
pitchers, sometimes to the level of full personification (Fig. 3.13).494 A drawing attributed to 
Bosch that resurfaced on the art market in 2003 is another good example (Fig. 3.14); here 
                                               
487 Van Mander’s phantasms have already been called ‘castles in the air’ in Cole 2002a, p. 628. On the drawing, 
see Göttler 2018, pp. 147-76. 
488 On this engraving, see Gersch 2004, p. 95 and fig. 46. 
489 Proverbs from the Cage of Fools broadsheet cited above have been documented on plates, pots and other 
three-dimensional maiolicas. See Wilson 2016, no. 107; Ravanelli Guidotti 1996, pp. 351-52. 
490 Poole 1995, no. 195. 
491 On the long tradition of puzzle jugs, see Alexandre-Bidon 2014 (online publication). On playful practices 
involving juggling and reversal in ancient kitchenware, see Lissarrague 1990, notably figs. 59-66. 
492 Elsig and Sala 2013, no. 33. For another example of a jug which reveals a surprise when turned upside down, 
see Bernini 1979, no. LXXX. Other examples of reversible jugs are discussed in Gaimster 1997, pp. 142-55. I 
am grateful to Maxime Poulain for sharing the Gaimster reference with me. 
493 The burlesque valence of medicine jars was explored in: Alexandre-Bidon 2013. 
494 Jeanneret and Elsig 2004, nos. XVII, XIX, XXXIII, LXXVII, CII, CVIII. 
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jugs are a prominent attribute in the fantastical miscellanea of the so-called diableries.495 In 
the case of the Fitzwilliam ewer, the medium also makes for a double pun: far castelli in aria 
could mean, as we have seen, to engage in futile or meaningless pursuits. There was another 
well-known proverb which meant the same thing: ollam exornas (you are painting up the 
kitchen jar). According to Erasmus it was ‘said of people who make great and useless efforts 
for quite ridiculous reasons. It is lost labour to paint designs on a kitchen pot, a despised 
object meant for cooking’.496 The jar painter who made this castle in the air must have had a 
strong penchant for irony. 
 Before we return to Vasari’s Allegory of a Dream, let us explore one further aspect of 
the castle in the air motif. In the sixteenth century, the castello in aria became emblematic of 
the aesthetic values of the grotesque, thereby playing a significant role in the development of 
the decorative arts as well as poetry. A key aspect of alla grottesca decoration which 
fascinated the writers of the Cinquecento was the fact that the hybrid figures, the foliage as 
well as the architectural elements in this imagery seemed to hover in mid-air, as if they had 
been freed from gravity. Sixteenth-century authors speak of the grotesques as though they 
were in flight. Serlio’s early comments mention tempietti and buildings ‘in the sky’,497 Doni 
speaks of ‘grottesche in aria’,498 and Vasari of ‘cose in aria’.499 It seems that these authors 
were not inclined to regard the monochrome background of imperial Roman ornament as a 
neutral and non-spatial plane. As Eugenio La Rocca suggested, it may be that their eye was 
so deeply trained in linear perspective that it was accustomed to approaching painted surface 
as a field of illusionistic space; thereby they were not inclined to regard the monochrome 
background of Roman ornamental panels as a neutral and non-spatial plane.500 In any case, it 
is worth noting that the description of grotesques as cose in aria was also polysemous. To say 
that something was in aria in sixteenth-century Italian meant that it was absurd, unfounded 
or, so to speak, full of air.501 The phrasing thus ingeniously alluded to the fantastical nature of 
the grotesques, and to Vitruvius’s criticism that these paintings were impossible and therefore 
ludicrous.502 ‘Vitruvius’, writes Doni, ‘berates this illusion (bugia) which is placed in the air 
without any basis at all, because with your paintbrush you make a building on top of a stalk 
                                               
495 Ilsink, Alkins, and Calster 2016, no. 44. 
496 Massing 2011, p. 297. 
497 Sebastiano Serlio in Barocchi 1971, III, p. 2625. 
498 Doni 2004b, p. 142. 
499 Vasari 1966, I, p. 144 (both in the 1550 and the 1568 edition). 
500 La Rocca 2009, pp. 39-55. 
501 B. Varchi, L’Ercolano, in Varchi 1858, II, p. 57: ‘favellare in aria, senza fondamento’. For further reference, 
see Pfister 1979, I, col. 1061.  
502 Vitruvius 1999, pp. 91-92. 
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of fennel, or on clouds’.503 In fact, Doni’s reading of Vitruvius is already inflected by the 
double-entendre of the Italian cosa in aria — although Vitruvius had mentioned the example 
of a ‘temple on reed’, he never evoked things ‘on clouds’ or ‘without any basis at all’.  
 In his Disegno (1549), Doni fully exploits the ekphrastic potential of figurative 
language. The protagonists of his dialogue dwell on the question of how the grotesques were 
originally named in Roman times. They compare the ornament to the forms we sometimes 
see in clouds and suggest that, for being pure images of the fantasia, they may have been 
called sogni or castelli in aria.504 The latter expression encapsulates at once two of the most 
salient features of grotesque aesthetics: suspension in pictorial space and (by metaphor) lack 
of rule or decorum. In some occasions, moreover, Imperial Roman painting conformed to the 
description of ‘castle in the air’ in a rather literal way. Among the things that archaeologists 
and amateurs found down the holes of Nero’s residence, there were curious palaces which 
really seemed to glide. This was the case, notably, on the much-copied lunette below the 
Volta Gialla (Fig. 3.15).505 By sheer coincidence, a medieval idiom intersected an ancient 
pictorial tradition. 
 A taste for flying architecture of this kind grew, becoming particularly pronounced in 
the 1540s, as Philippe Morel has observed.506 It was used, for example, on the side walls of 
the Markgrafen Chapel at Santa Maria dell’Anima completed by Francesco Salviati in 1550 
(Fig. 3.16).507 In Castel Sant’Angelo, the interiors painted for Paul III between 1543 and 
1547 contain particularly remarkable examples of hovering edifices. In the room known as 
La Cagliostra, Luzio Luzi incorporated weightless tempietti on a winged atlantid of the same 
ilk as Raphaël and his team had painted on the pilasters of the Vatican Loggias, yet this time 
the tempietto constitutes the centrepiece of the mural composition (Fig. 3.17).508 In the later 
décor for the Sala di Apollo, the entire wall is occupied by baseless temples on a white 
                                               
503 Barocchi 1971, I, p. 586: ‘Vitruvio vitupera questa bugia, che è tutta posta in aria senza fondamento alcuno, 
conciosia che tu fai con li tuoi pennelli un casamento posto sopra un gambo di finocchio, o sopra nuvoli’. 
504 Barocchi 1971, I, p. 585. Several terms are proposed successively: sogni, castelli in aria, and chimera. 
Chimera, like castelli in aria, has the property of describing both literally and metaphorically: some grotesques 
are hybrid creatures, while chimera already meant mere figment of the imagination. 
505 Dacos 1969, pp. 39-40 and figs. 56-58; Faietti and Nesselrath 1995, pp. 44-88. In the modern designation this 
is the South Lunette of Room 31. The painting was badly damaged. In Fig. 8, we reproduce the engraving 
published by Ludovico Mirri in 1776, which remains one of the most accurate renderings. See Meyboom and 
Moormann 2013, I, pp. 158-159. 
506 Morel 1997, p. 106: ‘… lorsque les architectures peintes ne prennent pas directement appui sur un socle 
solide, elles flottent dans un état de manifeste apesanteur’. For visual examples, see in particular figs. 132-154 
and 179, and pp. 105-111. For another, more literary discussion of castles in the air, see Scholl 2004, pp. 95-
101, 06-7, 403. For a possible evocation of castello in aria through Diana of Ephesus’s corona muralis, see 
Quiviger 2010, p. 78. 
507 On the genesis of the décor, see Nova 1981, pp. 355-72. 
508 Luzio’s drawings for these decorations are kept in the Royal Library at Windsor. See Aliberti Gaudioso and 
Gaudioso 1981, II, pp. 37-47. 
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background. 509  The importance taken by this element is certainly related to the wide 
circulation of a set of grotesque designs engraved by Tommaso Barlacchi and Enea Vico in 
1541, in which the compositions are generally centred around lofty temples that rest on a 
bird, a butterfly, or nothing at all (Fig. 3.18).510 The set was dubbed Leviores, et (ut videtur) 
extemporanae picturae.511 The vedutisti working for Paul III also hinted at the motif. In the 
Pompeian Corridor of Castel Sant’Angelo, a painter working under Luzio made a landscape 
in the spirit of the Roman Third Style featuring a large castle on a mound which appears 
strikingly suspended (Fig. 3.19).512 In 2010, François Quiviger read the small turreted castle 
at the top of an ornamental panel by Agostino Veneziano as an evocation and ‘anticipation’ 
of the idea of castello in aria (Fig. 3.20).513 The proposal is suggestive; since the castle rests 
on the head of a Diana of Ephesus, however, it may also simply be Veneziano’s liberal 
interpretation of the iconography of the corona muralis. 
 Painters were not the only ones to chase castles in the air. Poets did too, and 
Cinquecento enthusiasm for zero gravity architecture has literary ramifications worth 
considering. In the Baldus (1552, posthumously), a mock-epic dubbed ‘phantasia plus quam 
fantastica’, Teofilo Folengo developed a poetics of levitas which ultimately materialises as 
literal weightlessness.514 The story ends in a scene of surreal levitation, where the characters 
glide to a House of Fantasy (Domus Phantasiae) entirely free of gravity. In it, everything is 
upside down, and words and images collide: ‘[In the domus] phantasms flutter, and there are 
dreams of a daft spirit, thoughts stirred by no reason … aspects and images of the mind … 
the noun is here, and the verb too, the pronoun and the participle, with the rest of the gang 
following, namely, huc, illuc, istuc, hinc … and the whole clan of cuius’.515 Folengo may in 
fact have been inspired by a visit to the Roman ‘grottoes’. The farcical Preface to the first 
edition of the Baldus claims that the book was found in a grotto full of antiquities,516 and one 
                                               
509 Aliberti Gaudioso and Gaudioso 1981, I, figs. 192-193 and II, pp. 172-183. 
510 Miller 1999, nos. 33a pl. 2, 33b pl. 15(l), 33b pl. 15(r), 33b p. 16(l); Spike 1985, XXX, nos. 470, 471, 481, 
484. All sorts of visual strategies were used to make clear that the buildings are positively fluttering: in our Fig. 
11 the owl on which the whole edifice stands is clearly in flight because its claws clutch on a mouse whose feet 
and tails are dangling down; under another temple (Bartsch-Spike no. 484), a well-stocked basket hangs from a 
rope. 
511 Miller 1999, no. 33, proposes that the plate containing this title was not in the original set by Barlacchi and 
Vico, but added no earlier than 1544 by Antonio Lafrery. 
512 Aliberti Gaudioso and Gaudioso 1981, I, fig. 55 and II, pp. 72-73. The composition was borrowed from a 
pinakes in the Sala delle Aquile of the Palazzo dei Conservatori. Scholars do not agree on its authorship. See 
Sapori 2016, pp. 75-99; Dacos 2006, pp. 41-73. 
513 Quiviger 2010, p. 78. 
514 Faini 2010, pp. 202-20. 
515 Folengo 2007, II, p. 473 (Book XXV, vv. 476-495). 
516 Folengo 1517, pp. ir-iiv.  
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episode clearly evokes a visit to the underground ruins of an ancient palace. 517  For a 
generation of eccentric writers following Folengo, the castello in aria represented the 
epitome of foolishness, as verses by Bronzino suggest,518 and the perfect culmination of a 
burlesque praise of folly. It became an emblem of the kind of absurdism they pursued, 
especially in the case of Doni, who developed the literary project of transposing grotesque 
aesthetics onto poetry.519 Doni referred to his literary works as ‘chimere, e castegli in aria’ 
and subtitled his book La Zucca ‘una colma … di castelli in aria’, among other things.520 He 
also made a commented edition of the cryptic poems of Burchiello, the ‘poeta pittor di 
grottesche’ whose mystifying ‘sonetti pazzi’ contained, as Doni confessed in his 
commentary, not much beyond castles in the air.521 In one letter of Nicolò Franco’s Pistole 
vulgari (1542), the castello in aria becomes the kernel of a manifesto for poetic nobility. 
Franco groups all flying constructions under the term l’architettura della pazzia (the 
architecture of madness), and argues that ‘the act of building in the air’ and of ‘founding 
one’s buildings where there is no foundation at all’ is a miraculous thing. Poets, therefore, 
should be regarded as saints. They build ‘ten thousand palaces in the air’, and their ‘celestial 
castles’ can never be torn down. Painters, furthermore, may be considered even more saintly, 
according to Franco, because ‘they partake of the fantastical, since they draw during the day 
what they dream of at night’. ‘The reason’, he writes, ‘is that with their art they show us 
battlements and towers in the air, and landscapes and perspectives in the sky, which is 
impossible to see’.522 
 In a glyphic form poised between image and text, Vasari also drew — or ‘wrote’ — a 
castle in the air in his Allegory of a Dream. What does this tell us about the meaning of the 
drawing more generally? Considering the drawing’s function may yield more insight. Several 
scholars have suggested that it may have been a preparatory drawing for some decorative 
programme. 523  In 2010, Stephanie Buck compared it to the apparato made for Pietro 
                                               
517 Folengo 2007, II, pp. 9-13 (Book XIII, vv. 129-191). This is the episode of Cingar leading his friends down a 
dark ‘grotta’ which turns out to be a palace with frescoes by Apelles. In this palace, there is also a room which 
rotates by itself. Interestingly, Rodolfo Signorini showed that this rotating cloister was probably inspired by 
Suetonius’s description of the Domus Aurea — a curious coincidence, because the site of the Domus Aurea had 
not been identified as such at the time. Mario Chiesa links it to the ‘château tournant’ and other Arthurian 
myths. See Folengo 1997, II, p. 571 notes ad v. 148. 
518 Bronzino 1988, pp. 245-46 (Il piato, cap. 5), about fools who ‘build a castle or a city in the air, or have 
thoughts that defy nature [chi fabbrica or castello ed or cittade/nell’aria o fa pensier fuor di natura]’ and are 
compared to men who leap into the void believing they may fly. For a summary and analysis of the poem, see 
Parker 2000, pp. 133-52 (these verses are addressed on p. 136). For other references to castles in the air in 
Bronzino, see Hope Goodchild 2014, p. 133, n. 19. 
519 On Doni’s poetics of the grotesque, see Scholl 2004. 
520 Doni 2003, I, p. 20 and II, p. 679. 
521 Burchiello 1553, pp. 17-18. 
522 Franco 1542b, pp. 159-62. 
523 J. Kliemann in Corti and Davis 1981, p. 173; Mai 1996, p. 217; Buck 2010, pp. 208-11. 
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Aretino’s play La Talanta in 1542.524 That year, Vasari was also working on panels for a 
ceiling in Giovanni Corner’s palace on the Grand Canal.525 The Allegory of a Dream bears 
interesting similarities to the panel of Justice in the Corner group (Fig. 3.21): on top of the 
format and composition, some details are analogous, such as the angle and outline of the 
central figure’s face, the placement of the legs, and, in particular, the terrestrial globe in the 
background, where the Italian peninsula was simplified in the same way. The Chatsworth 
Dream may have been intended for Corner’s ceiling. This would also explain why Vasari’s 
design is partly modelled on the acclaimed ceiling decoration that Primaticcio was 
developing for Fontainebleau at the time (Fig. 3.22). In effect, Vasari borrowed from the 
Allegory of the Nile for the lost grotesque ceiling of the Galerie d’Ulysse, appropriating the 
two putti playing at the far left (Fig. 3.23).526 Vasari certainly saw the design in 1540 when 
his presence in Rome overlapped with Primaticcio’s, who had been sent there by François Ier 
to cast ‘Egyptian’ statues (two sphinxes, the Belvedere Nile and the Ariadne, at the time 
thought to be a Cleopatra).527 The chiaroscuro technique used by Vasari is typical of a 
presentation drawing. He may have made it in hopes of enticing his employer to extend his 
contract to other rooms of the Venetian palace. The Dream, despite its dark mood, would 
have suited a bedchamber.528 Vincenzio Borghini once conceived for Vasari a programme for 
the ceiling of a bedroom which provides good iconographic comparison. In Borghini’s 
project, the Dream is a sleeping figure whose cranium gets cracked open ‘like one would 
open the shell of a crab’ by a many-eyed damsel, while butterfly-winged angels fly around 
the broken head ‘between clouds in the air, or instead of clouds bizarre forms of castles, 
chimeras, etc. that would be incomplete like sketches — smoke should suffice’.529 In his 
Chatsworth Dream, Vasari also included fumes, and, undeniably, ‘bizarre forms’ of dreams, 
                                               
524 Buck 2010, pp. 208-11 
525 Schulz 1961, pp. 500-09. 
526 We can be sure that he borrowed from Primaticcio (and not the other way around) because of the way the 
composition shifted: in Primaticcio’s invention the figures have a meaningful interaction, as the right putto 
directs the sphinx’s nemes headdress towards his companion to make the animal bite his leg. The humorous 
element was lost when Vasari moved both putti to the background. As specialists have noted, Primaticcio 
experimented with these postures on several occasions. See Cordellier 2004, no. 122. 
527 Cordellier 2004, p. 140. Primaticcio and Vasari were both simultaneously in Rome in 1540 and again around 
1543. We know that this left a strong impression on Vasari, who recounts it in his Life of Primaticcio by 
famously calling Fontainebleau ‘almost a new Rome’. Vasari 1966, IV, p. 144. 
528 On Michele Sanmicheli’s plans certainly including a bedroom, see Rößler 2014, pp. 63-69. 
529  Scoti-Bertinelli 1906, p. 243: ‘Sotto l’Oblivione metterei il Sogno. Questo farei pure addormentato … 
cor’una damigella accanto, piena di occhi, che gli aprissi come fassi una scarsella di granchio la parte di detro 
del capo, detta nuca; et in aria certi angeletti vaghi et belli con alle di farfalle … et gli volessino verso il capo di 
colui et fra nugoli in aria o in cambio di nugoli come forme bizzarre di castelli, chimere ecc. che sieno così 
come bozze e non appieno: fumo farebbe bene’. The invenzione has been dated c. 1570 and connected to a 
drawing in the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. See Härb 2015, no. 365; Kliemann 1978, p. 169 and 
no. 22. 
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in particular through his castello in aria. He was aiming for an uncanny atmosphere of the 
same ilk.530  
 
3.5.  Impossibilia as Prerogative of the Fantasia 
 
The fact that the castles in Vasari’s drawing and Lucian’s illustration are upside down is not 
without significance. Both Vasari and the anonymous illustrator of Lucian could have 
conveyed the idea of a flying castle by putting the buildings on clouds, like it was done by 
some other artists we have mentioned (Fig. 3.7 through Fig. 3.9). Yet they chose to invert the 
representation. This pictorial act often carries particular cultural significance, as Peter 
Springer highlighted in his study Das verkehrte Bild (2004).531 We have already touched on 
the importance of inversion in the case of the reversible beakers, and in passing our reader 
will have noticed the association of our trope with the theme of the World Upside Down. 
Turning the world upside down is an act of subersiveness and utopianism particularly central 
to the intellectual culture of the late Renaissance. It is quite revealing, therefore, that the 
castello in aria should partake of this mechanism. This, as we shall see, also has to do with a 
certain understanding of the fantasia which, as a maker of fictions, was regarded as an 
enabler of mental revolution. 
 We may return to the letter of Niccolò Franco, Pietro Aretino’s secretary and 
follower, from the Pistole vulgari (1542) we referred to earlier. Franco argued for the 
superiority of artists on the basis of their power to submit the world to an inversion. Painters 
are somewhat saintly, he argues, because they have the ability to depict miracles; moreover, 
they also partake of ‘the fantastical’ (hanno un poco del fantastico), because ‘they draw 
during the day what they dream during the night’.532  
 
And the reason is that [painters] do not solely show us with their art battlements 
and towers in the air, with landscapes and perspectives in the sky — a thing that is 
impossible to see —, horses jumping over walls and balconies, birds flying 
without moving their wings, animals running without taking a step, and a 
thousand other wonderful things. They also know how to paint devils and saints 
                                               
530 Additionally, the ceiling picture could have served the function of a memento against vanity. The castle in 
the air was often used as an image of peccaminous vanity in late-sixteenth-century sermons. See da Bologna 
1563, p. 150; Musso 1588, p. 291 (‘Chi vide mai piu gran frenesia? [...] fo castelli in aria’); Ferrini 1606, p. 8r 
(‘che altro sono questi nostri pensieri terreni [...] se non castelli in aria? Se non sogni vanissimi?’); Zanoni 1614, 
p. 199 (‘Gli huomini mondani fan gli castelli in aere’). 
531 Springer 2004.  
532 ‘...hanno un poco del fantastico, perche disegnano il giorno cioche sognan la notte’. Franco 1539, p. LXXv. 
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just as they please. And he who is able to do this nowadays deserves to be 
regarded as more than divine.533 
 
Franco’s remarks on the movement of animals in immobile pictures strikes as ironic, and it is 
certainly the trace of the author’s caustic humour. Yet his remarks on the depiction of ‘towers 
in the air’, lands in the sky, and other ‘things impossible to see’ resonate simultaneously with 
the castelli in aria and with the ancient rhetorical figure of the adynaton (from the Greek 
adúnatov, impossible thing) or impossibilia.534 Early Mannerist writers were fond of such 
construals, in particular the inversion of sky and earth. We find this figure, notably, in 
Bronzino’s poem Il Piato (The Plea) where the artist describes finding himself in a world 
where people walk on their heads, mountains hover in the sky, stars lie on the ground, fire 
freezes and water burns. The reception of Lucian, and in particular his True Story, fuelled the 
Italian taste for this kind of paradox. The idea was also present in Euripides (‘the stars will 
descend on earth, the earth will rise into the sky’, Electra 2, 36) and in particular in Plautus’s 
Asinaria, which was translated into volgare in 1530 under the presses of Niccolo d’Aristotile, 
named ‘Zoppino’, who had been responsible for the princeps of Lucian’s dialogues 
containing the flying castle. In this loose Italian version of Plautus, Demenaetus requests his 
friend Libanus to ‘invert the earth, the air and the sky’ (fa che la terra, e l’aria, e’l ciel 
riuersi).535 Libanus’s response suggests one might just as well try to ‘fly without wings’, ‘fish 
fishes in the sky’ or ‘hunt deers by casting a net in the sea’ — o strana fantasia, he 
concludes.536 
 Illustrations of the upside-down world were common. Subliminal allusions to the 
theme are scattered in the margins of Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s so-called Big Fish Eat Little 
Fish (Fig. 3.24), for example. In the top right corner, fish fly in the air while boats are seen 
resting on mountains; in the middle-ground, we see fish regurgitating seashells as well as 
seashells regurgitating fish.537 In Italy, the iconography of the mondo alla riversa took the 
form of large engraved broadsheets coming from the same print shops as the Cage of Fools 
ones where the castelli in aria where illustrated and captioned; the earliest extant copies of 
                                               
533 Franco 1539, p. LXXv: ‘E la cagion’, che non solo fan uedere con la lor arte i merli e le torri in aria, con i 
paesi, e le prospettiue nel cielo; cosa impossibile da uedere; & i caualli saltar per le mura; e per i balconi, e gli 
uccelli uolare senza mouer l’ali, e gli animali correre senza dare un passo, et altre migliaia di cose stupende, ma 
sanno dipingere diauoli, e santi sempre che uoglioni: e colui, che sa far questo al di d’hoggi, merita d’esser 
tenuto piu che diuino’. 
534 Kunzle 1978, p. 59. 
535 Plautus 1530, p. 5v. 
536 Plautus 1530, p. 5v. 
537 Orenstein 2001, nos. 41 and 42. For a recent reading, see Ribouillault 2016. 
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the former date from the later sixteenth century (Fig. 3.25).538 Such compositions, probably 
meant to be humorous as much as they were subversive, generally featured an upended planet 
earth at the centre surrounded by illustrations of physical, social and economic role 
inversions. The Italian example of Fig. 3.25 shows a cart pulling two oxen, a sheep shearing 
his shepherd, women going to war; it also comprises boats on mountains, fishes on trees, 
birds in water, and people hunting game in the sea. 
 The breach of decorum inherent to these images certainly played a role in their 
appeal. Their status in sixteenth-century culture, however, was probably that of capricci, 
fantasie or bizzarrie. As a consequence, they would not be regarded as part of the normative 
canon, and the imperatives of mimesis and decorum would not apply to them. Niccolò 
Franco’s remark that a painter’s ability for outlandish fantasy contributes to his superiority, 
however, proves that this kind of imagery testified to the fertility of an artist’s creativity. This 
value of impossibilia as proof of inventiveness already had currency in poetry, and by 1505 
Pietro Bembo remarked in his Asolani that poets ‘create impossible things’.539 Franco might 
be the first author in the Renaissance to apply this to visual artists. In the philosophical 
tradition, it was frequent to attribute to the phantasia a capacity of making impossible things. 
Pico, in his De imaginatione (1501), poses this as a criterion for distinguishing sense from 
imagination: the latter can form images of impossibilia, while the former cannot.540 
 By the second half of the century, art theory reflects the ways in which this shift of 
emphasis put a strain on the primacy of mimesis.  This is clearly visible in a passage from the 
ninth dialogue of Francesco Patrizi’s Dialoghi della retorica (1562), which has not received 
the critical attention it deserves so far.541 Patrizi is probing the limits of the conception of the 
visual artist as imitatore. He ends up asking how a painter may ever represent ‘what does not 
fall under the senses’: ‘emptiness, infinity’ (il vacuo, l’infinito), ‘the invisible, a thought’ (lo 
invisibile, alcun pensiero), and even sound, taste and smell. Such an artist does not produce 
any ‘resemblance’ at all, explains Patrizi; therefore his status as an imitator is excluded. The 
dialogue illustrates how far from the imperative of pictorial mimesis the emphasis had already 
shifted by the early 1560s. The question, for Patrizi, is no more that of the limits of imitation, 
but altogether of the limits of representation. Some things, being ‘out of nature’ (fuor di 
                                               
538 Examples are gathered in Rigoli and Amitrano Savarese 1995, nos. 857-880. Our drawing in Fig. 3.7 and the 
series from which it stems is connected to the designs in these broadsheets. The drawings may have constituted 
the inceptive models for each of the broadsheets’ individual sheets. 
539 ‘...egli fingono le cose impossibili’. Pietro Bembo, Gli Asolani, 1505, II, chap. 9, p. 271, quoted in Nagel 
2011, n. 47 p. 297. 
540 Pico della Mirandola 1971, chap. 2. 
541 Patrizi 1562, pp. 55r 
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natura), can simply not be depicted. Their portrayal, says Patrizi, would not be a portrayal at 
all; they sit outside the realm of art. 
 Two years after Patrizi’s own approach to impossibilia in Della retorica, Anton 
Francesco Doni offered his own treatment of the question in his Pitture del Doni (1564). In 
this text, he raises the question of the conceivability of inexistent objects through the 
example, traditionally featured in medieval ontology, of the golden mountain. It is, says 
Doni, the fantasia which renders us able to ‘compose’ the idea of a golden mountain by 
combining — in the same way discussed in chapter 2 above — the notion of ‘mountain’ with 
that of ‘golden’, allowing us to ‘form and paint, and imprint on our Idea’ the notion of such 
impossible things.542 
 Let us now return to Vasari’s drawing. In the following sections, we shall explore two 
more hypotheses explaining why Vasari chose to postulate a hieroglyphic nature of fantasmi. 
These two lines of enquiry will lead us back to the question of the manifestations of pure 
imagination, allowing us to consider other perspectives from which to read Vasari’s drawing 
as a statement on fantasia. 
 
3.6.  The Artistic Hieroglyph: Grylloi, Grotesques, Fantasia 
 
Besides the concrete likening of dreams to hieroglyphs in Vasari’s immediate intellectual 
environment, there exist other, more imperceptible incursions of this metaphor in sixteenth-
century artistic culture. They remain imperceptible because they are rarely explicit, 
manifesting mainly in acts of ekphrasis or recognition: in how people described and 
identified (or, rather, misidentified) objects. 
 It is sometimes overlooked that the Renaissance artist’s means of accessing 
hieroglyphs first-hand was not limited to viewing the obelisks of Rome. Such symbols could 
also be found on gems and cameos. Florence had one of the most important concentrations of 
gems thanks to the collection of Lorenzo de’ Medici, who prized these amulets purported to 
have magical powers.543 Many of these stones were associated with Egypt and their virtues 
linked to the glyphs they carried.544 A particular kind of apotropaic amulet bore symbols 
today known as grylloi, but often called chimere at the time — a word which could also be 
                                               
542 Doni 1564, pp. 27r-27v. 
543 See Aakhus 2008, pp. 185-206; Zwierlein-Diehl 2007; Michel 2010. For a brief overview of Lorenzo’s 
collection, see Giuliano, Dacos, and Pannuti 1973. 
544 The most important example of semi-precious intaglio in Lorenzo’s collection was the Tazza Farnese, which 
bears a sphinx and an unmistakable allegory of the Nile. 
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synonymous with sogni.545 A gryllos was typically a hybrid creature composed of different 
animal and human parts. 
 In principle, these cameos did not have anything to do with the act of sleeping. Yet 
their imagery was frequently associated with dreams, or it inspired pictorial motifs which 
were interpreted in this way. The fantastical figures of Hieronymus Bosch provide us with an 
example of this phenomenon. Over fifty years ago now, Jurgis Baltrušaitis showed how 
Bosch sourced some of his monsters in these allegedly Egyptian glyphs (Fig. 3.26).546 It is 
well known that when they were first viewed in Italy, Bosch’s droleries — on top of having 
been called ‘grillo’ by Don Felipe de Guevara547 — were identified as ‘sogni’ or ‘somnia’.548 
Furthermore, around the same time it seems that the Italian iconography of nightmare 
apparitions also began to draw on this very imagery. A typical gryllos is the Hippalektryon, 
or part-horse part-rooster hybrid, sometimes with a human face as a chest (Fig. 3.27).549 It is 
striking that Marcantonio Raimondi’s so-called Dream of Raphael (Fig. 3.30) and Battista 
Dossi’s Allegory of Night (Fig. 3.31) compose their chimere using the same strategies. Facial 
torsoes and the limbs of poultry, in particular, play an essential role in Dossi’s ‘volailles 
oniriques’ (D. Cordellier).550 Cameo monsters were also thought to have been among the 
sources from which the Romans had drawn the original grotesques. Thus Sebastiano Serlio, 
in his description of the origin of grotesques, affirms that some were based on ‘fictional 
figures from cameos’.551 Hieroglyphic cameos also came into direct contact with the theme of 
dreams in the pages of the Hypnerotomachia Poliphili. One of the symbols encountered by 
Poliphilio displays little grylloi half-elephant and half-ant (Fig. 3.28), which cannot but recall 
similar intaglio glyphs which would have circulated at the time, in particular the half-
elephant and half-shell gryllos (Fig. 3.29).552 I must leave open the complicated question of 
the concrete transmission of these designs and the role of potential intermediates (such as 
manuscript marginalia). My suggestion is simply that Vasari may very well have been aware 
of the (allegedly) Egyptian and highly symbolic nature of these motifs. Ultimately, his 
                                               
545 On grylloi, see Lapatin 2011, pp. 88-98. The near-synonymy of sogno and chimera can be observed, for 
example, in the writings of Anton Francesco Doni, and most notably in his Disegno (1549) and his Pitture 
(1564). The mythological Chimera, by extension, began to mean ‘fantastical creature’, impossibilium/adynaton, 
fiction, absurdity. 
546 Baltrušaitis 1955, fig. 26. 
547 Lapatin 2011, p. 90. Note, however, that Lapatin has ‘found no evidence of the term gryllos applied to 
ancient gems depicting hybrids, rather than caricatures, before the 18th century’ (p. 92). 
548 Gibson 1992, pp. 205-18. 
549 Lapatin 2011, p. 189; Vitellozzi 2010, pp. 134-6. 
550 Cordellier 2005, p. 143. 
551 Serlio 1584, p. 192r: ‘sarà da seguitare le vestigie de gli antichi Romani [...] in quelli facevano diversi 
bizzarie, che si dicono grottesche: [...] in quelli dipingevanno qual che gli piaceva, qualche fiata si può fare una 
figuretta finta di cameo [...].’ 
552 Baltrušaitis 1955, fig. 23; Hypnerotomachia poliphili  1499, p. p-viv. 
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‘hieroglyphic dream’ could be his erudite attempt to revisit the origin of this clandestine 
transmission of forms. 
 A similar conflation of dreams and hieroglyphs manifests itself in the way Vasari’s 
contemporaries interpreted the recently discovered ‘grotesque’ ornament of ancient Rome. As 
we have already pointed out, grotesques were frequently compared to dreams, being called 
‘sogni della pittura’ (D. Barbaro), ‘sogni’, ‘chimere’ (A.F. Doni) or ‘come de insogni’ (P. 
Ligorio).553 The association was also prompted by a number of ornamental compositions 
which displayed a sleeper at their centre surrounded by grotesque designs and creatures.554 
As is well known, some authors including Ligorio himself regarded grotesques as a kind of 
hieroglyph because they believed that the figures possessed a hidden signification.555 Gian 
Paolo Lomazzo similarly associated them with ‘figure egizzie, dimandate ieroglifici’ since he 
thought they could ‘express things and ideas not with the things themselves, but through 
other figures’ — in other words by way of allegory. 556  Some authors suggested that 
grottesche should be called ‘cryptics’ — reflecting the fact that they were found in crypts as 
much as in grottoes, but simultaneously evoking that their meaning could not be 
understood.557 
 There is, finally, a third reason why Vasari may have wanted to associate hieroglyphs 
with dreams. The imagination, which was responsible for both dreaming and the making of 
grotesques (see notably our discussion in chapter 2), was also the seat of disegno — 
explicitly in Cellini (‘internal disegno takes place in the Immaginativa’) and implied in 
Vasari (who defines disegno as the ‘concetto colla mente immaginato’).558 Yet the Vasarian 
theory of disegno also entertains relationships with the Renaissance notion of hieroglyph. In 
recent years, scholars have sought to reconsider his theory of disegno by expounding it as a 
form of graphic expression which partakes of immutable archetypes, thereby likening it to 
doctrines on the semantics of ancient and holy languages that prevailed at the time. Charles 
                                               
553 Daniele Barbaro, I dieci libri (1567), in Barocchi 1971, III, p. 2634. A.F. Doni, Disegno (1549), in Barocchi 
1971, I, p. 585; Pirro Ligorio, Libro de antichita, in Barocchi 1971, III, p. 2668. Barbaro’s definition was the 
starting point of Gian Paolo Lomazzo’s reflections on grotesques. See Lomazzo, Trattato (1585), in Barocchi 
1971, III, p. 2692. 
554 Morel 1997, p. 97; Warncke 1979, II, no. 1100. 
555 Barocchi 1971, III, p. 2676. Cristina Acidini Luchinat saw the premises of this association in Pinturicchio’s 
decorations for the Appartamento Borgio in the Vatican, in Filippino Lippi’s style of grotestque ornament, or in 
Parentino’s painted candelabra in the Chiostro di Santa Giustina, Padua (now lost). See Acidini Luchinat 1982, 
IV, pt. 3, pp. 170-2. 
556 Lomazzo, Trattato dell’arte (1585), in Barocchi 1971, III, p. 2692 and p. 2694: ‘...esprime le cose ed i 
concetti non con le proprie, ma con altre figure’ (the italics are mine). The same tendency can be seen in French 
culture. The Preface of the Songes drolatiques also attributed a ‘sens mistique ou allegorique’ to the grotesque 
figures. See Jeanneret and Elsig 2004, p. 52. 
557 Scholl 2004, p. 15, n. 2. 
558 Vasari, Vite, 1568, I, p. 42: ‘...esso disegno altro ni sia che una apparente espressione e dichiarazione del 
concetto che si ha nell’animo, e di quello che altri si è nella mente imaginato e fabbricato nell’idea’. 
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Dempsey emphasized that Vasari’s disegno relies on the idea, often repeated in the 
Renaissance, that writing and drawing are historically bound as one and the same activity, as 
evidenced by the Greeks’ use of a single word, graphein, to refer to the both the inscription 
of letters and of that of images. ‘The concept of Disegno as the philosophical principle 
unifying the arts of painting, sculpture, and architecture’, writes Dempsey, ‘was adapted 
more or less unaltered from the elementary defining principles of the philosophy of Logos, 
the study of language that underlies the arts to which the visual arts are the sisters, namely, 
rhetoric, poetry, and dialectic’.559  Matteo Burioni recently went further, highlighting the 
affinities between Vasarian disegno and hieroglyphics:  
 
Disegno, namely art as a trans-historical principle which does not evolve 
historically, is ascribed a similar status in the Vite as the one granted to the 
languages of revelation. These languages are characterized by the fact that, like 
Hebrew, they do not employ alphabetical script, and are thought to be 
immutable. A similar status was also given to Egyptian hieroglyphs.560  
 
It is tempting to regard Vasari’s Dream as a meditation on the nature of the imagination’s 
unique grammar. Vasari may be pondering the odd fact that the same faculty, fantasia, was 
simultaneously the home of disegno during the day, yet the stage of absurd and idle 
phantasms during the night, however always using the same ‘caratteri strani’ (strange signs) 
for both the useful task and the futile one.561 The castello in aria is the epitome of such a 
‘wasteful’ use of an artist’s faculty to reach out for pictorial ideas – the archetype of a sogno 
di pittura. It is worth considering the possibility that Vasari’s Allegory of a Dream drawing 
also constitutes a reflection on the origin and value of an individual’s artistic ideas, especially 
given the relation the work entertains with Michelangelo’s Sogno: the nature of such ideas, 
their absurdity or hideousness, as well as their potentially demonic origin.562 
 Furthering this analysis, it is worth exploring the kinship between the act of 
conceiving an artistic project and that of dreaming. This too could play a role in Vasari’s 
drawing. The imagination is the ‘projection screen’ of both reverie and design, and we should 
add that there is barely more than a slip of the pen between sogno and disegno — all the more 
since Zuccaro memorably bridged the gap between disegno and segno. It is not surprising, 
                                               
559 Dempsey 2010, p. 51. 
560  Burioni 2017, p. 233: ‘Der disegno, also Kunst als überhistorisches Prinzip und nicht als sich historisch 
Entwickelnde, erhält in den Vite einen ähnlichen Status, wie er in der frühen Neuzeit Sprachen der Offenbarung 
zugewiesen wurde. Diese Sprachen zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass sie sich wie das Hebräische nicht 
alphabetischer Schriftzeichen bedienen und als unveränderlich gedacht sind. Auch den ägyptischen 
Hieroglyphen wurde ein ähnlicher Status zugesprochen.’ 
561 ‘Caratteri strani’ is how Vasari once described hieroglyphs. Vasari, Vite, 1550, p. 27: ‘gli Egizzii [...] 
scrivendo in queste aguglie, coi caratteri loro strani, la vita de’ grandi per mantener la memoria della nobiltà e 
virtù di quegli.’ 
562 On the demonic origin of artistic inspiration, see Cole 2002a, pp. 621-40. 
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then, to see this idea surface in Italy in the seventeenth century, and most dramatically in 
Giuseppe Mitelli’s practice and pattern book for drawing titled Alfabeto in sogno (1683), the 
frontispiece of which amply suggests that disegno is a sign language which appears to man in 
his sleep, consubstantial, perhaps, with the grammar of dreams (Fig. 3.32). In 2005, an 
exhibition of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Italian drawings at the Louvre titled Comme 
le rêve le dessin (As is dreaming, so is drawing) was devoted to this hypothesis.563 Among 
the many references invoked by the exhibition’s originator, Philippe-Alain Michaud, is the 
semiotic model of night vision and its Freudian ramifications, on which we have touched 
above.564 Yet the discussion was not limited to mental disegno. The manual and material 
dimensions of drawing also came into play, since the affinity between the texture of dreams 
and the cursory, ‘abstracted’ nature of the graphic medium were a key axis guiding the 
exhibition’s concept — as Michaud writes: ‘from the construction box which serves as quarry 
in the dream’s making, experiences re-emerge in recomposed fragments, submitted to effects 
of fusion, shifts and losses identical to those we observe in the work of a draughtsman.’565 
This would appear to take us far from Vasari’s drawing, where it is clear that the young 
sleeper is a victim of his demonically-influenced imagination rather than its author. He is by 
no means shown in an act of disegno. Yet if we retain the hypothesis that the young boy is an 
artist, the drawing may well be an admonition against the proclivity of disegno’s organ, the 
artistic imagination, to stray into indolence and debasement. In the quick heat of fancy, there 
is only a thin line between ambition and excess, between dream and dissipation. This is just 
what Anton Francesco Doni reminds us in one of the earliest significant passages equating 
sogno and disegno in the Cinquecento. Doni recounts vivid dreams he recently experienced, 
first comparig them to a drawing by Michelangelo, playing on the word disegno (intention 
and drawing), then to a castello in aria fondato sopra una grottesca: 
 
It was at the time when dreams seemed to me as real as if they had come out of 
the gate of mother-of-pearl, not from the one of ivory, and I thought the disegni I 
made happened to me as if they were by the hand of Michelangelo. But after I 
found out that one was surely a lie, and the other was a castle in the air founded on 
a grotesque, I laughed at dreams of poverty and misery as much as those of 
richness and power.566 
                                               
563 Michaud, Cordellier, and Criqui 2005. We are grateful to Diane Bodart for bringing this exhibition and its 
catalogue to our attention. 
564 Michaud, Cordellier, and Criqui 2005. 
565 Michaud, Cordellier, and Criqui 2005, pp. 16-19, and notably p. 17: ‘[...] de la boîte de construction qui sert 
de lieu d’emprint à l’élaboration du rêve, l’expérience ressurgit en fragments recomposés, soumis à des effets de 
fusions, de déplacements et de perte identiques à ceux qui s’observent dans le travail du dessin.’ 
566 Doni, Zucca (1551), in Doni 2003, p. 293: ‘Egli fu già tempo che i sogni mi parevan così veri come se 
fossero usciti della porta di madreperla, nonché di quella d’avorio e i disegni che io faceva credeva che mi 
riuscissero come se fusser di mano di Michelangelo. Ma poi ch’io ho provato l’uno esser menzogna certa e 
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3.7.  Epilogue: Dreams and Discursiveness 
 
The nexus between dreams and hieroglyphs, woven deep into the fabric of Cinquecento 
intellectual culture, may have been explored in many other fields — from teratomancy to 
alchemy through, of course, emblematics.567 In fact the elective affinity between these two 
notions forms an elusive undercurrent running through Western culture since antiquity. It 
aroused the interest of scholars such as Jacques Derrida and Aleida Assmann, and before that 
it surfaced in the writings of Bishop William Warburton (1698-1779), Gotthilf Heinrich von 
Schubert (1780-1860) or E.T.A. Hoffmann. 568  Its ubiquity and diversity, even in the 
Cinquecento, make it hard to identify with precision where Vasari’s hieroglyphic metaphor in 
the Allegory of a Dream was sourced. Its appearance in a work of visual art, however, is a 
rare occurrence, which marks out the drawing as an original contribution to the iconography 
of dream images. Through it, the Aretine does not solely shroud his dream in mystery. He 
invites us to consider the independent ontology of phantasms, their profundity and 
irreducibility to natural vision. He affirms their quiddity: as ideograms, ideas, schemata or 
prototypes of higher density than reality or even art. 
 By moving away from the convention of depicting dreams naturalistically, Vasari 
renounces the ability to express their impressive verisimilitude.569 Yet this choice allows him 
to evoke a feature of oneiric vision which none of the traditional iconographies manage to 
convey: its discursiveness. Indeed, for being glyphic, Vasari’s dream is both image and text. 
More than a single view, it is a story. We may contrast it again with the nightmare Albrecht 
Dürer recorded in graphic form some twenty years earlier (Fig. 3.4). 570  Because Dürer 
depicted it in its phenomenological aspect, he had to resort to a long textual commentary 
beneath the image in order to make up for the picture’s stillness. Vasari’s strategy yields a 
different result. His phantasms are deployed as a sentence, translating the diegetic — and 
thereby cinematic — nature of dreams. We are almost reminded of a passage in C.G. Jung: 
‘By a few hieroglyphic images strangely strung together, we express more in a few moments 
                                                                                                                                                  
l’altro un castello in aria fondato sopra una grottesca, io mi rido così del sognare d’esser povero e diserto, come 
far disegno d’esser ricco e potente.’ Doni evidently plays with the polysemy of disegno, as well as with pseudo-
oxymoron (menzogna certa). 
567 The common trait of all of these is a fundamental involvement in allegory, or the summoning of otherness 
through signs. 
568 Derrida 2001, pp. 258-78 (chap. 7: ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’); Assmann 1997, pp. 119-44. 
569 This aspect was particularly relevant to David Freedberg, who noted that all the traditional methods of 
marking out the dream (surrounding it by a cloud, altering its colour, etc.) ultimately fail to convince because 
‘we know from experience that one of the essential properties of the figures we see in our dreams is that they 
seem to participate to the same level of reality as ourself’. See Freedberg 1999, p. 37. 
570 Traumgesicht, 1525, Vienna: Kunsthistorisches Museum. 
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in dream language than could be expressed by ordinary language over the course of several 
days.’571 In so doing, Vasari also captures the insuperable complexity of oneiric experience. 





                                               













4.1.  The Viewer’s Imagination 
 
So far we have focused on the question of the imagination’s role in the making of images, in 
other words on the fantasia of the artist. In this chapter, we turn to the imagination of the 
viewer, its role in the constitution of an image, and the way this was understood — we move, 
in other words, from ‘production aesthetics’ to ‘reception aesthetics’. 572  This kind of 
imagination is in dialogue with pictures already painted, sculptures already sculpted. Yet 
there is no doubt that, here too, the imagination plays a role in the act of beholding. The 
viewer fills the blanks, thinks up the story, participates; in the word of John Shearman, ‘the 
notionally present spectator [...] can have much to do with the shape the work of art takes’.573 
Thus, while in chapter 1 we proposed that the role fantasia could be pre-pictorial or para-
pictorial, in this chapter we suggest that it could also be post-pictorial.  
Our focus will lie on visual responses to images, rather than literary or musical objects, 
although it is worth reminding that the latter two were an essential part of Renaissance 
reception aesthetics, especially in the poetic genre of ekphrasis, which was generally 
considered as a work of the imagination. Aretino’s ekphrastic poem on Titian’s portrait of 
Francesco Maria della Rovere (Fig. 4.1) was ‘created by the fantasia because of Titian’s 
                                               
572 Produktionsästhetik and Rezeptionsästhetik, in the terms employed by Hans Robert Jauss, Wolfgang Iser and 
the Constance School. See Holub 1993, pp. 14-17; Jeanneret 2013. On the use of this approach in art history, 
see Kemp 1985, pp. 250-257. On viewer experience in Renaissance art, see Frangenberg 1990; Frangenberg and 
Williams 2006. 
573 Shearman 1992, p. 261. 
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brush’, as Aretino explained.574 The poem praises Titian’s talent in showing ‘every invisible 
concetto’ in the Duke’s heart and the ‘terror’ (read: terribilità) in his brow, but especially the 
painter’s ability to rival nature itself: ‘when I saw [the painting] I called upon nature for her 
to testify that art had converted into nature herself’.575  
We shall focus, instead, on cases where viewers reported that, conversely to Aretino’s 
statement, nature converted itself into art. Let us recall the important passage in Anton 
Francesco Doni’s Disegno (1549) we have already evoked earlier in another context: 
 
Art: When you paint the sketch [macchia] of a landscape, don’t you often see 
within it animals, men, heads and other fantasies [fantasticherie]? 
Painting: Particularly in the clouds, I have seen fantastical monsters [animalacci 
fantastichi] and castles, with people and infinitely varied figures. 
Art: Do you believe that these are actually in the clouds that you see? 
Painting: No, I don’t. 
Art: Where are they, then? 
Painting: In my fantasia and my immaginativa, in the chaos of my brain! 
Art: What name would you give them, according to the reasoning you just 
proposed? 
Painting: Castles in the air. 
Sculptor: Dreams, namely nothing, that’s what they seem to me. 
Art: Don’t you know, Nature, that someone who imagines thousands of bizzarrie 
and as many confusions in his head, which are no other than, as these men say, 
fantasie, castles in the air — don’t you know how they are called? Chimeras 
[chimere], hell’s bells! I like this manner of saying so many things in one word, and 
there was never another way of speaking.576 
 
The passage amalgamates different tropes we have discussed so far — chimeras, castles in 
the air and dreams — and places them under the purview of fantasia and immaginativa, a 
faculty in ‘chaos’. Notably, it also associates them with cloud-figures. As scholarship has 
shown on several occasions, the trope of cloud-figures features in traditional discussions by 
Aristotle, Pliny, Lucretius and Philostratus; it is also mentioned in several passages of 
Renaissance artistic literature, and it crops up in a number of paintings, too. 577  Doni’s 
reference to this trope here certainly owes to his reading of Philostratus’s Life of Apollonius 
                                               
574 Letter of 7 November 1537, in Aretino 1997, I, p. 314: ‘Io, donna elegante, vi mando il sonetto, che voi 
m’avete chiesto e ch’io ho creato con la fantasia, per cagione del pennello di Tiziano’. On this episode and 
ekphrastic fantasia in general, see Land 1986, pp. 130 ff, and p. 90. 
575 Aretino 1997, I, p. 315: ‘Io nel vederlo chiamai in testimonio essa natura, facendole confessare che l’arte 
s’era conversa in lei proprio’.  
576 Anton Francesco Doni, Disegno (1549), in Barocchi 1971, III, p. 585. 
577 See chiefly Campbell 2015, pp. 7-36; Gamboni 2009, pp. 259-66; Gamboni 2002; Campbell 1997, pp. 131-
161; Bittner 2001, pp. 17-41; Berra 1999, pp. 358-419; Summers 1981, pp. 124-6 and pp. 490-2; Dacos 1969, 
pp. 124-6; Janson 1961 (with the correction added by Lewis 2012, pp. 1–24); Damisch 2002; Gombrich 1960, 
pp. 181-202. 
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of Tyana. 578  Yet Doni distinguishes himself from the tradition in two ways. Firstly, he 
includes man-made landscapes in the imagery that causes flights of the imagination. He 
refers to a macchia d’un paese, a sketch of a landscape: macchia also means ‘stain’, and in 
fact Doni is adroitly playing with this polysemy, because accidental blotches and splatters 
were also regarded as a spur to the imagination in Leonardo’s famous treatment of the 
question, to which we shall come very shortly.579 Secondly, Doni denies the actual existence 
of images in the clouds and declares that the shapes only exist in the imagination.  
Doni’s claim of the material inexistence of form — and, correlatively, their solely 
imaginative existence — is momentous. It does not come from Philostratus’s text, where the 
cloud-images were attributed, not to imagination, but to a ‘proclivity for imitation’.580 In this 
chapter, we shall attempt to analyse in greater detail the significance of Doni’s affirmation of 
solely imaginative existence of cloud-figures; fundamentally, we will argue that it belongs to 
a larger trend which signals a change of attitudes toward the imagination’s role in perception. 
 The phenomenon of seeing faces, animals, architectures, landscapes or other shapes in 
various natural or accidental phenomena has already garnered substantial attention on the part 
of art historians, who have made different proposals to historicize the understanding of this 
kind of mental event.581 What psychologists now agree to call pareidolia (defined as ‘the 
tendency to perceive meaningful forms in suggestive configurations of ambiguous stimuli’582) 
has, in the art-historical literature, variously been referred to as a ‘projective process’,583 an 
‘error of sight’,584 an ‘aberration’585 or the ‘beholder’s share’ in the art work.586 The imagery 
causing it has been termed — with nuances I here overlook — ‘potential image’,587 ‘pseudo-
                                               
578 The text appeared Italian translation the same year as Doni’s Disegno. See Philostratus 1549, Lib. 2, Cap. 10, 
p. 136. The relevant passage in Philostratus the Elder’s Life of Apollonius of Tyana, 2, 22 reads: ‘the things 
which are seen in heaven, whenever the clouds are torn away from one another, I mean the centaurs and stag-
antelopes, yes, and the wolves too, and the horses, what have you got to say about them? Are we not to regard 
them as works of imitation? [...] rather [...] these figures flit through the heaven not only without meaning, but, 
so far as providence is concerned, by mere chance; while we who by nature are prone to imitation rearrange and 
create them in these regular figures’. 
579 On the term macchia, see Sohm 1999, pp. 116 ff and Sohm 2001, pp. 148 ff. 
580 In the Italian text Doni could have read, the expression is ‘principio dell’imitare’. See Philostratus 1549, Lib. 
2, Cap. 10, p. 136. The imagination is central in other passages of the Life of Apollonius, for example in 6.19, 
where it is said to be ‘a better artist than imitation, for imitation can only depict what it saw, but imagination 
what it has not seen.’ In the Imagines, Philostratus famously affirms that ‘the art of painting has a certain 
kinship with poetry, since an element of imagination [φαντασία] is common to both’. 
581  See the references we quote above n. 575, and more recently Weemans, Gamboni, and Martin 2016; 
Rosenberg 2016, pp. 103-121. Baltrusaitis, Gombrich and Janson were pioneers in their interest in the question. 
See also Hallyn 1994. 
582 Nees and Phillips 2015, p. 129. 
583  Dolev 1995, pp. 129-142, recalling the frequent term ‘projective imagination’ used, for example, by 
Starobinski 1970, p. 238. 
584 Kemp 1992, pp. 153-162. 
585 Baltrušaitis 1989. 
586 Gombrich 1960, pp. 181-202. Also called ‘Hinsehen’, for example in Stelzer 1964, pp. 171-176. 
587 Gamboni 2002. For a more discriminating discussion of the varying terminology, see the ‘Introduction’ to 
this book, as well as Gamboni, Thürlemann, and Weemans 2009, pp. 418-425. 
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image’, ‘crypto-image’,588 ‘chance image’,589 Kippfigur, Phantasiebild,590 ‘bivisibility’591 or 
the more wide-casting notion of ‘double image’; 592  when such imagery is deliberately 
contrived by an artist, some have spoken of ‘double mimesis’.593 Scholars today often discuss 
the topic under the heading of ‘visual ambiguity’.594  
In the early modern period there is no accepted term to refer to the phenomenon. It is 
often subsumed under the category of the scherzo (joke) or the grillo (‘crotchet’). Yet there is 
a certain consistency in the kind of object which is regarded as conducive to imaginative 
perception. They usually are: 
- clouds and vapours, 
- stains, 
- stones, 
- wood and tree trunks. 
Landscapes also play a great role in this form of perception: one can see shapes in the distant 
landscape, in the sketch of a landscape (as in Doni), or a landscape can appear to us in 
accidental forms.595 
 We shall focus on one particular type of ambiguous image which incorporates in itself 
features of many of the abovementioned objects, namely figured stones, and in particular the 
pietra paesina or landscape stone (Fig. 4.2). This is a kind of Albarese marble commonly 
found on the banks of the Arno river in Tuscany.596 When cut in two, its section reveals 
multi-coloured veining which often recall a rocky landscape. It has also been compared to a 
view of ruins or the panorama of an early modern Italian city bristled with turrets (compare 
with Fig. 4.3). Athanasius Kircher’s Mundus subterraneus (1665, 2nd ed. 1678) described 
                                               
588 Urbain 1992, pp. 3-15; Weemans 2006, pp. 459-481. Another term is ‘undecidable objects’. See Dufrêne 
2003, pp. 31-40. 
589 Janson 1973, I, pp. 340-53. 
590 Thielemann 2000, pp. 17-92. 
591 Davis 2017. 
592 Gamboni, Thürlemann, and Weemans 2009. In philosophy one speaks, after Ludwig Wittgenstein, of aspect 
perception or seeing-as. Note that these problems have also often been dealt with under the heading of 
anthropomorphism. In the abundant literature, see notably Melion et al. 2015, pp. 1-18; King et al. 2012, pp. 10-
31; Weemans 2009b; Lestringant 2006, pp. 261-280; Tapié and Zwingenberger 2006; Hallyn 1988, pp. 43-54; 
Hallyn 1994. See also the forthcoming publication: Michel Weemans and Jean-Hubert Martin (eds.), Le paysage 
anthropomorphe à la Renaissance, Paris: Réunion des musées nationaux. 
593 Thürlemann 2002, pp. 9-18. 
594 Krieger, Mader, and Jesberger 2010. See also: Weemans, Gamboni, and Martin 2016; Martin 2009; Elkins 
1999. On the early modern period specifically, see Rosen 2012, and the references we quote below. A 
forerunner is Kris 1964, pp. 243-64. 
595 See notably Melion et al. 2015. 
596 It is also called Alberese del Fiume d’Arno or pietra d’Arno (the English Albarese being spelled Alberese in 
Italian), pietra cittadina or cittadinesca, ruin marble, in German Landschaftsmarmor or Ruinenmarmor, and 
pierre-aux-masures by Roger Caillois. When the veining undulates, we speak of lineato d’Arno. See Koeppe, 
Giusti, and Acidini Luchinat 2008, no. 31 and no. 32; Seelhof 1999, pp. 36-41; Chiarini and Acidini Luchinat 
2000a; Chiarini and Acidini Luchinat 2000b; Giusti 1978; Opere in mosaico intarsi e pietra paesina; catalogo  
1971; Chiarini 1970. 
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this stone as a petrified urban landscape; in its illustration (Fig. 4.4), houses appear distinctly, 
complete with doors and windows, under a clouded sky.597 Although Kircher’s illustration 
much exaggerates the stone’s capacity for naturalism, some exemplars of paesine give a 
surprisingly convincing impression of the sky as they can turn blue (Fig. 4.5). 
 Interest in pietra paesina increasingly grew in the second half of the sixteenth 
century, as Agostino del Riccio recounts in his History of Stones (1597):  
 
The lovers of beautiful and fine stones have started to search the riverbed of the 
Arno, into which many large and small streams flow. Since these streams come 
cascading down impetuously, they carry into the Arno a number of boulders and 
pebbles, which nowadays we like to split open and to polish, because in them one 
sees various fantasie and jokes [scherzi] that mother nature does: at times small 
trees, at times forests, or little ring-shaped patterns.598 
 
This beautiful stone was used to make small precious paperweights, and frequently employed 
in commesso tables, as Del Riccio further explains. It was also included in Kunstschränke, 
and we keep letters of Philip Hainhofer to his brother in Italy asking for such stones mit 
selbstgewachsenen Landschaft (with ‘self-grown’ landscapes). 599  Although Del Riccio’s 
account omits it, paesine were frequently used as ready-made backgrounds for paintings, 
providing dramatic landscapes in which artists staged hand-painted figures (Fig. 4.6). Artists 
such as Antonio Tempesta, Filippo Napoletano, and Stefano della Bella became masters of 
this technique — or, rather, this medium — to which much scholarly attention has been 
devoted in recent years.600 Its inception is often attributed to Sebastiano del Piombo who, in 
1530, is credited with the discovery of the ‘secret’ for applying oil on marble, resulting in a 
painting ‘little less than eternal’.601 Apparently Del Piombo did not take advantage of the 
suggestive shapes in the veining to include them in the representation.602 This is a later 
                                               
597 Kircher 1664, Vol. II, Lib. VIII, Cap. IX, pp. 32-33. Simply described as ‘lapis marmoreus’ by Kircher, it 
was suggested to be pietra paesina by Blümle 2007, pp. 74-5. 
598 Del Riccio 1996, chap. LXXXVIII, p. 122-123 (‘Dell’Alberese del Fiume d’Arno’): ‘Gl’amatori delle vaghe 
e belle pietre hanno cominciato a cercare nel fiume d’Arno, dove in esso fiume si sbocca assai fossati grandi a 
piccioli; e, venendo de’ lor letti con impetuose acque, menano in Arno assai frombole e sassi, che oggidì 
s’usano segare, così poi lustrate, ché in essi si veggono varie fantasie e scherzi che fa la madre natura, or 
alberetti, talvolta selve, or occhii’. Gnoli and Sironi’s commentary specifies that paesine began to be collected 
in the second half of the sixteenth century (p. 201). 
599 Baltrušaitis 1957, p. 59. 
600 The landmark studies are Seifertová 2007; Collomb 2012; and Lohff 2015. See also Casaburo 2017; Nygren 
2017, pp. 36-66; Hirst 1981, pp. 123 ff. Forthcoming is the publication of the proceedings of a 2016 conference 
at the British School at Rome: Piers Baker-Bates (ed.), ‘La Pittura poco meno che eterna’: Paintings on Stone 
and Material Innovation. As Lohff rightly emphasizes (p. 104), in this field we are much indebted to the 
groundbreaking work of Jurgis Baltrusaitis, especially his monumental Aberrations (1959). 
601 Letter of Vittorio Soranzo to Pietro Bembo, 8 June 1530: ‘pittura poco meno che eterna’. See Hirst 1981, p. 
124; Lohff 2015, p. 17. 
602 Lohff 2015, p. 18. Note, however, that the veining was already frequently utilized for mimetic effects in 
sculpture. See Fehrenbach 2011, pp. 47-55, and his references. 
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tendency. 603  Most importantly for us, the method reveals how keen painters were to 
imaginatively read into mineral lineaments. In theoretical terms, their practice was 
transgressive. The act of isolating a non-figurative naturalium and adding naturalistic and 
stylized artificialia on its surface in order to reveal or accentuate its mimetic potentialities 
overturns foundational principles of Renaissance artistic theory, such as the rational and 
symbolic value of spatial illusionism, or the primacy of techne over the accidents of nature.604 
From our modern perspective, it is difficult not to think of Duchamp’s readymade, in 
particular the variant known as readymade aided (small hand-made additions by the artist on 
pre-existing objects).605 
The phenomenon of most interest to us is the emergence of a practice of framing bare 
pietra paesina and staging it like a work of art without any artificial addition (Fig. 4.7, Fig. 
4.8). Most extant examples are from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, yet Gnoli 
proposes that the taste for placing the stone in quadretti dates back earlier, to the years of 
Francesco I’s reign.606 Placing the object in an elegant frame (Fig. 4.8) – parergon and 
traditional boundary marking the beginning of pictorial representation – ‘artifies’ the 
naturalium, resulting in a sophisticated and typically Manneristic reversal: the artificial is 
outside of the picture plane; inside the frame, only the primeval chaos of nature is to be 
seen.607 The dispositif also conditions the gaze. ‘Works’ such as these invite the viewer to see 
a landscape, and to further scrutinize the mineral surface in search of more details, until the 
illusion suddenly dissolves.608 They testify to a taste for stimulating flights of the imagination 
through ambivalent images. Bare paesine were also set in chests (Fig. 4.9). In this micro-
architectural setting, the stone collection formed a virtual gallery for the collector’s 
daydreaming, letting his eyes wander from stone to stone, from country to country (paesino 
in its original sense). The interactive dimension of these objects is even clearer when large 
book-matched sections are kept together as a diptych (Fig. 4.7). Here the gaze is induced to 
travel back and forth from one panel to the other, spotting the similarities, then the 
                                               
603 Lohff 2015, p. 21, speaks of late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, for lack of any evidence in the 
centuries before that. Some early cases in different media, however, should not be wholly overlooked. Note for 
example the gilded fishes on a serpentine plate from the treasure of Saint-Denis, now in the Louvre, where the 
stone’s speckles clearly evoke the reflections on the water in which the fishes swim. See Patène de serpentine, 
Louvre MR 415, in Alcouffe 1991, no. 12. 
604 These foundations are expounded at lenght in the traditional historiographical landmarks on early modern 
artistic theory: Erwin Panofsky’s Perspective as Symbolic Form, Hubert Damisch’s The Origins of Perspective 
(on spatial illusionism) and Robert Williams’s Art, Theory and Culture in Sixteenth-Century Italy (on techne). 
605 For an attempt at mapping out the early modern prefigurations of the readymade, see Dolev 1996, pp. 175-
193. 
606 Raniero Gnoli, ‘Introduzione’, in Del Riccio 1996, pp. 11-54, p. 14. 
607 On early modern views on frames and other parerga, see Degler 2015; Stoichita 1997. 
 
608 In eighteenth-century China, some figured stones were labelled with the name of the artist in the style of 
whom the landscape seemed to have been ‘painted’. See Harrist 2011, pp. 569-578. 
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differences, and imagining the three-dimensional deployment of the vein in the rock and the 
location of the sagittal cut; and then to get a view of the whole, and notice the order of 
symmetry within the stony disorder. In Fig. 4.7, two blue spots, symmetrical across the 
panels, evoke large blue eyes. Is the stone looking at us? The Mannerist scherzi, as Del 
Riccio named them, are infinite.609 
 In this chapter, we take a closer look at what these imaginative practices meant to the 
sixteenth-century public. We focus on the case of figured stones, and we seek to contrast 
accounts of these objects by artists with those proposed by mineralogists and other 
connoisseurs. Our thesis is that artists had a singular approach to these images found in 
nature, in that they acknowledge the necessary contribution of the imagination in one’s 
identification of figurative patterns in what is, in essence, non-figurative. 
 
4.2. Naturalists on Figured Stones: Lusus naturae and Miraculous Signs 
 
The way sixteenth-century naturalists considered figured stones has been studied in depth in 
the recent work of Robert Felfe which, together with the foundational work of Paula Findlen, 
Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, provides us with a rich overview of the early modern 
understanding of the phenomenon. 610  For early modern naturalists, figured stones were 
regarded either as a sport of nature (lusus naturae) — whereby nature entertains itself or its 
public through visual jokes (the scherzi evoked by Del Riccio) —, a wonder, or a miraculous 
image acting as a sign of God’s presence and power. The biologist Michele Mercati describes 
lapides idiomorphoi as ‘the result of a lusus naturae, a lifelike likeness of things in the 
stones, shaped without any [human] auxiliary, but a sport of innocent nature.’611  Ulisse 
Aldrovandi, the most important mineralogist of the sixteenth century, comments on the 
content of figured stones reported by Albertus Magnus by saying that ‘nature had represented 
[these subjects] from the life, so that it surpassed all of human ingenuity and artistry.’612 
                                               
609 On the aesthetic and psychological implications of book-matched marble and their eventual relation to the 
Rorschach test, see Flood 2016, pp. 168-219, and the forthcoming conference proceedings: Dario Gamboni and 
Gerhard Wolf (eds.), The Aesthetics of Marble: from Late Antiquity to the Present. 
610 Felfe 2015b, Chap. 2, ‘Die „Figurensteine“ und die Historisierung der Natur am Paradigma der Künste’; 
Felfe 2015a, pp. 97-109; Felfe 2014, pp. 153-175 (of interest is also the contribution by Lisbet Tarp in this same 
volume); Adamowsky, Böhme, and Felfe 2011; Daston 1998, pp. 232-253; Findlen 1990, pp. 292-331. 
Synthetic overviews are also provided in Daston and Park 1998, and Findlen 1994, pp. 233-4. 
611 Mercati 1717, Armarium IX, Cap. II, p. 216: ‘Commituntur in præsentia ludi Naturae, rerum simulacra in 
lapidibus prope viva, nullis adminculis conformata, sed innocentis naturæ joco.’ On Mercati, see Cooper 1995, 
pp. 1–24. 
612  Aldrovandi 1648, p. 754: ‘Item Albertus Magnus refert se vidisse Venetijs, in Marmore, caput Regis 
diademate coronatum, & ita à Natura ad vivum effigiatum, vt omne humanum ingenium, & artificium 
superaret’. The text was composed in the 1580s. 
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Authors take recognizable forms in minerals to have an actual reference to what they seem to 
represent, and regard this as the result of some intentionality (the intentionality of nature, or 
that of God, the former generally implying the latter). Nature has a pictorial activity — 
natura pictrix, nature the painter — and it delights in making portraits of herself. It does so 
with great realism: Aldrovandi uses the term ad vivum for stone images, an expression also 
employed in the description of specimens in the mineralogical collection of Francesco 
Calzolari (1522-1609).613  
 Authors do not discuss the possibility that the shapes they identify, such as the 
landscapes of the paesine, be the result of a mental disposition in the viewer. They are, of 
course, justified to do so in the case of fossils, which, save for a few exceptions, are still 
treated as figured stones in the sixteenth century.614 But the reasoning generally extends to 
other kinds of stone images, including ruin marbles — sometimes to surprising results. We 
have already evoked Kircher’s detailed description of the ‘houses’, ‘towers’ and ‘windows’ 
he saw on a pietra paesina (Fig. 4.4). Albertus Magnus, the founding medieval authority on 
mineralogy, apparently mistook a Roman or Hellenistic sculpted cameo in the shrine of the 
Three Kings in Cologne for figured a stone. Dorothy Wyckoff, followed by Lorraine Daston 
and Katharine Park, identified it with a highly stylized cameo now in Vienna (Fig. 4.10). 
‘This picture’, affirmed Albertus, ‘was made naturally and not artificially’.615  Sixteenth-
century mineralogists generally abstained from considering the possibility that the mineral 
patterns owe to chance.616 Michele Mercati brings up this eventuality, yet he explicitly denies 
it, reasserting the principle that nothing in nature is fortuitous (natura nihil frustra facit).617 In 
sum, men of science tended to understand figured stones as exhibiting real images with 
purposeful resemblance. In their eyes, they were what we today would call acheiropoieta, 
images not made by man’s hand. 
 Several factors play a role in this proclivity, on the part of naturalists, to attribute 
significance and signification to stone forms. Ancient literature is full of examples of natural 
marvels of this kind, many of which were gathered by Pliny in books 36 and 37 of the 
Natural History. The most famous cases were the gem possessed by the king Pyrrhus (37, 3), 
which bore representations of Apollo and the nine muses made ‘not by art, but by nature 
itself [natura sponte]’, and a block of Parian marble which, split open, contained an image of 
                                               
613 ‘Conchylia, sive Conchae lapidae, quae ad vivum naturales exprimuntur [...]’. Museum Francisci Calzeolari 
(1622) cited in Felfe 2015b, p. 122-3. 
614 Rudwick 1985; Rossi 1984, pp. 3-12. 
615  Daston 1998, pp. 232-254, p. 232, relying on Dorothy Wyckoff’s work in Albertus Magnus, Book of 
Minerals, Dorothy Wyckoff (tr.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967, 2,3,9, pp. 130-1; and Park 1998, p. 258. 
616 Note that a century later, in Kircher’s Mundus subterraneus, chance will be listed as a possible cause of 
figured stones. See Daston 1998, p. 242. 
617 Lohff 2015, p. 174-5.  
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a Silenus (36, 14). Nature’s profuseness in producing images fitted well with the theory of a 
vis plastica (moulding force) pervading nature, which had been the authoritative view of 
Albertus Magnus. Stones were included in these natural processes, and many authors 
followed the ancient view that stones had their origin in a petrifying juice or sap (succus), 
which could be subject to planetary influences but also be affected by the proximity of other 
forms. Thus Girolamo Cardano explained the gem of Pyrrhus by saying that the agate had 
‘grown’ in the proximity of a man-made sculpture showing the subject in question, which 
transmitted its shape. He regarded stones as dynamic beings which ‘suffer maladies, old age, 
and death’.618 Ferrante Imperato believed that stones had a ‘vegetal’ activity that explained 
why some rocks look like they have forest landscapes on their surface.619 The view was often 
invoked to explain fossils, as animal seeds could also grow in the petrifying juice. In the early 
modern terminology, as Felfe explains, fossilia (from the Latin ‘dug out’) still encompassed 
any form of mineralia; in Conrad Gesner’s system, disinterred antiquities are also termed 
‘fossils’.620 The theoretical porosity between the categories of mineralia, vegetabilia and 
animalia was such that nature was sometimes taken to speak conventional human languages. 
Thus when Athanasius Kircher gathered rocks on which he thought he could read letters of 
the alphabet or geometrical figures, he attributed their formation to the action of a spiritus 
architectonicus or spiritus plasticus.621 The intellectual climate was favourable to the finding 
of signs in all manifestations of nature.622 Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa discusses images in the 
clouds in the same terms, namely as a transmission of form through natural plasticity: 
 
When certain appearances, not only spiritual, but also natural do flow forth from 
things, that is to say, by a certain kind of flowings forth of bodies from bodies, and 
do gather strength in the Air, they offer, and show themselves to us as well through 
light as motion, as well to the sight as to other senses, and sometimes work 
wonderful things upon us, as Plotinus proves and teacheth. And we see how by the 
south wind the air is condensed into thin clouds, in which, as in a looking glass are 
reflected representations at a great distance of castles, mountains, horses, and men, 
and other things, which when the clouds are gone, presently vanish.623 
 
Let us now turn to remarks by artists on the question. 
                                               
618 Daston 1998, p. 241. 
619 Imperato and Imperato 1599, Lib. 24, Cap. XXI, p. 659: ‘Che nelle pietre sia virtù vegetale’. 
620 Felfe 2015b, p. 131, and Felfe 2015a, p. 99, with reference to Conrad Gesner’s De omni rerum fossilium 
genere, gemmis, lapidibus metallis, et huiusmedi (1565). 
621 Adams 1954, p. 255, with reference to Kircher, Mundus Subterraneus, Amsterdam, 1678, II, p. 22. 
622 See Céard 1996. 
623 Agrippa von Nettesheim 1993, Bk I, p. 18. 
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4.3.  Artists on Figured Stones: the Fantasia-Image 
 
Three famous passages in Leonardo’s notebooks deal with the imaginative discernment of 
form in random patterns.624 Scholarship has discussed these passages at length.625 Leonardo 
speaks of looking at variegated stones (pietre di uarij misti), clouds, stains — found ones or 
obtained by ‘throwing a sponge full of various colours against a wall’ — and at one’s own 
drawings insofar as they are of rough, uncultivated composition (componimento inculto). In 
these ‘confused things’, he says, we can often see all sorts of figures and scenes, including 
‘beautiful landscapes’. Having grown up in Tuscany and listing a ‘Lapidario’ among his 
library possessions, he was probably aware of pietra paesina, and this could be what the 
‘pietre di varij misti’ refers to.626  
 Leonardo does not make any statement concerning the ontological status of the 
images he sees. ‘If you will look’, he says, ‘you will be able to see’ — these images are, to 
use Gamboni’s apposite term here, potential images.627 The mind’s share in the existence of 
an image is not Leonardo’s interest here; the telos of his remarks is to propose a method for 
‘rousing the mind to various inventions [destare lo ingegnio a uarie inuentioni]’. In his text, 
the word ingegno was chosen over fantasia and imaginatione.628 Yet the reception of the 
passage indicates just how quick ‘imagination’ established itself as the appropriate term for 
referring to this very question in the course of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. 
Indeed Fréart de Chambray’s French translation of 1651 (published the same year as the 
princeps) recast Leonardo’s formula as ‘moyen d’éveiller l’esprit, et d’exciter l’imagination à 
produire plusieurs inventions diverses’.629 
 It is clear that Leonardo does not regard the subliminal images as being intrinsic to the 
rock veining or the blotches he mentions. ‘An infinity of things’ can be discerned through his 
method, which in itself ‘seems a small thing, and most laughable’. Leonardo also presents his 
method as being applicable to a potentially unlimited number of stains and stones. This 
aspect is also implicit in Vasari’s use of the idea in the Life of Piero di Cosimo: Vasari says 
                                               
624 Cod. Urb. 1270 in da Vinci 1956, II, fol. 35v (cap. 66); ibid. fol. 61v-62r; Ms. B.N. 2038, fol. 22v in da Vinci 
1939, I, no. 508 and da Vinci 1952, p. 211.  
625 See in particular Pedretti 2004; Zwijnenberg 1999, pp. 60-65; Berra 1999; Lebensztejn 1990. 
626 Codex Madrid II, fol. 3r. The ‘Lapidario’ could be the undated Lapidario o la forza e la virtù delle pietre 
preziose delle erbe e degli animali. Descendre , p. 3. On Leonardo’s stones, see Venturelli 1998, pp. 449-472. 
627 This is particularly clear of what Leonardo says of the sound of bells: there is not one specific message 
encrypted there, but ‘any name or word you care to imagine’. 
628  This element also raised the attention of Fermor 1993, p. 36. On Leonardo’s reservations concerning 
imaginatione see our chapter 1. On ingegno, see chiefly Marr et al. 2018; Feser 2010, pp. 293-295; Syson and 
Thornton 2001, pp. 135-181; Pfisterer 2002b, p. 265-89; Kemp 1997, pp. 226-255 and passim; Summers 1987, 
pp. 99-101; Kemp 1977a; Baxandall 1971, p. 16. On early modern ‘genius’ in general, see Gensini and Martone 
2002; Brann 2002; Kemp 1989; Zilsel 1926; and our own Zagoury 2018, pp. 61-93. 
629 da Vinci 2012, Chap. XVI, p. 65 (our emphasis). 
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that Piero draws inspiration from stains, yet these are described as coming from the spittle of 
sickly people, turning the artist’s lofty inventions into a paradox.630 To our knowledge, the 
first art critic to make a statement about the nature of imaginative pareidolia is Doni, in the 
passage we cited above: in his view, the images exist ‘only in the imagination, in the chaos of 
one’s brain’. 
 Bernard Palissy (1510-1589), master ceramist at the Parisian court of Catherine de’ 
Medici, also evoked figured stones. ‘In the jaspers, marbles and mixed stones, we see figures 
made by strange ideas’, he writes.631 The use of the term ‘idea’, which played an important 
role in Italian theory in the decades before Palissy’s statement, suggests a mental figure.632 
Palissy’s view on the origin of figured stones is tied to the theory of mineralogy he adheres 
to. He regards stones as petrified juice, and veining as the result of a movement of liquids.633 
‘As for the colours of figured marbles, jaspers, porphyries, serpentines and other such 
species, their colours are caused by various drips of water that fall from the top of the earth to 
the place where the said stones are formed.’634 Nature paints by dripping, then. But also by 
pouring, as Palissy further explains: ‘If the drops fell from top to bottom and congealed as 
soon as they have fallen, they would only make a round shape [...] but as the congealing 
matter makes some bulges, the falling matter [...] is constrained to flow in the furrow.’ These 
flows can have various colours, and may mix as they leak, ‘and since they will go down with 
great speed, by the violence of their descents, they will mix by whirling like two rivers that 
meet [...] and make confused figures.’635 As such, it seems clear that for Palissy the mineral 
figures are aleatory. 
 We find confirmation of this point in some of the artistic experiments devised by 
Palissy. The aim of Palissy’s art was to re-enact the processes of nature, and eventually to 
recreate stones containing pareidolic veining. In another text, he proposes to create ‘pleasant 
                                               
630 Vasari, Vite, 1550, p. 590. 
631 Palissy, Discours admirables (1580), in Palissy 1996, II, p. 263: ‘nous voyons aux jaspes, marbres, & pierres 
mixtes, des figures faites par idees estranges’. 
632 See Bianchi and Fattori 1990 (esp. the contribution by Ernst Gombrich, pp. 411-420) and Panofsky 1968. 
Further bibliographical indications up to 2010 can be found in the entry ‘Idea’ of Burioni, Feser, and Lorini 
2010. 
633 The same belief can be seen in Vasari’s description of the ‘bellissime e bizarre’ stalactite formations of 
grottoes as ‘congelazioni d’acque’. See Vasari, Vite, 1568, I, p. 27. On the ancient belief that stones are petrified 
water, see Barry 2007, esp. pp. 630-631. 
634 Palissy, Discours admirables (1580), in Palissy 1996, II, p. 262: ‘Quand est des couleurs des marbres 
figurez, jaspes, porphyres, serpentins, & autres telles especes, leurs couleurs sont causées par divers egousts 
d’eau qui tombent du haut de la terre, jusques au lieu où lesdites pierres se forment’. 
635 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 263: ‘Il est vray que si les gouttes qui tombent du haut en bas se congeloyent soudain qu’elles 
sont tombées, elles ne feroyent autre figure que ronde [...]: mais d’autant que la matiere qui se conglaçant fait 
quelques bosses, les matieres qui tombent de plusieurs endroits tout en un coup, trouvant la place bossüe, sont 
contrains de se couler en la vallée [...] et outre cela ainsi qu’elles descendront de vitesse, par la violence de leurs 
descentes, elles s’entremesleront en tournoyant comme deux rivieres qui se rencontrent, [avec ce que une autre 
descente, ou deux ou trois, se pourront faire tout à un coup en ce mesme lieu, qui en se combatant ou 
contrepoussant l’une l’autre,] ils ne faudront à faire des figures confuses.’ 
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figures and ideas’ in stone by making colours drip and whirl, recalling his mineralogical 
explanations on figured stones. He describes the construction of a rustic ‘cabinet’ – in fact an 
alcove made to resemble a cavernous rock and pierced with many shelves – which should be 
filled with smalt of different colours.  
 
Once this is done, I shall come and light a great fire inside the cabinet, until the 
abovementioned smalt has melted or liquefied on the said construction. And thus 
the smalts, since they will liquefy, will drip, and as they drip, they will mix, and as 
they mix, they will form very pleasant figures and ideas.636 
 
The fire should then be removed from the cabinet and the outcome kept as such. Palissy 
deliberately embraces the randomness of the result, as well as its non- or pseudo-iconic 
character. Of another cabinet, he writes that it should carry ‘neither the appearance or form of 
the art of sculpture, nor the work of man’s hand’.637 In many regards, Palissy is gesturing 
toward a new paradigm of the creative process. Protogenes had thrown a sponge onto his 
canvas out of anger and only incorporated the blotch into his painting because he found it 
suitable ex post facto; Leonardo used stains as aids to invention, but not as the inventions 
themselves. By deliberately launching a chain reaction that produces an unpredictable image 
without his intervention, Palissy comes ever closer to the explorations of randomness we see 
flourish in the twentieth-century, in the drippings of a Max Ernst or the pourings of a John 
Armleder for example. 638  Such an orchestration of amorphousness, furthermore, relies 
entirely on the imagination of the viewer to identify the ‘figures et idées’ latent in the leaks. 
Palissy explicitly compared the randomly generated shapes in his enamel niches to the art of 
painting, stating that ‘no painter or draughtsman, with his paintbrush, knows how to do 
shapes or lines so fluid and subtle’, although ‘these shapes and lines contain no art of 
drawing, they are only imaginations and Ideas’.639  
 Authors of artistic trattati emphasize the dependency on imagination of this kind of 
images. Giambattista Armenini, a painter and priest of Faenza, evokes the role of ‘folds or 
                                               
636 Bernard Palissy, Recettes (1565) in Palissy 1996, I, p. 131: ‘[...] quoy fait, je viendray faire un grand feu 
dedans le cabinet susdit: et ce, jusques à tant que lesdits esmails soient fondus ou liquifiez sur ladite 
massonnerie: et ainsi les émails en se liquifiant, couleront, et en se coulant, s’entremesleront, et en 
s’entremeslant ils feront des figures et ydees fort plaisantes [...].’ 
637 Ibid. p. 59: ‘[le cabinet] [...] ne tenant aucune apparence ny forme d’art d’insculpture, ny labeur de main 
d’homme’. 
638 On dripping and pouring, see Friese 2011. Palissy’s proposal was not included by Janson and Berra in their 
respective seminal studies (see footnotes above). It is also absent from a recent meditation on dripping by a 
Cinquecentist: Palissy 1996. It is noted, however, by Morel 1998, p. 43. 
639 Palissy, Recettes (1565), in Palissy 1996, I, p. 34: ‘[l’ouvrier me montra certains sièges, qui estoient au fonds 
des niches, lesquels estoient d’un jaspe madré, & labouré d’un labeur si tressubtil] qu’il n’y a peintre, ny 
pourtrayant, qui de son pinceau sceust faire traicts, ou lignes si deliées et subtiles, que celles qui sont ausdicts 
sieges. Lesquels traicts, ou lignes ne tienent aucun art de pourtraicture, ains sont imaginations ou Idées estranges 
esdicts sieges’. In this passage Palissy talks more specifically about enamel seats (sièges) placed within grottoes. 
Their shapes are later called ‘phantasmes’. 
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stains that you can find on walls that were left blank’ in his treatise on the True Precepts of 
Painting (1586). ‘Looking at those stains, all sorts of fantasie appear, and new forms of 
extravagant things.’ Yet ‘it is not the case that they really are there, but they are created in 
our intellect, which plays with those inventions and, it appears, delights in those forms.’640 It 
is not nature that delights in this lusus, but the brain. The images, however, have no real 
existence; they are, so to speak, only in our imagination. It might be objected that Armenini 
did not speak of figured stones, however, but of macchie. Yet we should not altogether 
exclude that his statement could also apply to veined marble. Macchie was also the word 
used by Cristoforo Landino in his famous Italian translation of Pliny’s Natural History of 
1476 to describe the shapes in figured gemstones.641 Many authors, including geologists, call 
fully outlined spots in the veining of marble macchie.642 
 Our enquiry suggests that a different apprehension of natural images branches out in 
the sixteenth century, which distinguishes itself from the understanding of this phenomenon 
by naturalists. The latter regard figured stones as actual images with an objective reference to 
the content they portray. They rarely speak of chance in the emergence of the image, or 
explicitly deny its role. In any case, they never underline the imagination’s share in the 
recognition of form. As Lorraine Daston notes about the scientific discourse on figured 
stones, ‘it is impossible to ignore the distinctive sensibility of wonder that saturated these 
objects’. 643  Artists, on the other hand, also speak of suggestive mineral shapes with 
enthusiasm, yet they do not praise the ‘pencil of nature’.644 On the contrary, they evoke the 
‘pencil of imagination’, so to speak, and its ability to infer representation from inchoate 
reality. They find a third means of explanation having to do neither with chance nor with 
wonder, but with human inventiveness.645 This has a remarkable consequence for the way 
they regard the question of the (in)existence of images. As we have seen, Doni and Armenini 
                                               
640 Armenini 1587, p. 193: ‘[...] quelle toppe over macchie, che si scuoprono sopra quei muri che erano già tutti 
bianchi, nelle qual macchie, considerandovisi sottilmente, vi si rappresentano diverse fantasie e nuove forme di 
cose stravaganti, le quali non che siano cosí in quelle, ma si creano da sé nel’intelletto nostro, il quale, cosi 
variando in quei ghiribizzi, pare che con diletto si goda di queste forme’. Armenini regards these ghiribizzi as 
the origin of the grotesque, possibly taking his cue from Doni. See Morel 1997. 
641 Pliny 1476, Libro Ultimmo, first page (unpaginated). 
642 See for example Del Riccio 1996, p. 110; Dolce 1565, p. 56v. Vasari also uses this terminology. Vasari, Vite, 
1568, I, p. 13 or p. 16. 
643 Daston 1998, pp. 232-254, p. 237. 
644 The distinction I make between artists and naturalists is certainly not an easy one to make in the period of 
general curiosity that is the Renaissance. We regard as artists those who practice drawing, painting or sculpture 
regularly, show talent for it, and have interest in the status of their art. This is the case of Giambattista Armenini, 
who was a painter. Anton Francesco Doni, who purportedly also painted, was an outstanding draughtsman. He 
devoted much of his later career to the production of highly crafted manuscripts. Book ornament, including 
impressive frontispieces, by his hand have come down to us. See for example his manuscripts of Lo Stufaiolo 
(Biblioteca Riccardiana, Florence, ms. 1184; Biblioteca Valentiniana, Camerino, MS 2), recently digitized by 
Elena Pierazzo: http://scholarlyediting.org/2015/editions/intro.stufaiuolo.html . 
645 In that sense they also anticipate later skepticism in this matter, such as Leibniz’s who spoke of the risk of 
lusus imaginationis in the recognition of shapes in figured stones. 
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say that the fantasie seen in random shapes do not exist per se in the outside world, but only 
in the mind of the onlooker. For Cinquecento naturalists, ambiguous form in nature challenge 
the distinction between naturalia and artefacta; artists, on the other hand, propose to regard 
them as mentalia. This view is not only particular to artists, but also specific to the sixteenth 
century. In his De pictura, Leon Battista Alberti mentioned figures seen ‘in the cut faces of 
marble’, but he still attributed them to natura pictrix.646 The evolution of the artistic literature 
concerning this theme suggests that something changes at the dawn of the Cinquecento, as a 
more ludic conception of imagination becomes widespread.  
 
4.4.  From Mental morphē to Gestalt: a Suggestion 
 
The paradigm we have identified in the previous section – namely the postulate that some 
images we perceive do not actually exist in the visible configuration we apprehend, but only 
in the mind of the viewer, as if overlaid by the imagination on top of our percept – has a 
surprisingly modern flavour. In short, artists propose that ambiguous images have the same 
ontology as illusions, namely that they are viewer-dependent. In this regard their position 
comes close to the conclusions arrived at by Gestalt psychologists in the late nineteenth 
century. These scientists meditated on visual puzzles such as the famous rabbit-duck 
drawing, which can be seen either as a rabbit or a duck, but not as both at the same time. 
From this visual puzzle, they concluded that perception did not consist in the sheer mental 
representation of visual data, since a single image could give birth to two equally possible 
(yet incompatible) mental representations. Current histories of Gestalt psychology trace the 
origins of such views of the mental dependence of visual form back to the Berlin School of 
psychology or their forefathers, Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932) and Franz Brentano 
(1833-1917), or to Goethe at the earliest.647 It seems that Cinquecento trattatisti deserve a 
place in the history, or at least the pre-history, of these ideas. 
 In this section, we attempt to put their ideas into context. We propose to associate the 
paradigm we have identified with a new phase in the reception of Aristotelian philosophy in 
Italian vernacular criticism, notably through the combined use of Aristotle’s views on the 
mind and on form (hylomorphism) which occurred at the Accademia Fiorentina in the 1540s. 
 In the first of his two lectures on the visual arts at the Accademia Fiorentina delivered 
in March 1547, Benedetto Varchi presented an interpretation and commentary of 
                                               
646 Alberti 1966, p. 67. The figures are ‘hippocentaurs’ and ‘faces of bearded kings’, suggesting Alberti is 
thinking of the tradition of Albertian mineralogy. 
647 Farrell 2014, pp. 284-312; Murray 1995. 
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Michelangelo’s poem Non ha l’ottimo artista alcun concetto. In this text, Michelangelo 
proposes that a raw block of marble contains ‘in its excess’ an infinite number of possible 
concetti (concepts) which the artist can potentially bring to light.648 These many potential 
forms, in Michelangelo’s language, are ‘hidden’ in the block. It takes ‘a hand that obeys the 
intellect [intelletto]’, namely the skill to sculpt the marble according to the ideal model 
viewed with the mind’s eye, to bring one of them forth. Varchi proposed to read this passage 
through the lens of Aristotle’s theory of the four causes. Following to this theory, everything 
in nature is made up of a compound of matter (an object’s ‘material cause’) and form (its 
‘formal cause’). In the case of art, as Varchi further explains, the material cause of an art 
work consists in the prime matter with which he works (for a sculptor, clay, marble, etc.). 
The formal cause is the form or ‘idea’ conceived in the artist’s mind or fantasia, as Varchi 
puts it, before he begins to sculpt. When Michelangelo speaks of the concetto, Varchi argues, 
he means nothing other than this formal cause, which can also be called ‘forma’, ‘Idea’, 
‘essemplare’, ‘intenzione’, or ‘Modello’, and is located ‘in the fantastic power, or, as we 
should say, the imaginative faculty’ of the artist.649 
 Varchi does not solely paraphrase of expound Michelangelo’s text. He uses exegesis 
to propound his own theory of art. Sometimes he corrects Michelangelo, as when he 
comments on the artist’s use of the term intelletto: 
 
INTELLETTO: The noun intelletto means many things [...] but in this passage it 
should be taken to mean this power, or faculty, which is called immaginazione, 
and also fantasia, and which we have discussed several times. It is not only 
distinct from the intelletto, but different, since the latter is immortal according to 
the Philosophers, while the former, according to all and without any doubt, is 
mortal.650 
 
Varchi takes the opportunity to put forward his own conception of art. Following the long 
tradition of Florentine idealism, he argues that every work of art starts with an idea conceived 
in the mind, namely in the imagination – ‘concetta nella mente, cio è immaginata nella 
fantasia’.651 He then proposes a general definition of art, in the form of a Latin maxim: Ars 
                                               
648 Buonarroti 1991, no. 151, p. 302: ‘Not even the best of artists has any conception / that a single marble block 
does not contain / within its excess, and that is only attained / by the hand that obeys the intellect. The pain I 
flee from and the jos I hope for / are similarly hidden in you, lovely lady’.  
649 Varchi 1550, p. 25. 
650 Varchi 1550, pp. 30-31, also in Barocchi 1971, II, p. 1337: ‘Questo nome Intelletto significa più cose [...] ma 
in questo luogo si piglia altramente, ciò è per quella potenza o virtù che si chiama immaginazione, o vero 
fantasia, della quale avemo ragionato più volte, la quale non solamente è differente dall’intelletto, ma diversa, 
essendo quello immortale appresso i più veri filosofi, e questa appresso tutti e senza alcun dubbio mortale.’ 
651 See our discussion in Chapter 2, Section ‘Composite Perfection’, and our list of references given in the 
footnotes. The idea that all art begins with a form pictured in the imagination runs through many influential 
thinkers of Florence of active in this city. We find it in a letter of Manuel Chrysoloras of the 1410s with 
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nihil aliud est quam forma rei artificialis, existens in anima artificis (Art is nothing else than 
the form of an artificial thing, which exists in the soul of the artist).652 
 Varchi’s source for this sentence is Marcantonio Zimara (1460-1532), one of the most 
influential Aristotelians during Varchi’s formative years. It is drawn from Zimara’s 
Theoremata (1523), a text to which Varchi himself owes most of his knowledge of 
psychology.653 The original source is the Arabic philosopher Averroes, who was regarded as 
Aristotle’s prime commentator and whose thought had practically superseded the primary 
text. In Averroes’s Metaphysics, VII, the original sentence reads: Forma artificialis, quae est 
in materia, et quae est in anima arteficis est eadem (The artificial form that is in matter, and 
the artificial form which is in the mind of the artist, are the same). There is, then, a 
discrepancy between the initial statement that the material form ‘is identical’ to the mental 
form of the artist, and the later Italian paraphrase by Zimara according to which art is 
‘nothing else’ (‘ars nihil aliud est’) than the mental form. The difference is subtle, but it has 
its consequences. Indeed, ultimately the alteration allows Varchi to conclude that ‘art is 
nothing else than the form [...] which is in the soul, namely in the fantasia, of the artist’.654 
 The statement that ‘art is nothing else than the form in the artist’s fantasia’ comes 
close to the statement we found in Anton Francesco Doni’s Disegno, opening this chapter, 
that an image seen in the clouds exists nowhere else than ‘in the imaginativa and in the 
fantasia’ of the Painter who is looking. The similarity could be regarded as coincidental, if it 
weren’t for the fact that Doni was present at Varchi’s lecture (he was the Secretary of the 
Accademia Fiorentina at the time), that he was composing his Disegno at this very time 
(which would appear the following year), and that his pamphlet was largely, as scholars 
argue, a reaction to Varchi’s very lectures.655  
 We can easily see how this statement by Varchi could have been interpreted (or 
misinterpreted) as implying that the images one sees in stones, stains and clouds have no real 
existence and only mental existence. After all, Michelangelo’s poem was about a raw block 
of marble and the infinitely various forms that an artist is able to visualize inside of it. While 
Michelangelo (and Varchi) were talking about the artist’s own ideal project, there is only a 
                                                                                                                                                  
reference to to phantastikon tes psuches (the soul’s phantasy) as the mental faculty at play. In Lorenzo Valla’s 
De expendis, the same idea is framed in terms of imaginatio. For Chrysoloras see Baxandall 1965, pp. 183-204, 
p. 198. For Valla, see Azzolini 2005, p. 503. 
652 Varchi 1550, p. 24. 
653 Zimara 1564, p. 85v, repeated in Benedetto Varchi, Due Lezioni, in Varchi 1858, II, p. 617. On Varchi’s 
relation to this text, see Sgarbi 2015, p. 3. 
654 Varchi 1550, p. 25: ‘l’Arte non è altre, che la forma, cioè il modello della cosa artifiziale, la quale è 
nell’Anima, cio è nella Fantasia dell’Artista’.  
655 This suggestion was first made by Waźbiński 1987, I, p. 71, and later followed and reinforced by a number 
of scholars: Pepe 1998, pp. 123-126; Thomas 2005, pp. 3-4; Hegener 2008, pp. 470-472; Pierguidi 2013, pp. 
199-214. 
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fine line to cross to misread Varchi’s theoretical and non-specific discussion as meaning that 
the sculptor was in fact not imagining of his own accord, but inferring an image from the 
veining in the marble block. In fact, such a confusion seemed so probable to Varchi himself 
that he took care to drop a few remarks for the sake of clarification. In his gloss to the term 
‘contain’ used by Michelangelo to describe the marble’s ‘containing’ many concetti, he adds: 
 
But one ought to warn very clearly that when we say that a thing is contained in 
another, we do not mean […] that it is there in the same way as when we 
sometimes see a face or another figure made by Nature in a marble [...] like Pliny 
recounts that after splitting a block of marble we found the face of a Silenus inside 
it. Instead we mean this in the sense we have explained above, and declared many 
times by Aristotle, above all in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, when he says: In 
lapide est forma Mercurij in potentia [The form of Mercury is in potency in the 
stone]656 
 
Yet as we have seen, the idea of images in potency is exactly how Leonardo regarded the 
shapes in ‘variegated marble’. 657  If only implicitly, the art writers we have reviewed 
attributed the status of forma in potentia to a range images ‘made by nature’ of this kind. 
Much hinges on whether these images are considered as real, and therefore predetermined 
and univocal (as the naturalists or Varchi would), or as ambiguous, and therefore only 
potentially iconic (as the art writers we have cited).658  
 The theoretical tendency we have observed in the art writers (especially in Doni and 
Armenini), then, appears to be tied to a context, namely that of Varchi’s work and the early 
reception of a particularly intellectualist version of Aristotle’s doctrine of forms. Varchi’s 
influential lecture simultaneously introduced into art theory the distinction between actual 
and potential images, and the idea that potential images only have mental existence. Art 
theorists writing in this context were particularly prone to propose that images existed ‘only 
in the imagination’, both in the case of projected inventions (Vasari’s theory of mental 
disegno) and found images (Doni and Armenini’s claim that ambiguous images exist ‘only in 
the mind’). Varchi’s warning cited above shows that he was aware of the amenability of 
Aristotle’s idea of morphē to the understanding of pseudo- or quasi-iconic forms. 
                                               
656 Varchi 1550, pp. 26-7: ‘Ma bisogna auuertire molto bene, che quando noi diciamo vna cosa essere in vna 
altra, noi non intendiamo [...] che elle vi siano, come si vede tal volta essere vn viso, o altra figura fatta dalla 
Natura in vn marmo, come [...] Plinio racconta, che nel fendere vn marmo uisi trouò dentro vn uiso di Sileno, 
ma intendiamo in quel modo, che hauemo dichiarato di sopra, & che dichiara Aristotile tante volte, & 
massimamente nel quinto della Metafisica quando disse In lapide est forma Mercurij in potentia’. 
657 ‘And what happens with regard to such walls and variegated stones’, wrote Leonardo, ‘is just as with the 
sound of bells in whose peal you may find any name or word you care to imagine’ (Inst. de France Ms. B.N. 
2038, fol. 22v in da Vinci 1939, no. 508). 
658 Michelangelo probably spoke of concetti imagined without any perceptual input (such as looking at the 
marble block) to guide invention. 
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 It is striking that this view appeared primarily in the writings of artists, namely of 
people accustomed to carefully observing the outside world and portraying it. This no doubt 
made them particularly aware of the problems involved in representation, including mental 
representation. The key argument of Gestalt psychologists, as we have mentioned above, 
came from their observation of the double image of the rabbit-duck: because to one material 
image corresponds two incompatible mental images, it cannot be the case that reality is 
simply re-presented in the mind; something unique to the mind is gained. A similar 
realization seems to underpin the remarks of our sixteenth-century trattatisti. It would take a 
few more years – indeed centuries – for this realization to stir up the foundations of the 
disciplines of psychology and the philosophy of perception.  
Our enquiry suggests that Italian artists made sense of the question of the pseudo-
image through the mediation of the Aristotelian notion of form, largely received, as we 
argued, through the mediation of Benedetto Varchi. This should not come as a complete 
surprise. Gestalt psychology also came out of intense engagement with Aristotle. The father 
of the movement, Franz Brentano, sometimes called ‘the last of the scholastics’, was by 
training a historian of philosophy who devoted most of his early work to Aristotle.659 This 
coincidental progeny can still be felt in the term Gestalt, German for form as well as 
Aristotelian morphē. 
 
4.5.  Fantasia and the Non-finito 
 
The intuition according to which the many figures one can discern when looking at the 
veining of marble, clouds or tree trunks are figurae in potentia in the same sense as 
Michelangelo’s mental concetti before he undertakes a sculpture – an intuition proscribed by 
Varchi, but embraced nonetheless by Doni and some of his followers – manifested 
powerfully in Bernardo Buontalenti’s decision to install Michelangelo’s four unfinished 
Prisoners in the Great Grotto of the Boboli Gardens in 1585 (Fig. 4.11, 4.12).660 These 
figures, originally planned for the tomb of pope Julius II della Rovere, had been abandoned in 
Michelangelo’s studio of Florence when he definitely left the city in the 1530s. They are non-
finito (unfinished) works, but non-deliberate ones, and left at a particularly early stage; 
observers at the time called them abozzi, sketches.661 In this inchoate state, they blend with 
                                               
659 Farrell 2014, p. 290. 
660 See chiefly Gabriele 2012, pp. 45-59; Heikamp 2003, pp. 446-474; Morel 1998, pp. 49-64; Lazzaro 1990. 
661 Vasari calls them ‘Prigioni bozzati’ in 1568, and Francesco Bocchi ‘statue [...] abbozzate’ in 1591. See 
Vasari, Vite, 1568, II, p. 776 and Bocchi 1971, p. 138. 
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the amorphous mass of artificial stalactites, mossy stones and shells that hug them. Since 
antiquity, grottoes were regarded as a window into nature’s fecund and mysterious inner 
forces, and the epitome of nature’s own ‘work of art’ or nature’s ‘architecture’.662  This 
significance was further stressed by Buontalenti’s collaborator, the goldsmith Piero Mati, 
who sculpted the Grotta Grande’s wall coverings: Mati made subliminal human and animal 
bodies, sometimes simply faces, entirely mineral in texture as if they were growing out of the 
rock (Fig. 4.12).663 Scholars have compared the experience of this room to a journey into the 
stomach of the earth, an encounter with the prime chaos of creation.664 The grotto is placed 
under the aegis of the faun Pan, the epitome of duplicity, whose effigy sits at the summit of 
the vault.665 The place is also notably dark. Ambiguity being a universal rule here, the grotto 
is a feast for the viewer’s imagination.666  
 In this section, we show that the aesthetic strategy of this interior was deliberately 
intended to engage the spectator through imaginative viewing. We demonstrate this by cross-
examining the principle of the grotto and the evolving valence of the non finito, highlighting 
the dialogue between the two. This dialogue, we argue, can be regarded as mirroring the 
interplay between the viewer’s fantasia and the maker’s fantasia as it came to be understood 
and valued at the end of the Cinquecento. Meanwhile, the display also speaks to the peculiar 
understanding of the phenomenon of natural images, and figured stones in particular, which 
we associated with artists in the previous sections. Here again, the imagination is a key 
protagonist in this artistic meditation over the question of the origin of form. 
 Almost no documentary evidence regarding Buontalenti’s intention in installing the 
Prisoners has come down to us.667 Evidently the grotto sheds new light on the non-finiti, and 
the non-finiti on the grotto, however in this dearth of written sources much is left to 
speculation. Most scholars agree that the idea of natura naturans, and in particular nature’s 
will to generate form, was a guiding principle in Buontalenti’s ‘museographical’ choice of 
                                               
662 Ovid, Metam., 3, 157 ff: ‘In this hole is a grotto surrounded by forest. It is not a work of art, but one in which 
Nature imitated art with its own fecundity. All by herself did Nature build its vaults with living calcary and light 
tuft.’ On the significance of grottoes in the early modern period, see chiefly Morel 1998. 
663 Their subject is probably inspired by a story from Pausanias’s Periegesi, 1, 32, 7. See Gabriele 2012. 
664 Vossilla 2012, pp. 61-77; Morel 1998, pp. 52-7. 
665 Fauns, Satyrs, and in particular Silenus were emblematic of double-entendres in language and double-aspect 
images in art. See Waddington 2004, esp. chap. 5: ‘Serious Play: From Satyr to Silenus’, pp. 117-152; Lavocat 
2005. Michel Weemans developed the concept of ‘Silenic landscape’ to refer to the practice of hiding the face 
of a Silenus in the suggestive stone protrusions of rocky landscape, stressing its theological and literary 
significance. See for example Weemans 2009a, pp. 307-331. On the cnetral importance of the Silenus in early 
academic culture, see Rodda 2017, pp. 1-8. 
666 Of this kind of figures caught in the rustic surface of grottoes, Vasari said they were ‘bizzarra cosa da 
vederle’ (Vite 1568, I, p. 28). Taking ambiguity as a central property of the grotto are Schröder 2012, pp. 115-
137, and Vossilla 2012, pp. 61-77. 
667  Recent hypotheses on Francesco I and Bernardo Buontalenti’s programme are explored, with useful 
bibliographical references, by Gabriele 2012. 
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integrating the Prisoners in the grotto. According to an unknown hellenistic artist-theorist of 
the circle of Alexander the Great, the art of sculpture could be defined as a generative process 
akin to nature itself in her growth. This metaphysical definition could have been the origin of 
Buontalenti’s idea. It must have been widely known, and we find it expressed in a letter by 
Francesco da Sangallo: 
 
See how essentially difficult and laborious this profession [i.e. of the sculptor] is, 
on top of which we should consider the hardness of its materials, such that it 
requires a long time to complete a work [...] [and] before you reach this goal, a 
certain firmness of the soul is required, and assiduousness and patience, because 
one does not reach the end if not in the way nature makes things little by little. 
Because nature produces nothing at once, and does everything with time and 
principle, and means, and finality. Therefore to the question, asked by Alexander 
the Great, of what sculpture is, a sculptor, who was in fact a philosopher, once 
replied that it was nothing but a second nature.668 
 
The same difficulty of the art of sculpture was invoked a few lines earlier by Francesco to 
explain why some artists left their works unfinished.669 
 Difficulty was already a central theme in Michelangelo’s own reflection on sculpture. 
According to Michelangelo’s writings the main challenge of sculpture lies not in its 
laboriousness, but in the difficulty of realising in the marble a figure faithful to the form one 
has imagined in the mind. His poem Non ha l’ottimo artista, which formed the basis of 
Varchi’s lecture, was also about failure, namely the sculptor’s inability to complete his work 
because his hands did not ‘obey the intellect’. Varchi insisted on the cardinal role of the Idea 
— called ‘imagine che si forma ciascuno nella fantasia’ — in this artistic process. The only 
true maestro, he argues, is the one who can ‘perfectly execute with his hands what he 
perfectly imagined with his brain’.670 The imagination is a demanding master.671 Vasari, in a 
                                               
668 The letter was addressed to Varchi in preparation for the 1547 lectures mentioned above. Francesco da 
Sangallo, in Varchi 1550, p. 145: ‘Hor guardate che difficile e laboriosa proprietà tiene in se questa professione 
senza che doppo questa ne seguita apresso la durezza della materia, donde nasce quella lunghezza del tempo che 
bisogna à condurre vn opera [...] che auanti che à essa fine s’ariui, vi bisogna quella fermezza d’animo, quella 
assiduosità, quella patientia, tanto che à fine s’ariui, non altrimenti che fa la natura à poco à poco che nulla 
produce di fatto, & tutto fa con tempo e principio, e mezzo, e fine, che ben quello Statuario, anzi proprio 
Filosofo ad Alessandro Magno ripose quando lo domando che cosa era la Scultura, e degli à lui, che altro non 
era che vna seconda natura’. The passage is difficult due to its lack of punctuation. In translating it, I relied on 
Varchi 2013, p. 258. A similar idea can be found in Iacopo de’ Barbari’s undated letter on painting of about 
1500, in Barocchi 1971, I, p. 69: ‘[...] la pitura [...] è una natura exanimata, la qual crea visibile quello che la 
natura crea palpabile e visibile’. 
669 Ibid. p. 144: ‘La scultura bisogna motlo piu tempo senza comperatione [...]. La estrama fatica corporale non 
si puo narrare [...] e venendo alle cose mentale, la continua gelosia che regna nello Scultore che la materia non 
gli manchi, o per difetto suo, o per difetto di esse materia. Come spesso auuiene e mancando o per luno conto o 
per laltro, lo Scultore non puo piu finire la sua statua’. 
670 Varchi 1550, p. 18, also in Barocchi 1971, vol. 2, pp. 1323-1324: ‘quello è solo vero maestro che puo 
perfettamente mettere in opera colle mani quello che egli s’è perfettamente immaginato col cervello.’  
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similar fashion, attributed Michelangelo’s non finiti to the uncompromising nature of his 
imagination: 
 
Michelangelo had such a distinctive and perfect imagination [immaginativa] and 
the works he envisioned were of such a nature that he found it impossible to 
express such grandiose and awesome conceptions [concetti] with his hands, and 
he often abandoned his works, or rather ruined many of them.672 
 
Vasari’s choice of the term immaginativa to describe Michelangelo’s visionary faculty, rather 
than intelletto or ingegno (the terms preferred by Michelangelo himself in his poems), may 
owe to the influence of Varchi. 
 Accordingly, to the sixteenth-century viewer Michelangelo’s non finiti functioned as 
indexes of the master’s imagination at work. This kind of speculative spectatorship had been 
endorsed by Pliny, who affirmed that art works left unfinished allow us to discern ‘an artist’s 
actual thoughts [cogitationes]’.673 Michelangelo certainly knew this passage, just as well as 
he knew Pliny’s story that Polyclitus signed his works not by apposing the word fecit (has 
done) to his name, but faciebat (was doing), ‘as though art was always an inchoate or 
unfinished thing’ — indeed Michelangelo signed at least two works with faciebat.674 The 
Grotta Grande brims with cues that invite us to regard the Prigioni as embodiments of 
Michelangelo’s subjectivity: these bearded prisoners evoke Michelangelo himself, who 
repeatedly called himself a ‘prisoner’ or ‘slave’ of love;675 the master bemoaned having been 
‘tied’ (legato) to the overbearing commission of Julius II’s tomb;676 Pan, presiding over the 
room, is the sculptural alter ego of Michelangelo.677 
 Vasari gives us another perspective on the Prigioni’s ability to put the imagination at 
work. He regarded the unfinished statues as pedagogical tools that allow us to see how a 
master sculptor goes about subtracting the stone.678 It seems in order to say a few remarks 
about Michelangelo’s working methods here. Cellini attributes to Michelangelo a technique 
of drawing on one side of the marble block the ‘principal view’ of the figure to be sculpted, 
                                                                                                                                                  
671 ‘Chère imagination’, wrote André Breton, ‘ce que j’aime surtout en toi, c’est que tu ne pardonnes pas.’ 
André Breton, Manifeste du surréalisme, 1924. 
672 Vasari 1991, p. 472.  
673 Pliny, Natural History, 35, 145. On the reception of this passage, see notably McHam 2013; Bert 2012. 
674 Bambach 2016, pp. 39-40. The Vatican Pietà, famously, is signed MICHAEL. A[N]GELUS. BONAROTVS. 
FLOREN[TINVS]. FACIEB[AT]. 
675 Buonarroti 1991, nos. 12, 25, 32, 52, 54, 176, and see Saslow’s introduction p. 27. 
676 Buonarroti 1875, p. 490: ‘Io mi trovo aver perduta tutta la mia giovinezza, legato a questa sepultura’. 
677 Barolsky 1994, p. 97 
678 Vasari, Vite, 1568, II, p. 776: ‘quattro Prigioni bozzati, che possano insegnare a cavare de’ marmi le figure 
con un modo sicuro da non istorpiare i sassi [...] si debbono cavare con lo scarpello le figure de’ marmi, prima 
scoprendo le parti più rilevate e di mano in mano le più basse; il quale modo si vede osservato da Michelagnolo 
ne’ sopradetti Prigioni.’ 
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and then chiselling it out as if it were a half-relief and gradually shaping it in the round.679 
According to this method, then, sculpture begins with a disegno in the material sense.680 This 
recalls Michelangelo’s definition of sculpture as an art form which proceeds from the ‘same 
intelligence’ as painting, except painting is done ‘by way of adding’ matter, while sculpture 
is done ‘by strength of removing’.681 Once the template drawing has been made, however, 
sculpture and painting require very different uses of vision and imagination. In sculpture, the 
figure’s final outline only materializes at the very end of the working process. Throughout 
this process, the artist must visualize the future figure in three dimensions in order to gauge 
the thickness that remains to be removed. Vasari says the process should look like a body 
slowly emerging from a surface of water.682 Francesco da Sangallo explains that it involves 
very complex and demanding mental effort. Mistakes are irreversible, furthermore, which 
puts sculptors in a state of constant gelosia (wariness) of removing too much stone. ‘It is a 
most difficult thing’, says Francesco, ‘if only to imagine this, and it does not enter the head of 
many, except those who work in this art form’.683 
 Michelangelo’s non finiti give enough clues for each viewer to speculate on the 
appearance of the final statue. Since they are surrounded, in the Grotta Grande, by sculptural 
translations of saxa viva (living stones) in constant growth, the spectator is further 
encouraged to regard them as dynamic forms, and to picture their future evolution.684 This is 
reinforced by the presence in the grotto of a depiction of the myth of Deucalion and Pyrrha, 
painted on the ceiling. According to this story, after the deluge that wiped the earth, 
Deucalion, son of Prometheus, and his wife Pyrrha repeopled the planet by transforming 
stones into men. ‘The stones’, writes Ovid, ‘began at once to lose their hardness and stiffness, 
to grow soft slowly, and softened to take on form. Then, [...] a certain likeness to the human 
form, indeed, could be seen, still not very clear, but such as statues just begun out of marble 
have, not sharply defined, and very like roughly blocked-out images.’685 The first visitor to 
                                               
679 Benvenuto Cellini, Trattato di scultura (1568), in Cellini 1967, p. 136. Pietro Bernini is described by 
Baglione as having used the method with great talent: ‘io stesso il vidi, che prendendo un carbone, e con esso 
sopra un marmo facendo alcuni segni, subito vi messe dentro i ferri, e senz’altro disegno vi cavò tre figure dal 
naturale’.  
680 On the use of drawing for sculptors, see Cole 2014. 
681 Michelangelo, letter to Varchi, in Varchi 1550, p. 155: ‘io intendo scultura quella, che si fa per forza di 
levare, qualle che si fa per via di porre è simile alla pittura, basta che venendo l’una, & l’altra da una medesima 
intelligenza’. 
682 Vasari, Vite, 1568, II, p. 776. Vasari says the Prigioni are the best example of this. Yet this is not exactly 
how Michelangelo worked. He carves deep and lets the excess bulge out.  
683 Francesco da Sangallo in Varchi 1550, p. 146: ‘[piu lieua la materia, e quella sempre diminuisce, o racconci, 
o guasti,] talche questa è vna difficilissima cosa, non che altro imaginarla, laquale non cade nelle mente di molti, 
saluo che in quegli che operano nel arte’. 
684 On the saxum vivum in grotto aesthetics, see Rinaldi 1999, pp. 299-307. The idea that the grotto represents 
the earth in constant growth is put into its broader context in Bredekamp 1981, esp. pp. 12-14. 
685 Met. 1, 400-6, from Ovid 1916, I, p. 31. 
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publish an account of the grotto approached it through the lens of this iconography, and 
found Michelangelo’s unresolved figures to ‘seem as if they wanted to escape from the 
marble at all costs’.686 The grotto was indeed acting on the imagination. 
 
4.6.  Fantasia and the Origins of Iconic Expression 
 
There is a natural proclivity of the imagination to complete forms that are unfinished, to bring 
the imperfect to its fulfilment (perfezzione in the language of sixteenth-century art criticism). 
This mental tendency, studied by psychologists under the heading of pareidolia, was evoked 
by art writers in their texts well before it was put to use visually in the Grotta Grande. Leon 
Battista Alberti, in the opening of his De statua, speculates that the art of sculpture was born 
the day individuals...  
 
... observed in a tree trunk or clod of earth and other similar inanimate objects 
certain outlines [lineamenta nonnulla] in which, with slight alterations, something 
very similar to the real faces of Nature was represented. They began [...] to try to 
see whether they could not add, take away or otherwise supply whatever seemed 
lacking to effect and complete [perfinire] the true likeness. [...] Not surprisingly 
man’s studies in creating likenesses eventually arrived at the stage where, even 
when they found no assistance of half-formed images [inchoatarum 
similitudinum] in the material to hand, they were still able to make the likeness 
they wished. 687 
 
The first sculptures were objects found in nature, instinctively recognised as something akin 
to non finiti, and therefore ‘finished’. Buontalenti certainly knew the first Italian edition of 
this text (which appeared in a translation by Cosimo Bartoli in 1568). It is not altogether 
uninteresting to consider the possibility that Buontalenti thought of this origin myth when he 
displaced the Prigioni, and that his grotto may also constitute an archaeological meditation 
on the primary conditions of art-making. In any event, Alberti’s intuition was surprisingly 
perceptive. A visitor to the grotto of Chauvet will find that some of the earliest known 
paintings were made according to a similar method. In the Brunel Room, a mammoth was 
                                               
686 Francesco Bocchi in 1591, cited in Vossilla 2012, p. 61: ‘mostrano queste figure con ogni sforzo di voler 
uscir del marmo, per fuggir la rovina, che è loro di sopra, et fanno sovvenire di quello, che favoleggiano i poeti, 
quando estinti gli huomini per lo diluvio, cavando quelli da pietre, fu fatto il mondo da Deucalione restaurato’. 
On this passage having been often misinterpreted as applying to the whole grotto, see Gabriele 2012, p. 56, n. 
24, and the discussion by Carlo Cinelli in the same volume p. 83 with reference to Luciano Berti. 
687 Leon Battista Alberti, De statua, 1, in Alberti 1972, p. 121-122. On this passage, see notably Alberti 2000, 
pp. 31 ff; Janson 1961; Poséq 1989, pp. 380-384, argued against Janson that Alberti was not talking about ‘a 
Gestalt effect’ but a ‘haptic’ phenomenon. Posèq overlooks Alberti’s use of terms of vision (vedere, species, 
vultus) and seems to believe that Alberti is talking of ‘anthropomorphic’ forms, which is not certain. 
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painted merely by stressing certain stalagmitic bulges that evoked the morphology of the 
animal (Fig. 4.13).688 
 Alberti is not interested in the psychological mechanisms at play in the phenomenon 
he describes. It is not entirely clear from the passage to what extent he understood the 
viewer’s imagination to play a role in the recognition of the found objects’ quasi-iconicity.689 
Oskar Bätschmann proposes that Alberti was actually speaking of actual images made by 
nature (akin to figured stones) which were only found by chance.690 This interpretation is 
coherent with Alberti’s adoption of the natura pictrix doctrine in the passage we quoted 
above, as well as his narrative of the birth of painting (through Narcissus’s discovery of his 
reflection in water): men were inspired to make images by looking at nature’s own capacity 
to make images. Yet the text of De statua is not clear on the question of whether Alberti 
regarded the tree trunks as real images or only pseudo-forms interpreted as images by the 
viewer’s imagination; the question cannot be determined with certainty. The passage does, in 
any case, give the impression that the first images were found fortuitously. This unexpected 
and somewhat provocative stance of attributing the birth of art to happenstance was extended 
by Alberti to the other arts: ‘The arts were born of Chance [casus] and Observation’, he 
writes, ‘fostered by Use and Experiment, and matured by Knowledge and Reason’.691 
 This element of casualness was taken up by Vasari in his account of the birth of 
disegno in the Vite (1568). Interestingly, however, Vasari distinguishes himself from Alberti 
by introducing the role of the viewer’s subjectivity in the process of apprehending the found 
object. Vasari’s text, which rings like a direct response to Alberti, is also noteworthy because 
it raises a different kind of imagination to the one we’ve encountered so far: 
 
Disegno is not other than a visible expression and declaration of our inner 
conception and of that which others have imagined and given form in their idea. 
And from this, perhaps, arose among the ancients the proverb ex ungue leonem 
                                               
688 Alloa 2010, pp. 9-15. Archaeologists have suggested that the famous Willendorf Venus was also made by 
intervening on an already suggestive found stone. See Bredekamp 2013, p. 16, citing Luc Moreau. Janson had 
already pointed out that Alberti’s description corresponded to some works ‘on the cave walls of Spain and the 
Dordogne’. Janson 1961, p. 254. 
689 We have already pointed out, in our first chapter, how the terms imaginatio and phantasia are absent of 
Alberti’s treatises on architecture and the figurative arts. 
690 Alberti 2000, p. 34; Alberti 2011a, p. 30. This is in fact an important departure from the reading of Janson 
1961. 
691 Alberti 1988, 6, 2, p. 157. This view is provocative because it runs counter the idea that art is a rational 
process guided by human intention, which is supported by important authorities on the nature of art. Aristotle, in 
Metaphysics I, 981a1-6, defines art as the opposite of chance: ‘experiences creates art, as Polos says – and he 
speaks the truth! – whereas the lack of experience only creates fortuitous events. Art is borne when, from a 
multiplicity of empirical notions, one deduces a single universal judgement which encompasses all similarities 
between things.’ Robert Williams argued that this passage was the source of Vasari’s incorporation of giudizio 
universale in his definition of disegno. See Williams 1997, chap. 1. On the role of chance in the early modern 
period, see notably Witmore 2001, and Lyons 2012. 
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when a certain clever person, seeing carved in a stone block the claw of a lion, 
apprehended in his mind from its size and form all the parts of the animal and then 
the whole together, just as if he had it present before his eyes. Some believe that 
accident [il caso] was the father of design and of the arts, and that use and 
experience as foster-mother and schoolmaster, nourished it with the help of 
knowledge and of reasoning, but I think that, with more truth, accident may be 
said rather to have given the occasion for design, than to be its father.692  
  
For Vasari the natural image only acted as a springboard for the imagination, and it is really 
the imagination itself that should be credited for the finding of the image. This fantasia, 
however, is doing something else than the one which ‘projects’ faces on the shapes of clouds. 
It is the imagination which, from a single clue or fragment, infers the whole thing thorough a 
pars pro toto mental act — in a way, much the same imagination at play in a detective’s 
investigation or a historian’s research.693 
 This important passage, like in the discussion of figured stones we reviewed above, 
shows that Vasari, like the artists of his time, tends to stress the role of the viewer’s mental 
contribution in the apprehension of a ‘chance image’ or ‘found image’. Compared with 
Alberti’s treatment of the question, Vasari’s argument is also emblematic of the increasing 
importance taken by mental faculties in art-theoretical discussions on the whole between the 
late fifteenth and the late sixteenth century. As artists became keen to stress the intellectual 
dimension of their work, they necessarily began to specify the mental acts required for their 
work, to multiply their uses and value. In doing so, their attention was further drawn to the 
mental dimension of many perceptual or creative operations which are usually taken for 
granted. Thereby, they raised new questions, and highlighted new aspects of the 
imagination’s activity. To our knowledge, the imagination’s tendency to conjure up an image 
from a pars pro toto prompting had not been thematised before Vasari’s discussion above. In 
that sense, artists also actively contribute to the debate on imagination. 
 Finally and above all, the evidence reviewed in this last section testifies to the deep 
and almost indissoluble ties that bind the viewer’s imagination and the creator’s imagination 
in the view of Cinquecento artists. Leonardo regarded stain and marble forms as aids to 
creativity. Doni’s discussion of cloud-monsters was an account of the birth of the grotesque. 
So was Armenini’s on stains. Vasari, in the passage above, is talking about the birth of 
disegno. All of our authors understand the act of subliminal seeing as tied to an act of 
producing. Buontalenti seems to think in the same way when he recontextualises 
Michelangelo’s Prisoners. These indexes of a creator’s concetto are placed in a context such 
                                               
692 Vasari 1907, p. 206. 
693 On the ex ungue leonem phrase and its origin, see Williams 1997, pp. 42-3. 
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that they themselves trigger other concetti, not from the maker’s, but in the viewer’s 














Fantasia in the eyes of the sixteenth-century artist is an intermediary — a medium. It is 
poised between the eye and the mind, between nature and knowledge and, more importantly, 
between the particular and the universal. As the Renaissance itself oscillates from idealism to 
empiricism and back, fantasia liaises between two more essential and revered components of 
man. This is a difficult situation to be in, and the early modern imagination is, in many ways, 
the poor relation of the human soul. It is an easy scapegoat for error and sin; it is often 
mistrusted and denounced. Ambiguous, unreliable, unpredictable, it is ‘a most dangerous 
power’, as Daniele Barbaro said. For all of these reasons, it was bound to pique the curiosity 
of artists. Isn’t its task very close to theirs? It is a medium, reliant on the eye yet at the service 
of the mind, trading only in images. Like art itself it was called a ‘mirror’ (Barbaro again), 
like mimesis itself it was called ‘a chameleon, or Proteus’ (Ficino). It is no surprise that 
philosophers, from the outset, have called fantasia a painter.  
Fascination for fantasia on the part of artists corresponds to a specific moment in the 
sixteenth century. Leonardo, who entrusted painting with the mission of becoming the bearer 
of truth and the ultimate science, distrusted the imagination. His lexical exercises show that 
he assimilated the word imaginatione in view of introducing it into pictorial theory; he was 
the first to problematize the role of imagination in painting, but he opted to condemn it. 
Interest in fantasia came from the next generation, the artists who, in the first half of the 
sixteenth century, were eager to call into question the aesthetic-scientific project of the 
Quattrocento. Rebelling against the consecration of fixed models and the normative 
conception of representation it implied, they were called the fantastici, the bizzarri, the hot-
tempered, the ambiguous, strange, frightening, irascible and melancholic — in fact they were 
blamed for the same defects as fantasia itself. They may have identified with it directly. For 
them, fantasia meant more than simply licence — a connotation which was already current 
since the late Middle Ages. They associated it with a specific grammar of images, tied to the 
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way fantasia had been expounded in the philosophical tradition and, in particular, to the 
limits that were imposed on it. 
In effect, in philosophy the imagination was predominantly regarded as contingent on 
sense perception. The kind of iconic ‘novelty’ it could achieve, therefore, was limited to a 
recombination of fragments of perceived reality. The ‘collagist’ fantasia could apprehend 
appearances, divide them, shuffle their parts and rearrange them; crucially, it could also 
invert and turn upside down. These operations were correlated to a paradigmatic menagerie 
of fictions: the chimeric monster, the being without limbs, the golden mountain and the castle 
in the air. These crystallized as the vocabulary of fantasia; and the trattatisti showed an 
impressive awareness of this vocabulary. Evidence of this can be found in the way they 
understood and described the newly rediscovered grotesques of the subterranean Domus 
Aurea and the other buried ruins of Roman antiquity. The first descents into these ‘grottoes’ 
revealed a perplexing and provocative archaeological reality: ancient painting subverted 
Horatian decorum, it turned away from the human figure, and made no use of perspective. 
Identifying men interbred with plants, birds and beasts, weightless architecture, and a reversal 
of the values of representation, the artists recognised in these images the visual grammar of 
fantasia. The theory of fantasia allowed these observers to find coherence in the apparently 
incoherent: these pictures were, according to Barbaro, what ‘the Fantasia presents us with in 
dreams’. The Philosophia pauperum instructed that the imagination made ‘castra in sphera 
aeris’, and Cinquecento philosophers taught that the fantasia made castelli in aria; Doni 
therefore proposed that the insubstantial architecture painted in the Roman grottoes was, 
precisely, an illustration of ‘castles in the air’. In a fascinating way, psychological theories 
retro-acted on observation and informed these writers’ ekphrases. The castello in aria, 
furthermore, became an emblem of the reign of fantasia. Folengo spoke of a weightless 
Domus Phantasiae; Piero di Cosimo made cities in the sky; Doni called his poems chimere 
and castelli in aria. Depicted by a number of artists, as we have shown, the hovering castle 
was not solely associated with emptiness and absurdity. It was also shown upside-down, in a 
paradoxical gesture of inversion which testified to the imagination’s power to subvert reality. 
In effect, fantasia also strongly partook of a moral and political dynamic of subversion at the 
heart of the Italian burlesque, rooted in Erasmian satire and utopianism. 
 This subversive dimension did not chime with the courtly aspirations of the most 
ambitious artists, and a reaction against the seditious culture of fantasia emerges in the 
earliest historiography coming from court-established figures such as Vasari, and later 
Ligorio. A significant effect of this reaction can be seen in the way Vasari articulated his 
influential theory of disegno between the first and second editions of the Lives. A number of 
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authors from the first wave of artistic theory had located mental disegno in the imagination: 
Paolo Pino affirmed that artistic ideas emerge in the imaginativa (1548); 694  Innocenzio 
Ringhieri credited the power of Pygmalion’s imaginatione for the beauty of his statue 
(1551);695  and Daniele Barbaro designated the imaginatione as the place where an artist 
mentally ‘paints’ his ideas (1557).696 Shortly before the publication of Vasari’s second Lives 
(1568), Benvenuto Cellini coupled imagination with disegno in his own proposal for a 
definition of this concept, penned on an unpublished sheet: ‘Disegno is of two sorts: the first 
kind is that which is made in the Immaginativa, and the second derives from the first and 
expresses it in lines.’697 The canonical definition Vasari issued a few years later clearly laid 
claim on the technical terminology of faculty psychology. Significantly, however, it 
consciously avoided the word fantasia, and merely used the verb immaginare:  
 
disegno [...] proceeding from the intellect [intelletto], derives from many things a 
universal judgement [giudizio], like a form or idea [forma overo idea] [...] and 
because from this there arises a certain notion or judgement [concetto e giudizio] 
which forms in the mind [mente] that which, when expressed with the hands, is 
called disegno, [...] disegno is nothing other than a visible expression and 
declaration of that notion [concetto] of the soul [animo], or of that which others 
have imagined in their mind or given shape to in their idea [nella mente imaginato 
e fabricato nell’idea].698 
 
In this ‘unlabored but deliberate juxtaposition of conceptual vocabularies’, as Robert 
Williams described it, Vasari favours the intelletto.699 He could not ignore the authoritative 
published lecture of Varchi, who explained that, in spite of Michelangelo’s phrasing, artistic 
ideas are formed in the fantasia, not the intelletto. Vasari’s attempt to elevate the status of the 
                                               
694 Paolo Pino, Dialogo di pittura (1548), in Barocchi 1960, I, p. 107: ‘uno pittore non può nell’arte nostra 
produrre effetto alcuno della sua imaginativa, se prima quella, così imaginata, non vien dagli altri sensi 
intrinseci [...]’. 
695 Ringhieri 1551, p. 50v: ‘Se la Statua di Pigmalione gli porgeua tanto diletto per cagione dell’eccellenza dello 
Scultore, per la politezza, & dolcezza dell’Auorio, ò pur per la potente imaginatione, ch’egli del uero hauea’. 
This question is part of a guessing game about paragone. For hypotheses on the place of Ringhieri in the 
development of art literature, see Striker 1965, pp. 165-176. 
696 Barbaro 1557, p. 14: ‘nella pittura si dimostra, lo artefice della quale ogni forma, che egli cerca di far uedere 
nelle sue tele, prima nella imaginatione fermamente si dipinge.’ 
697  Calamandrei and Cordié 1971, p. 145: ‘il Disegno è di due sorte, il primo è quello, che si fa 
nell’Immaginativa, e il secondo, tratto da quello, si dimostra con Linee’. For a commentary of this passage see 
Cole 2002b, pp. 123 ff. Ligorio associates disegno and imagination in a similar fashion when he speaks of the 
‘forma che si vuole immaginativamente per lo mezzo del disegno’. Pirro Ligorio, Libro dell’antichità, cited 
from Schreurs 2000, p. 429. 
698  Vasari, Vite, 1568, I, p. 43: ‘il disegno [...] procedendo dall’intelletto cava di molte cose un giudizio 
universale simile a una forma overo idea [...] e perché da questa cognizione nasce un certo concetto e giudizio, 
che si forma nella mente quella tal cosa che poi espressa con le mani si chiama disegno, [...] esso disegno altro 
non sia che una apparente espressione e dichiarazione del concetto che si ha nell’animo, e di quello che altri si è 
nella mente imaginato e fabricato nell’idea.’ Our translation is informed by Williams 1997, p. 34. 
699  Williams’s exact statement is: ‘The juxtaposition of these two conceptual vocabularies [Platonic and 
Aristotelian] is unlabored but deliberate: Vasari’s aim was to synthesize Plato and Aristotle [...]’. Williams, Art, 
Theory and Culture, pp. 33-34.  
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artist, then, was accompanied by a psychological promotion, raising artistic conception from 
the median imagination to the superior intellect. The critical attitude Vasari adopted toward 
the so-called fantastici further suggests that he was making a stand against the disreputable 
artists who had embraced the values of fantasia. Of the invectives the Aretine biographer 
uses against the extravagant early Mannerists, the harshest is certainly that they were less 
than human. Andrea del Castagno, Domenico Beccafumi, il Sodoma and Piero di Cosimo are 
called bestiale. Vasari underlines the squalid lifestyle of Piero, the maker of ‘castles in the 
air’, who allegedly lived surrounded by climbing plants and animals; Vasari calls him 
selvatico (wild) and ‘more bestial than human’. 
 Vasari’s cruelty brings us back to Gelli’s Circe with which we opened our thesis. In 
this dialogue, Gelli was reworking Plutarch’s famous allegorical reading of the Odyssey, 
understood as a quest for humanity and a triumph over animality. At the fulcrum of 
Odysseus’s attempt to convince the elephant of the superiority of the human condition, Gelli 
placed the question of fantasia. The imagination was the last faculty man still shared with 
animals. It was, again, an intermediary, between the human condition and its other; alone it 
represented man’s animality. Curiously this was also — alongside irrationality, irascibility 
and melancholy — one of the characteristics of fantasia which the extravagant early 
Mannerists claimed for themselves. Amico Aspertini, one of the great pioneers of the 
grotesque, made a self-portrait of himself as a goat-legged satyr; Michelangelo said he had ‘a 
chest like a harpy’; one Parmigianino’s self-portraits likens him to his pet bitch; Mantegna, in 
his grotesques, painted his face emerging from plants. When the art of Bosch was received it 
Italy, people took the artist’s surname to indicate that he came from the bosco (the woods). 
We have seen how the faun pan, emblem of duplicity, presided over Buontalenti’s ambiguous 
grotto. Since every painter must look like his figures, it is only right for the painter of 
grotesques to be monstrous.  
 Animalistic and untamed, the fantasia was often described as an uncontrollable 
faculty. It acted of its own accord, manipulating images during sleep and at times during 
wakefulness, unpredictably. Its operations were sometimes described as random, and its 
incongruous products as accidental. It was a creative principle in its own right, an 
autonomous maker within the self. An important consequence of the doctrine of the faculties 
is that it breaks up the soul’s activity into different operations, and thereby into distinct 
departments. The ancient and medieval physicians distributed these powers into ventricles, 
further compartmenting the soul organically. Ultimately, the doctrine of the faculties 
compromises the unity of the mind, and therefore the unity of the self. The mind has 
subdivisions which escape reason’s control; and this chiefly concerns the middle-man 
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fantasia. It implies that there is more than one creator in the artistic mind, more than one 
‘artist’ in the artist. Thus fantasia could be seen as a creative territory within the subject, yet 
unknown to the subject. The Sermon of Dreams portrayed the imagination as a force that 
would awaken when the body fell asleep and begin to weave its confused trelliswork of 
images (see Chapter 3). The affinities between this understanding of fantasia and the notion 
of the unconscious developed at the end of the nineteenth century is rather striking, not least 
because fantasia was also associated with cryptic dreams, mental illnesses, and with the 
reading of forms in amorphous stains; on the other hand, the Surrealists, who were most 
drawn to this idea, were keen on combinatory and aleatory mechanisms of invention. In its 
role of intermediary, then, the Cinquecento fantasia is also, possibly, an intercessor between 
the artist and a concealed part of himself. Like the ‘grillo in testa’, the insect nagging at the 










Illustrations to Chapter 1  
 
 
Fig. 1.1: Leonardo da Vinci’s word lists in the Codex Trivulzianus, Castello Sforzesco 
(Milan), fol. 51v (former pagination fol. 94). From the facsimile in Anna Maria Brizio (ed.), 
The Codex Trivulzianus of Leonardo da Vinci in the Biblioteca Trivulziana, Milan, New 




Fig. 1.2: Detail from Fig. 1 (end of the second colon from the left): inauldibile, fantassticare, 




Fig. 1.3: Leonardo da Vinci, sheet of anatomical drawings and annotations, c. 1506-8, 




Fig. 1.4: Leonardo da Vinci, detail from a sheet of anatomical sketches, c. 1485-90, Windsor: 
Royal Collection, RC 12626r.  
At the centre of this detail: section of a head seen from above. The eye balls (at the bottom) 
are connected to the first ventricle, labelled ‘imprensiva’ and ‘intelletto’. Nerves from the 
nose and ears go straight to the middle ventricle, labelled ‘senso commune’ and ‘volonta’. 
The rear ventricle is marked a ‘memoria’. 
 
   
Fig. 1.5 (left): Leonardo, drawing containing a section of the human head seen from above, c. 
1487, Windsor: Royal Collection, inv. no. 12603r (Keele-Pedretti 32r). The design was 
turned 90° anti-clockwise. Notice that the auditory nerves go from the ears into the first of 
three ventricles, seat of ‘imprensiva’. 
Fig. 1.6 (right): Leonardo, drawing containing a section of the human head seen from above, 
c. 1487, Windsor: Royal Collection, inv. no. 12627r (Keele-Pedretti 4r; Saunders & 
O’Malley no. 159). Notice that the auditory nerves, as well as the olfactory nerves, go into 










Fig. 1.7: Jacopo Mazzoni’s diagram on the polysemy of phantasia. From: Della difesa della 









Fig. 2.1: Raphael and assistants, grotesque figure from the Vatican Loggias (detail), 1517-19, 
fresco, Vatican City: Palazzi Vaticani. 
 
 
Fig. 2.2: Anonymous, grotesque figure in the Salotto (first floor) of the Palazzo Farnese at 




Fig. 2.3: Luca Signorelli and assistants, grotesque figures, detail from the ‘Oculus with 





Fig. 2.4: Luca Signorelli and assistants, ‘Oculus with Empedocles’, 1499-1502, fresco, San 












Fig. 2.6: Giuseppe Arcimboldo, L’ortolano (The Gardener), 1587-90, oil on wood, 36 × 24 




Fig. 2.7: Andrea Mantegna, detail of a column grotesque in the Camera picta, 1465-74, 




Fig. 2.8: Unknown, Plate with Grotesques (Venetian), c. 1540-60, tin-glazed earthenware, 
47.7 cm diameter, New York: The J. Paul Getty Museum, inv. no. 84.DE.116 
 
 
Fig. 2.9: ‘Io niente faccio, et il ceruel mi becco’ (I am idle, and peck at my own brain). Detail 
from Sebastiano di Re, The Cage of Fools (La gabbia de’ matti), c. 1557-63, engraving, 38.2 
× 51.9 cm, New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, no. 2002.51 
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Fig. 2.10: Anonymous, Deus de nichilo creans universa, woodcut from: Charles de Bovelles, 
Liber de Nichilo, Paris: Henri Estienne, 1510. 
 
 
Fig. 2.11: Giulio Bonasone (?), ‘Entelecheia Psuche’, from Achille Bocchi, Symbolicarum 
quaestionum de universo genere, quas serio ludebat, Bologna: in aedib. novae Academiae 





Fig. 2.12: Dosso Dossi, Jupiter, Mercury, and Virtue, c. 1523-24, oil on canvas, 112 x 150 










Fig. 3.1: Giorgio Vasari, Allegory of a Dream, 1542, pen and brown ink, heightened with 






Fig. 3.2: Michelangelo, The Dream, c. 1533, black chalk on laid paper, 398 x 280 cm, 




Fig. 3.3: Albrecht Dürer, Venus Tempting a Sleeper (‘The Dream of the Doctor’), c. 1498, 










Fig. 3.5: Title and engraved illustration in Dialogi di Luciano philosopho, nelliquali sotto 
piaceuoli ragionamenti si tratta la vita morale, Venice, 1527, p. 28r 
 
 
Fig. 3.6-1: Detail from Sebastiano di Re, The Cage of Fools (La gabbia de’ matti), c. 1557-




Fig. 3.6-2: Sebastiano di Re, The Cage of Fools (La gabbia de’ matti), c. 1557-63, engraving, 





Fig. 3.7: Anonymous (Francesco Salviati?), Scene from The World Upside Down (probably 
‘Roots grow in the sky, and castles are built on clouds’), 16th c., 8.7 × 6.3 cm, pen and ink on 
paper, private collection (sold by Studio Lapeyre, Milan, December 1992) (scan from: L. 
Carissimi and C. Lapeyre, Francesco Salviati (Firenze, 1510-Roma, 1563). Il mondo alla 
rovescia, Milan, 1992, no. 16) 
 
 
Fig. 3.8: Karel van Mander, Allegory of Night, c. 1601, pen and brown ink, blue wash, 





Fig. 3.9-1: Anonymous, Abbildung der wunderbarlichen Werckstatt des Weltstreichenden 
Artzts Simplicissimi, c. 1671, engraving, 19.9 × 27.7 cm, Kupferstichkabinett der Staatlichen 
Museen zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, inv. no. AM 600-1980 
 
 




Fig. 3.10: Unknown Tuscan manufacture, Jug, c. 1490-1520, tin-glazed earthenware 




Fig. 3.11: Two jugs bearing reversible double-heads of the pope and the devil, c. 1550, 
probably made in Siegburg, earthenware, Bonn: LVR-Landesmuseum, inv. 74.4291 (scanned 
from: Frédéric Elsig (ed.), Enfer ou paradis: aux sources de la caricature, XVIe - XVIIIe 
siècles, Gollio: Infolio, 2013, no. 33)  
 
 
Fig. 3.12: Detail from the Maestro di Tolentino, Marriage Feast at Cana, c. 1340-50, fresco, 




Fig. 3.13: Engraving from François Desprez (attrib.), Les Songes drolatiques de Pantagruel, 




Fig. 3.14: Hieronymus Bosch, Infernal Landscape, pen and brown ink on paper, 25.9 x 19.7 




Fig. 3.15: Franciszek Smuglewicz, Vincenzo Brenna, Marco Carloni (engraver), South 
lunette of the Volta Gialla (Room 31), Domus Aurea, from Vestigia delle terme di Tito e loro 




Fig. 3.16: Francesco Salviati, Grotesque composition with portrait of Quirinus Galler, 
completed 1550, fesco, Markgrafen Chapel (left wall), Santa Maria dell’Anima, Rome 
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Fig. 3.17: Luzio Luzi and collaborators, Grotesque wall decoration, 1545, fresco, La 




Fig. 3.18: Tommaso Barlacchi and Enea Vico (engravers), Grotesque composition (from the 
series Leviores et (ut videtur) extemporanae picturae), c. 1541, engraving, 17.1 × 9.7 cm, 




Fig. 3.19: Unknown (Cristofano Gherardi? Cornelis Loots?), Landscape with a castle, 1545-
6, fresco, Pompeian Corridor, Castel Sant’Angelo, Rome 
(scanned from F. M. Aliberti Gaudioso and E. Gaudioso, Gli affreschi di Paolo III a Castel 




Fig. 3.20: Agostino Veneziano, grotesque panel with Diana of Ephesus, c. 1520, engraving 
(scanned from: François Quiviger, The Sensory World of the Italian Renaissance, London: 
Reaktion Books, 2010, Fig. 41). 
 
 





Fig. 3.22: Francesco Primaticcio, The Nile, 1540s, black chalk, pen and brown ink, brown 
wash, heightened with white gouache on beige paper, 18.7 × 27 cm, Paris, École nationale 
supérieure des Beaux-Arts, inv. E.B.A. 297 
 
    








Fig. 3.24: Pieter van der Heyden after Pieter Bruegel the Elder, Big Fish Eat Little Fish, 
1557, engraving, 22.9 x 29.6 cm, New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, inv. 17.3.859 
 
 
Fig. 3.25: Unknown, after Giambattista de Cavalieri (c. 1525–1601), Il Mondo Alla Riversa 
(The World Upside Down), late 16th c., 38.5 x 48.6 cm, engraving, Boston: Museum of Fine 
Arts, inv. 2002.587 
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Fig. 3.26: The Fig. 26 of Jurgis Baltrusaitis, Le Moyen-Âge fantastique, Paris: Colin, 1955 
 
 
Fig. 3.27: Cameo engraved with a Hippalektryon, red-orange carnelian, 11.4x9.5x3.6 mm, 










Fig. 3.29: Ancient cameo reproduced by Jurgis Baltrušaitis in Le Moyen Âge fantastique. 









Fig. 3.31: Battista Dossi, Night (also called The Dream), 1544, oil on canvas, 82 x 149.5 cm, 














Fig. 4.1: Titian, Francesco Maria della Rovere, Duke of Urbino, 1536-8, oil on canvas, 114 x 






Fig. 4.2: Section of a pietra paesina. 
 
 
Fig. 4.3: Pictorial recreation of Bologna in the 13th. c., double page from Angelo Finelli, 
Bologna ai tempi che vi soggiornò Dante, secolo XIII, Bologna: Stabilimenti Poligrafiche 
Riuniti, 1929. Source: Delcampe auctions, www.delcampe.net 
 
 
Fig. 4.4: Engraving from Athanasius Kircher, Mundus subterraneus, Amsterdam: Janssonio-




Fig. 4.5: Detail of the section of a pietra paesina, private collection, location unknown. 
 
 
Fig. 4.6: Florentine school, Episode from the Orlando innamorato, c. 1630, Florence: Museo 






Fig. 4.7: Diptych of pietra paesina stones (‘book-matched’ from the same stone) in 17th-
century wooden gilded frames, each panel 43 x 41 cm, Florence: Museo dell’Opificio delle 




Fig. 4.8: Pietra paesina panel in an 18th-century ripple-moulded ebonised frame, 24 x 42.2 




Fig. 4.9: Chest with inlaid pietre paesine, manufactured in Florence, early 17th century, 
69x93.5 x 44 cm, private collection   
 
 
Fig. 4.10: Hellenistic or Roman cameo mistaken for a figured stone by Albertus Magnus 





Fig. 4.11: Grotta Grande of the Giardino de’ Boboli, Florence. One of Michelangelo’s four 









Fig. 4.13: Mammoth profile painted using bulges of stalagmitic formations. Salle Brunel, 
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